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Abstract of thesis 
The prospect of a justification defence in cases of direct sex discrimination is universally 
criticised by academic commentators on the ground that it would subvert the goal of 
equality that underlies sex discrimination and equal treatment legislation. At the outset 
the thesis examines the differences between the sexes, how these differences can be used 
to explain the distinction between direct and indirect sex discrimination and considers 
various concepts of equality. Building on various elements of the existing justification 
defences for indirect sex discrimination and disability discrimination, this thesis 
constructs a model justification defence. The impact on equality of such a defence is 
assessed by reference to the main existing legislative exceptions for direct sex 
discrimination and various judicial exceptions that have been created, in the main, by the 
European Court of Justice. Further, the thesis considers whether the blanket prohibition 
against the use of sex stereotypes is warranted and the extent to which they might be 
permitted under the model defence. The conclusions reached are that criticism of the 
potential defence is overstated. Rather than undermining the goal of sex equality, such a 
defence could in fact enhance the degree of legal protection as long as the criteria of the 
defence are stringently drawn. Indeed, in relation to some areas of direct sex 
discrimination, for example pregnancy and maternity, the introduction of such a defence 
could enhance the degree of equality. Moreover, the introduction of such a defence 
could introduce a greater degree of openness and clarity into this complex area of law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
BACKGROUND 
All domestic and European sex discrimination legislation recogruses two forms of 
discrimination, namely direct and indirect discrimination. Broadly speaking, direct 
discrimination involves detrimental treatment on the grounds of sex. Indirect 
~ .. ' 
discrimination arises where an employer arranges the working envil'Onment In such a 
way that it has a detrimental and disproportionate impact on one sex and the employer is 
unable to justify the practice. Thus, indirect sex discrimination is subj ect to what is often 
referred to as the justification defence. One of the issues that has engaged sex 
discrimination lawyers over recent years is the prospect of a justification defence for 
cases of direct sex discrimination. The main forum for debate has been European law 
where the tendency to draft legislation in terms of general principles allows for a 
considerable degree of judicial inventiveness although the issue has also arisen in 
domestic law in the context of the EPA. 
The first case to raise the possibility of a justification defence for direct sex 
discrimination was Birds Eye Walls Ltd v Roberts. 1 The case involved a bridging 
pension paid to employees forced to retire early by reason of ill health. Until the age of 
60 there was no material difference between the treatment of women and men. From the 
age of 60 the occupational pension payable to a woman was reduced by the amount of 
the state pension. A similar reduction was applied to men from the age of 65 when they 
too became entitled to a state pension. Thus, the overall amount paid to women and men 
(occupational and state pension combined) was the same but, in terms of the 
occupational scheme alone, between the ages of 60 and 64 women received less than 
men. On behalf of the applicant it was argued that the treatment constituted direct 
discrimination on the ground of sex and, therefore, no justification was possible. 
According to the report of the proceedings the European Commission argued in favour of 
a justification defence. 
The Commission of the European Communities accepted that the present case 
was one of direct discrimination, but argued that this did not imply that it could 
1 [1994] IRLR 29, Eel 
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not in any way be justified. It is inherent in the concept of discrimination that a 
distinction is unlawful only if it is unjustified. Thus, it is lawLll to treat different 
situations differently, so long as the difference on which one focuses is directly 
relevant to the ensuing difference in treatment. That must logically be true just as 
much for direct differentiations between the sexes as for indirect distinctions. 
In the present case the Commission was of the opinion that there was 
justification. It pointed to the fact that Birds Eye Walls was attempting to 
achieve substantive equality between the sexes by compensating for an inequality 
(difference in pensionable ages) in a particular set of circumstances where the 
inequality would otherwise cause considerable hardship, that is to say, in the 
situation of a male employee obliged to retire early because of the stat~._ of his 
health and (unlike his female counterpart) not qualifying for a state pension until 
he reaches the age of 65. 
Thus, the Commission argued in favour of a justification defence for cases of direct sex 
discrimination as long as the difference in treatment is directly relevant to a difference 
between the sexes. In this particular case, the Commission thought that the difference in 
treatment could be defended on the basis of the difference in state pensionable age and 
the aim of the respondent to achieve substantive equality. 
Advocate General Van Gerven also came down In favour of a justification 
defence. He argued that it would be undesirable to rule out completely the possibility of 
a justification case for direct discrimination on the basis that there might be exceptional 
cases where the need might arise. He referred in particular to the facts of the Webb case 
(see below) that was pending before the Court and the possibility that the treatment in the 
case might be justified.2 
The EC] managed to side-step the issue of justification completely by finding that 
between the ages of 60 and 64 women and men are not in a comparablf: position and, as a 
result, there was no discrimination either direct or indirect. Save for repeating the 
submissions of the Commission and the various other interested parties, the EC] made no 
comment whatsoever on the issue of a justification defence. 
2 His other argument in favour of such a defence was based on the premise that the treatment in the case 
could be analysed as either direct or indirect discrimination and, therefore, it would be quite arbitrary to 
make the question of justification depend on the way in which the discrimination was classified. The idea 
that the discrimination could be categorised as indirect came from the Commission which suggested that 
the problem could be analysed from the perspective that the respondent treated all its members in the same 
way ie by deducting from their occupational scheme their entitlement to a state pension. However, this 
loses sight of the fact that the payment of the state scheme is itself directly discriminatory and, therefore, 
on the application of the but for test proposed by the HL in James v Eastleigh Borough Council [1990] 
IRLR 288, the occupational scheme can only be categorised as direct discrimination. 
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The issue came up again in the case of Neath v Hugh Steeper Ltd.3 This was 
another pensions case, this time concerning the use of single sex actuarial factors and 
their effect on capital sums such as transfer payments. The applicant complained that 
the use of single sex actuarial factors meant that he received a smaller transfer payment 
than a woman with the same service and contributions record. The Commission argued 
that differences in treatment arising from the use of single sex actuarial factors were 
unjustified and, therefore, constituted unlawful direct discrimination. Advocate General 
Van Gerven adopted the same position as before that direct sex discrimination~ can be 
justified "if the difference in treatment is based on objective differences which are 
relevant, that is to say which bear an actual connection with the subj ect of the rules 
entailing unequal treatment". However, in this particular case he argued that the 
difference in treatment was not justified because average life expectancy was not a 
sufficient basis for a difference in treatment of individual members. Once again the ECJ 
side-stepped the justification issue, this time by finding that capital sums such as transfer 
payments do not constitute pay under Article 141. Thus, the question of whether the 
treatment could be justified was not addressed by the Court. 
The third occasion the issue came before the ECJ was in the case of Webb v EMO 
Air Cargo (UK) Ltd.4 The applicant was recruited to cover for another woman on 
maternity leave although it was anticipated that she would remain with the employer on a 
permanent basis. The applicant was dismissed three weeks later when it became known 
that she also was pregnant. She claimed that her dismissal was direct discrimination 
contrary to the ETD. The Commission argued that not every decision to refuse to engage 
a pregnant woman should amount to direct discrimination because it could lead to 
manifestly absurd results. Alternatively, employers should be able to justify the 
discrimination in certain circumstances for example, where the applicant's pregnancy 
means that she is going to be unavailab Ie for the period during which she is required. In 
this situation the employer should be able to modify the contract so that it would not 
constitute a financial or organisational constraint on the ability of the employer to recruit 
other staff during that period. Advocate General Tesauro took the position that the 
additional financial and organisational burdens on the employer could not justify the 
3 [1994] IRLR 91, ECl 
4 [1994] IRLR 482, ECl. See also the case of Dekker v Stichting [1991] IRLR 27, Eel 
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applicant's dismissal given that she was engaged on an indefinite contract. He saw no 
need to consider the hypothetical situation of a woman engaged for a fixed term who 
would be absent for the whole of the term. 
The EC} followed the lead of the Advocate General and held that the dismissal by 
reason of pregnancy of a woman recruited for an indefinite period cannot be justified. 
Furthermore, contrary to the submissions of the United Kingdom, dismissal of a 
pregnant woman cannot be justified on grounds relating to her inability to fulfil a 
fundamental condition of her employment contract. The availability of an 
employee is necessarily, for the employer, a precondition for the,i'proper 
performance of the contract. However, the protection afforded by Community 
law to a woman during pregnancy and after childbirth cannot be dependent on 
whether her presence at work during maternity is essential to the proper 
functioning of the undertaking in which she is employed. Any contrary 
interpretation would render ineffective the provisions of the Directive. 
In other words, the EC} held that financial considerations could not justify the 
employer's treatInent of the applicant. However, in its ruling the Court was careful to 
refer to the fact that the applicant was recruited for an unlimited period thereby leaving 
open the possibility that a woman recruited for a specified period would not be similarly 
protected. 
Finally, the EC} rejected the possibility of a justification defence in the recent 
Pedersen5 case. The issue in this case was whether it was direct discrimination to 
exclude pregnant women suffering from a pregnancy related illness from entitlement to 
sick pay. Under Danish employment law employees absent from wor~~ due to illness are 
entitled to full pay and the employer is then reimbursed by the state. By contrast, 
pregnant women absent from work for a pregnancy related illness more than three 
months before the expected date of confinement were not entitled to any pay from the 
employer but had a right to pre-maternity benefits paid by the state. The EC} held that 
the treatment was direct discrimination contrary to Article 141 and in doing so it 
expressly rejected the argument of the Danish Government that a ceiling on maternity 
allowances could be justified. 
The discrimination found in paragraph 35 above cannot be justified by the aim of 
sharing the risks and economic costs connected with pregnancy between the 
pregnant worker, the employer and society as a whole. That goal cannot be 
regarded as an objective factor unrelated to any discrimina~ion based on sex 
5 [1999] IRLR 55, EeJ. 
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within the meaning of the case law of the Court (see Lewark, cited above, 
paragraph 31). 
The reference to the Lewark6 case is somewhat surprising as Lewark was a case of 
indirect discrimination concerning the right of part-time workers to r,e compensated for 
time spent on training courses in excess of their normal working hours. However, the 
point the ECJ seems to be making is that the justification defence for cases of indirect 
discrimination cannot be extended to cases of direct discrimination. 
The precise and detailed wording of the domestic legislation appears at fitst sight 
to preclude the introduction of a justification defence for direct discrimination without 
parliamentary involvement. However, the HL has recently indicated that it may be 
possible to justify direct discrimination under the EPA. The issue arose in Strathclyde 
Regional Council v Wallace,7 an equal pay case brought by a number of women teachers. 
It was an agreed fact that the difference in pay between the women teachers and their 
comparators was nothing to do with sex. Even so, the tribunal held that the reasons put 
forward by the Council did not justify the difference in pay and, therefore, its defence 
under s 1(3) of the EPA failed. The decision was upheld by the EAT but overturned by 
the CS. On further appeal the HL agreed with the decision of the CS and held that there 
is only an obligation to justify a difference in pay if the reason relied upon by the 
employer is discriminatory. However, the HL went on to indicate that an employer could 
justify a difference in pay even if the reason is directly or indirectly discriminatory. 
Giving the only substantive judgment (with which the rest of their Lordships agreed) 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson made the following obiter comment. 
The correct position under s 1(3) of the Equal Pay Act 1970 is that even where 
the variation is genuinely due to a factor which involves the difference of sex, the 
employer can still establish a valid defence under subsection 0) if he can justify 
such differentiation on the grounds of sex, whether the differentiation is direct or 
indirect. I am not aware as yet of any case in which the European Court of 
Justice has held that a directly discriminatory practice can be justified in the Bilka 
case. However, such a position cannot be ruled out since, in the United States, 
experience has shown that the hard and fast demarcation between direct and 
indirect discrimination is difficult to maintain. 
6 [1996] IRLR 637, Eel 
7 [1998] IRLR 146, HL. 
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Thus, the senior Law Lord appears to be of the view that there is scope for a justification 
defence in cases of direct discrimination although he has not indicated the circumstances 
in which it might apply. 
REACTION 
In the cases that have come before the ECJ so far, the Court has either avoided the issue 
of justification (Roberts and Neath) or held that the treatment in question was not 
justified (Webb and Pedersen). The HL has indicated that it is possible to justify direct 
discrimination under the EPA but this was only said obiter. Despite the fact that there 
has been no successful use of the defence in a direct discrimination case, the possibility 
of the defence existing has aroused universal criticism from academic commentators. 
Perhaps the most direct attack has come from Hepple in an article in the Equal 
Opportunities Review. 
A dangerous heresy is threatening to subvert the developing principle of equality 
in Community law. This is the argument advanced by the European Commission 
and Advocate-General to the European Court of Justice that direct discrimination 
can be justified. 8 
And later on in the same article he explains the dangers of such a defence. 
In my view, the introduction of a general defence of objecL.ve justification of 
direct discrimination would seriously undennine the conceptual framework which 
is necessary to prevent gender-stereotyping of women and men. It is essential to 
maintain the distinction between direct and indirect discrimination. 
Barnard argues that the introduction of a justification defence for direct discrimination 
would involve a dangerous blurring of the dividing line between direct and indirect 
discrimination. 
Direct discrimination in the context of sex or race is morally abhorrent. .. 
Consequently, this principle should not be weakened by reference to a broader 
category of objective justification. This distinction has served the public interest 
well. Its abolition would mix the concepts of direct and indirect discrimination 
into an unstable cocktail. The resulting brew might prove better than the two 
separated, but the unknown risks are as yet too dangerous to allow such an 
experiment with fundamental rights to be undertaken.9 
8 Hepple B, 'Can direct discrimination be justified?', EOR No 55, May/June 1994, p 48. 
9 Barnard C 'Gender and commercial discrimination' in Dine J and Watt Beds, Discrimination law: , 
concepts, limitations and justifications, chp 6 (1996). 
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Ellis has described the prospect of a justification defence for direct discrimination as "a 
significant cloud on the horizon"!O and Matthews has suggest that tLis is an issue "on 
which we need to put some 'clear blue water' between ourselves and Brussels".!! 
To date there has been no attempt to analyse the impact of such a defence on the 
whole range of employment situations rather than in the context of individual cases.!2 
This may be due in part to the fact that it is unclear what the boundaries of any such 
defence would be. Would it be mainly a financial defence or would it also apply in cases 
of positive action or reverse discrimination? The Commission appears to be in fa.'i0ur of 
a defence that covers both of these things. In the Roberts case the Commission argued in 
favour of a justification defence that extends to positive action when it said that 
employers should be able to justify discrimination that aims at substantive equality 
between the sexes. In Webb the Commission argued that employers should be able to 
justify their behaviour on financial grounds. 
THESIS 
The purpose of this thesis is to devise a model for a justification defence in cases of 
direct sex discrimination and to assess the likely impact of such a defence on sex equality 
and on the clarity of the law. It is not the purpose of this thesis to argue in favour of 
greater (or lesser) equality; the normative question of how much sex equality is socially 
desirable falls outside the scope of this thesis as it is essentially a matter for political 
debate, not legal inquiry. The thesis reaches the conclusion that far from necessarily 
favouring the interests of employers, such a justification defence is unlikely to diminish 
the existing level of sex equality provided for by current law. This is mainly because if 
the defence is constructed using sufficiently stringent criteria, there are unlikely to be 
many situations in which it could be successfully relied upon. Additionally, there is 
likely to be a considerable overlap with existing legislative and judge made exceptions. 
10 Ellis E, 'The principle of equality of opportunity irrespective of sex: some reflections on the present 
state of European Community law and its future development' in Dashwood A and 0' Leary S eds, The 
principle o/equal treatment in EC law, chp 9, (1997) P 174. 
11 Matthews P, 'Legal concepts of justifying discrimination', in Dine J and Watt Beds, Discrimination 
law: concepts, limitations and justifications, chp 3 (1996). 
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The one area where the defence may have a substantial impact on equality is pregnancy 
and maternity and here it is possible that the defence may actually result in women being 
better off than they are at present. In legal terms, however, one significant benefit that 
could accrue from the introduction of the defence is greater clarity in the law: the current 
law is marred by complexity, inconsistency and a lack of transparency as a result of the 
ECl's efforts to avoid finding unlawful sex discrimination in some cases. A statutory 
recognition that direct sex discrimination can be justified in some circumstances would 
force the courts to be open about the fact that applicants' rights to equality hav~ been 
- ~ i· 
trumped by the financial interests of employers. However, the advantage of this potential 
openness needs to be set against the possibility of an increase in the costs of litigation 
that may arise from the addition of a new defence. 
The thesis starts by examining the numerous physical and biological 
characteristics that differ as between the sexes. These characteristics are divided into 
three discrete groups namely categorical sex differences, unique sex differences and 
distribution sex differences. This framework of sex differences provides a basis for 
analysing the relationship between direct and indirect discrimination in later chapters. 
Chapter 1 then moves on to consider the underlying purpose of sex discrimination 
legislation, namely equality of the sexes. Both traditional and feminist concepts of 
equality are considered and the framework of sex differences is used to analyse which of 
the many concepts of equality underlies sex discrimination legislation. 
Chapters 2 and 3 examine the various elements of a claim of direct sex 
discrimination so that it can be understood exactly what it is that might be rendered 
lawful by a justification defence. Reverting back to the framework of sex differences set 
out at the beginning of the thesis, chapter 2 analyses which sex differences are covered 
by a claim of direct discrimination and which are left to the province of indirect 
discrimination. Chapter 3 deals with sex stereotypes, examining the commonly held 
fallacy that all stereotypes involve a wrong or irrational thought process and asks 
whether there are any situations in which sex stereotypes should be permitted. 
12 The area that has received the most attention is the employment of pregnant women on fixed term 
contracts following the Webb case. See for example, Szyszczak E, 'Pregnancy Discrimination' (1996) 59 
MLR 589. 
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There are currently a number of legislative exceptions to the principle that direct 
sex discrimination is unlawful. The four main exceptions are examined in chapter 4 in 
order to discover their scope and underlying purpose or rationale. Chapter 5 looks at the 
justification defence available for claims of indirect sex discrimination. Each of the 
elements of the defence is examined in detail to see how it actually works in practice and 
whether it might have any application in the context of direct discrimination. A similar 
exercise is undertaken in chapter 6 in relation to disability discrimination. The various 
elements of the disability justification defence are examined to see if any of its el~ments 
could be used as part of a justification defence for direct sex discrimination. In addition, 
both forms of disability discrimination are analysed in order to see wh~ther there is such 
a thing as direct disability discrimination and if so, why there is an apparent dichotomy 
of treatment between direct disability discrimination and direct sex discrimination given 
that the former can already be justified while the latter cannot. 
Chapter 7 constructs a model justification defence for direct sex discrimination 
that is largely based on the most effective elements of the justification defences for 
indirect sex discrimination and disability discrimination. The model is then applied to 
three real cases of direct discrimination in order to illustrate how the defence would 
operate in practice. The chapter ends by considering the overlap between the model 
defence and the four main legislative exceptions. 
Chapter 8 looks at some of the pressure points that have arisen in the case law on 
direct sex discrimination. It is argued that in the absence of an applicable legislative 
exception the courts have been forced to use distorted and illogical reasoning in order to 
avoid a finding of discrimination. In each case the model justification defence of the 
previous chapter is applied to see whether the presence of such a defence would have 
made any difference. In chapter 9 the overall impact of the model defence is examined 
together with other issues such as legal clarity. 
TERMINOLOGY 
Finally, a note on the use of the words justify and justification. In ordinary speech to 
justify something is to show that it is right or just or reasonable and a justification is the 
13 
reason or explanation for an act. Thus, it is common to justify one's actions.13 However, 
justification is also a term of art when used in the context of indirect sex discrimination. 
Under s l(1)(b) of the SDA a practice that has a disproportionate and detrimental impact 
on one sex is unlawful unless it is one that the employer "cannot sho".v to be justifiable 
irrespective of the sex of the person to whom it is applied". In European law the practice 
must be "appropriate and necessary" and "justified by objective factors unrelated to 
sex" .14 When it is suggested that there should be a justification defence for direct 
discrimination the word justification is not being used as a term of art. It is not the idea 
, 
that the justification defence for indirect discrimination should simply be extended to 
cases of direct discrimination. This is in any event impossible because the justification 
defence for indirect discrimination requires the employer to justify the practice for a 
reason other than sex. In cases of direct discrimination the reason for the treatment may 
be related to sex.1S For example, an employer may wish to hire waitresses instead of 
waiters on the basis that waitresses attract more customers. This is a reason that relates 
to sex. However, this does not mean that it is not possible to have a separate and 
different justification defence for cases of direct sex discrimination. There could be a 
justification defence for indirect discrimination and a separate and different justification 
defence for direct discrimination. Clearly, it is potentially rather confusing to have the 
same name for two different defences. However, every effort will be made to avoid the 
problem by making it clear at all times which of the two defences is being referred to. 
13 On the linguistic uses of the concept of justification see: Bamforth N, 'Setting the limits of anti-
discrimination law: some legal and social concepts' in Dine J and Watt Beds, Discrimination law: 
concepts, limitations and justifications, chp 5 (1996) P 49. . .... 
14 See article 2(2) of Ee Directive 37/97 on the burden of proof ill sex dlscnmmahon cases. 
15 Szyszczak E, 'The status to be accorded to motherhood: case C-32/93' (1995) 58 MLR 860 at 864. 
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1 
EQUALITY AND SEX DIFFERENCES 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter starts by analysing the various differences that exist between the sexes and 
their impact on an individua1' s ability to work. The second part of the chapterJooks at 
traditional and feminist models of equality and examines which of these models is the 
type of equality that sex discrimination legislation aims to achieve. The chapter 
concludes by looking at the potential impact of a justification defence for direct sex 
discrimination on the goal of equality underlying the legislation. 
SEX DIFFERENCES 
In most cases the sex of a person is obvious even to a casual observer. There are 
numerous clues such as body size and shape, hair and dress that can be used to identify a 
person's sex. On a more detailed examination there are other biological factors that can 
be taken into account such as the chromosomal composition of the body cells and the 
form of the reproductive and sexual organs. These clues to sex identity can be termed 
sex differences as they all represent characteristics that differ as between the sexes 
although they are not necessarily characteristics which are unique to on~ sex. 1 They can 
be distinguished from non-sex differences or characteristics that can be used to 
distinguish between two individuals but which are neutral as an indication of sex. 
Examples of non-sex differences are eye colour, post code and number of off-spring. If 
a person has blue eyes, lives in W12 and has three children these factors are in no way 
indicative of the sex of the individual. 
Sex differences can be divided into three kinds namely, categorical sex 
differences, unique sex differences and distribution sex differences. A categorical sex 
difference relates to a characteristic that applies to all the members of just one sex. For 
IOn sex differences generally see: Archer J and Lloyd B, Sex and gender, (1985); Baker M ed, Sex 
differences in human peliormance, (1987); Halpern D, Sex differences in cognitive abilities, (1992); 
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example, all men but no women have a prostate gland. A unique sex difference relates to 
a characteristic that applies to some members of just one sex. For example, at anyone 
time some, but not all, women are pregnant. Finally, a distribution sex difference relates 
to a characteristic that applies to both sexes but to a differing extent or frequency. 
Examples of distribution characteristics include size, body strength and occupation. 
Categorical sex differences 
Categorical sex differences relate to characteristics that are shared by all the members of 
one sex but none of the members of the other sex. If all women have characteristic A 
and no men have A then A represents a categorical difference between the sexes. There 
are relatively few categorical sex differences. The main three are chromosomal 
composition (men have 46 chromosomes in each body cell including one X and one Y 
chromosome while women have 46 chromosomes including two X chromosomes) the 
sexual organs (eg the penis and the vagina) and the gonads (ie the testes and the ovaries). 
The tenns 'all men' and 'all women' are only intended to cover normal cases. There are 
rare instances where women have some male categorical sex characteristics and visa 
versa. For example, there is a phenomena of so-called sex reversal in males and females. 
The phenomena of XX males occurs in about 1 in 20,000 new born males. Similarly, 
there are XY females who do not have fully formed ovaries, show no sign of breast 
development and have scanty pubic and auxiliary hair. Furthermore, some people are 
true hennaphrodites in that they have both testicular and ovarian tissues and either XX or 
XY chromosomes.2 The fact that there are a small proportion of cases where women 
have some male characteristics and visa versa does not prevent these characteristics from 
being categorical sex differences as they do not represent normal instances of the 
characteristics appearing. 
In general, categorical sex differences have little if any impact on an individual's 
ability to work. The fact that men have an X and a Y chromosome while women have 
two X chromosomes is not normally a pertinent factor in the work context. However, 
there are a few situations where categorical sex characteristics are relevant. Obvious 
Nicholson J, Men and women: How different are they?, (1984); Margulis L and Sagan D, Origins a/sex: 
Three billion years of genetic recombination, (1986). 
2 Archer J and Lloyd B, above, p 81. 
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examples are sperm donors and surrogate mothers as both of these jobs require the 
presence of particular categorical differences. 
Unique sex differences 
A unique sex difference relates to a characteristic that applies to some but not all the 
members of just one sex.3 As with categorical sex differences, unique sex differences are 
relatively few in number. Furthermore, women have more unique characteristics than 
men. Three of the main female unique sex characteristics are pregnancy, childbirth and 
breast feeding. An example of a male unique sex characteristic is growing a beard. 
Categorical sex differences can give rise to unique sex differences if ill health occurs. 
For example, having ovaries is a categorical sex difference. However, if a woman 
develops cancer of the ovaries, the illness (a condition that affects only some women) is a 
unique sex difference. 4 
Some unique sex characteristics have an impact on an individual's ability to work 
and others do not. In most cases it is irrelevant whether a man has a beard although there 
are some situations in which it poses a problem eg a beard can be a health risk in some 
aspects of food production.s Similarly, menstruation is largely irrelevant except where 
the period pain is so severe that it results in the woman's absence from work.6 By 
contrast, pregnancy and maternity always have some impact on an indivridual's ability to 
work if only to the extent that the woman has a short period of time off work in order to 
give birth. 
Distribution sex differences 
A distribution sex difference exists where a characteristic applies to both sexes but to 
varying extents. One source of distribution sex differences is the absence of a unique sex 
3 This classification is also used by MacKinnon C in, Sexual harassment o/working women, (1979) p 114. 
4 This does not mean that it will always be treatment on the ground of a unique sex difference to dismiss a 
woman with ovarian cancer. Although ovarian cancer is a unique sex difference, ill-health generally is not 
unique to women and therefore a sickness policy that does not differentiate between types of illness will 
not involve treatment on the ground of a unique characteristic. This point is dealt with in more detail in 
chapter 2. 
5 See for example Panesar v Nestle Co Ltd [1980] IRLR 64, CA. This case is discussed in more detail in 
chapter 2. 
6 See for example Boyle v Falkirk District Counci EOR Discrimination Case Law Digest, No 11, Spring 
1992, P 5, where the applicant was given a [mal written warning in respect of absences which were due to 
dysmenorrhoea (period pain). 
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characteristic. For example, the class of people who are not pregnant will contain some 
women and all men. Similarly, the class of people who do not have cancer of the 
prostate gland will include all women but only a proportion of men. This is an important 
point because it means that special treatment on the ground of a unique sex characteristic 
results in disadvantage to both sexes. If all pregnant women are given a bonus of £50 
both women and men suffer a detriment on the ground that they are not pregnant. As a 
result, special treatment on the ground of a unique sex characteristic can result in a claim 
of indirect sex discrimination which, if it is not covered by an express exceptron in the 
legislation, would need to be justified by the employer. 
The range of distribution sex differences is enormous. The difference in average 
size between women and men means that for almost every body dimension there is a sex 
difference.7 Height, weight, strength, reach and flexibility are all examples of 
distribution sex differences. Sensory functioning is another area where there is a large 
number of sex differences. Studies in the areas of audition, vision, taste, smell and 
sensitivity to touch have all found examples of sex differences although in some cases, 
for example in relation to smell, the differences have been relatively small. 8 In the field 
of cognition and intelligence, the specialised skills that show the greatest sex differences 
are verbal, mathematical and visual-spatial ability.9 In addition, there are the huge 
number of social differences between the sexes such as the allocation of child care 
responsibilities, work patterns, dress styles etc .. However, it should be noted that in 
relation to many distribution characteristics the intra sex differences are greater than the 
inter sex differences. lO 
In some cases the distribution characteristic is one that either ~xists or does not 
exist. For example, a person either has or does not have a driving licence. Other 
characteristics can apply to a greater or lesser degree. This can be true of characteristics 
that initially appear to be dichotomous. For example, handedness is a continuum and a 
person can be more or less right handed or left handed. 11 Where a characteristic is 
capable of continuous measurement the variation between the sexes can be presented in 
7 Baker M, above, chp 7. 
8 Baker M, above, chp 2. 
9 Halpern D, above, p 64 and Baker M, above, p 41. 
10 Equality for women, Cmnd 5724, (1974), para 16. 
11 Halpern, p 41. 
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the form of distribution curves. Set out below are four fictitious graphs that could result 
from a test of hearing thresholds of a particular frequency for two sample groups, one of 
men and one of women. The horizontal axis represents volume and the vertical axis 
represents the percentage of women and men who can hear the noise at a range of 
volumes. 
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Figure A shows the situation where there is no difference in distribution for the 
scores of women and men. This means that for the frequency being tested, identically the 
same percentage of women and men will hear the noise at any given volume. Figures B, C 
and D are all examples where the means differ (in these cases, on average, the females 
excel). In Figure B there is substantial overlap between the sexes, less so in Figure C and no 
overlap in Figure D In the case of Figure D, the distribution indicates that the woman with 
the worst sense of hearing can hear better the man with the best sense of hearing. 
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Figure A represents a situation in which there is no sex difference and therefore the 
application of a hearing criterion as for example, a condition of employment, would not have 
an disproportionate impact on the sexes. At the other end of the spectrum, figure D 
represents such a large sex difference that its impact would be the same as the application of 
a categorical sex difference. The cut-off point between the sexes is around 75 points of 
volume. If an employer were to apply a selection criterion of a hearing ability of 75 points 
at this frequency the effect would be to exclude all men from the job. Of course, figure D is 
entirely fictitious and it may be that there are very few, if any, real examples where there is 
no overlap at all between the sexes in relation to a particular characteristic. However, this 
phenomena could arise between distinct groups of women and men, even if the groups are 
relatively large. For example, on average women have only 44 percent of the upper body 
strength of men. 12 In a group of 50 women and 50 men, the situation may arise where all of 
the men are able to lift a box that none of the women can lift. In this case, the ability to lift 
this box would have the same impact as a categorical sex difference if used as a selection 
criterion. 
In figure B there is only a very small difference between the sexes. In order to be 
significant in statistical terms the difference has to be large enough to exclude the possibility 
that the result is caused by random error. Psychologists have a convention whereby the 
potential for random errors is assumed to be 5%. Although, depending on the nature of the 
research, significance levels may be set at 1 % or even less.13 It seems that there is no direct 
correlation between significance and disproportionate impact in cfses of indirect sex 
discrimination. Under s l(l)(b)(i) of the SDA the size of the difference must be such that 
the practice in question has an impact on a considerably smaller proportion of one sex. The 
definition of indirect sex discrimination in the BPD refers to a practice which disadvantages 
a substantially higher proportion of one sex.14 The EeJ considered the question of 
disproportionate impact in the recent case of R v Secretary of State for Employment ex parte 
12 Baker M, above, p 109. 
13 For a more detailed explanation of statistical significance see: Robson C, Experiment, design and 
statistics in psychology, (1983), p 32 and Halpern D, above, p 44. See also: Allen R, The us.e ~fstatistics 
in discrimination law, Unpublished notes from a lecture to the Employment Lawyers ASSOCIatIOn, 5 July 
1995. 
14 EC Directive 37/97. The Directive is due to be implemented no later than 1 January 2001. 
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Seymour Smith and Perez. IS The case involved a challenge to the 1985 Order increasing the 
qualifying period for claims of unfair dismissal from one to two years. The evidence was 
that in 1985 the proportion of men who could comply with the two year requirement was 
77.4% and the proportion of women who could comply was 68.9%. ~n other words, there 
was a difference of 8.5 percentage points. Although there is no direct finding on this point 
in the judgment, given the size of the sample it is highly unlikely that this is a random result 
and, therefore, the difference is significant in statistical terms. 
The ECJ held that the correct test for disproportionate impact IS ":~-rhether the 
statistics available indicate that a considerably smaller percentage of women than men is 
able to satisfy the condition of two years' employment". While leaving the matter to the 
national court to decide, the ECJ went on to state that: "Such statistics do not appear, on the 
face of it, to show that a considerably smaller percentage of women than men is able to fulfil 
the requirement imposed by the disputed rule." Given this indication from the EeJ it seems 
that mere statistical significance is not enough to give rise to a claim of indirect 
discrimination. However, what is not clear from the judgment is how large the difference 
has to be in order to satisfy the test of being considerable . 
. As with unique sex differences, some, but not all, distribution characteristics can 
have an impact on an individual's ability to work. At one end of the scale characteristics 
such as being a primary child carer can have a significant impact in relation to the hours a 
person can work. Similarly, physical characteristics such as height, strength and flexibility 
may all have an impact depending on the job involved. Physical strength is much more 
important in a fire fighter than in a librarian. By contrast, an acute sense of smell, like so 
many other distribution differences, is relevant in only a few settings eg wine tasting. 
EQUALITY 
Traditional theories of equality 
The concept of equality can be expressed in many different ways. In its most basic 
formulation it can be used as a statement of fact ie people are equal. In this context equal 
can mean equal in terms of physical characteristics or equal in terms of moral worth. As 
15 [1999] IRLR 253, ECl For a note on this case see: Barnard C and Hepple B, 'Indirect discrimination: 
interpreting Seymour-Smith' (1999) 58 CLl 399. 
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Williams points out, the factual statement that all persons are equal in terms of physical 
characteristics is obviously incorrect: "to say that all men are equal in all those 
characteristics in respect of which it makes sense to say that men are equal or unequal, is a 
patent falsehood" .16 Since humans come in all shapes and sizes and with differing levels of 
intelligence, the only characteristic common to all people is their humanity. The maxim of 
equality therefore becomes reduced to the weak statement that all people are human. 
Williams argues that even in this weak form the statement is not entirely vacuous. For 
example, societies that treat certain races differently have often perswlded thew<selves that 
the people in question do not have the same capacity to feel pain and affection as other 
humans. In this situation, it is certainly useful to point out that people are equally human. 
However, Williams notes that: "if all that the statement does is to remind us that men are 
men, it does not do very much, and in particular does less than its proponents in political 
argument have wanted it to do. ,,17 
The other sense in which people are often said to be equal is in terms of moral 
worth. The idea of equal moral worth is found in many religions. It is also found in 
secular philosophy in the writings of Kant. I8 As Williams explains, in order for all 
people to be equal in terms of moral worth, moral worth cannot relate to physical 
characteristics. For example, if intelligence is relevant to moral worth, SInce some 
people are more intelligent than others, people cannot be said to be morally equal. 
16 Williams B, 'The idea of equality' in Laslett P and Runciman we eds, Philosophy, Politics and society, 
(1972) plIO. 
17 William's concept of being equally human is very similar to the idea of treatment as an equal put 
forward by Ronald Dworkin in his essay 'Reverse discrimination' in Taking rights seriously (1987) p 223 
at p 227. Dworkin argues that the right to treatment as an equal means that one person's interests should 
be treated as fully and sympathetically as the interests of any other person. Dworkin uses the example of a 
law school's admissions policy. 
Any standard will place certain candidates at a disadvantage as against others, but an admission 
policy may nevertheless be justified if it seems reasonable to expect that the overall gain to the 
community exceeds the overall loss, and if no other policy that does not provide a comparable 
disadvantage would produce even roughly the same gain. An individual's right to be treated as an 
equal means that his potential loss must be treated as a matter of concern, but that loss may 
nevertheless be outweighed by the gain to the community as a whole. 
Expressed in these terms, Dworkin's right to treatment as an equal becomes remarkably similar to 
Williams' definition of equality that people are equal because of their common humanity. Under Williams' 
definition humans must be accorded respect because of their capacity to form relationships, suffer, feel 
affection and have hopes and aspirations. Dworkin seems to be saying much the same thing when he 
argues that everyone's interests shouid be taken into consideration when deciding what is for the greater 
good of the community. 
18 Kant's theory is summarised by Williams B, above, at p 114. 
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Therefore, it is necessary to detach moral worth from all physical characteristics. The 
result is that moral worth becomes a transcendental characteristic: 
. .. man's capacity to will freely as a rational agent is not dependent on any 
empirical capacities he may have - and, in particular, is not dependent on 
empirical capacities which men may possess unequally - because, in the Kantian 
view, the capacity to be a rational agent is not itself an empirical capacity at all. 19 
What is the effect of all people having the same transcendental moral worth? 
According to Kant it means that all people are entitled to be treated with respect. This 
provokes the question what is meant by the notion of respect? Williams refers to Kant's 
celebrated injunction "treat each man as an end in himself, and never as a means only" 
and suggests that treating someone with respect means in part, looking at life from their 
perspective. Williams gives the example of a man who has spent his whole life trying to 
build a machine which could never work. From a technical point of view the man is a 
failed inventor. From the human point of view he is a man who wished to be a 
successful inventor and who persevered at his task. Treating people with respect means 
trying to understand each person's consciousness of his or her own life and activities. By 
making moral worth entirely transcendental, it is difficult to see how the concept of equal 
moral worth adds anything to the concept that all people are human and have, amongst 
other things, the capacity to form relationships, suffer, feel affection and have hopes and 
aspirations. The idea of treating humans with respect because of their equal moral worth 
seems to amount to no more than taking into account the fact that they have these human 
characteristics. 
A much stronger formulation is the statement of political aim that people should 
be treated the same irrespective of their differences. For example, in the process of 
dividing-up a loaf of bread between a group of people, each will get the same amount of 
bread irrespective of how hungry they are or how much they need to eat. This 
formulation of equality may be appropriate in some circumstances, for example the 
principle that everyone has one vote in an election. However, the formulation leads to 
absurd results if all benefits and burdens are distributed on this basis. For example, 
reading glasses would be distributed to everyone and not just to those with bad eye sight. 
This formulation of equality shows how important it is that some account is taken of 
people's differences. 
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A fonnulation of equality that takes differences into account is the idea that 
people should be treated the same only if they are alike. This fonnulation of equality 
was first propounded by Aristotle who said: "Equality in morals means this: things that 
are alike should be treated alike, while things that are unlike should be treated unlike in 
proportion to their unlikeness." The difficulty with this fonnulation is that it requires a 
detennination of when two people are alike and when a fonn of treatment is alike. 20 No 
two people are alike in every respect. (Two people can be alike in that they are both 
human or have equal moral worth but this leads to the alternative fonnulation of ,equality 
-"'-fi 
that all people are equal which is dealt with above.) Only immaterial symbols and forms 
such as ideal numbers and geometric fonns are identical. Two people can only be the 
same in relation to a defined standard by which their likeness can be measured. For 
example, hair colour, height and profession are all standards by which sameness can be 
measured. Two people, A and B, can be the same in that they both have brown hair. In 
all other respects, other than the standard by which their sameness is measured, A and B 
may be completely different. Similarly, treatment requires a standard by which likeness 
can be measured. If the treatment in question is the gift of a book, likeness could be 
detennined by a multitude of factors such as the colour, price or subject matter of the 
book. 
The second half of Aristotle's formulation requires that things which are unlike 
should be treated unlike in proportion to their unlikeness. The same problem arises here 
in that unlikeness needs a standard by which it can be measured or defined. If P has two 
'A' levels and Q has 3 'A' levels are they alike or unlike? They both have 'A' levels but 
P has one more than Q. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that the treatment must 
be in proportion to the unlikeness. In relation to P and Q does this mean that if P is 
entitled to a place at university Q is entitled to two thirds of a place? 
19 Williams, above, p 116. 
20 Phillip Weston argues that this absen~e of defmi~on me~ns that Aristotle' s f?rmulatio~ of equality, lacks 
any substantive moral content and that It collapses mto a s~ple statement o~ nghts: see ,The empty Idea 
of equality' (1982) 95 Harvard Law Review 537. Weston gIves a more detaIled explanatIOn of why 
equality is an empty idea in 'On "Confusing Ideas": Reply' (1982~ 91 Ya~e LJ} 153 ,at 1155: ,F?r a , 
criticism of Weston's original article see Burton S, 'Comment on empty Ideas: logIcal POSItlVISt analysIs 
of equality and rules' (1982) 91 Yale LJ 1135. See also the c~ticisms of Fredman S.' 'Less Equ~l than 
others - equality and women's rights', in Gearty C and Tomkins A eds, Understandmg human 1'lghts, chp 
9 at 201. 
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In practice, Aristotle's formulation is impossible to apply without identifying 
some underlying standard or right. For example, Loenen21 tries to rely on the second half 
of the formulation to support her argument for maternity rights. However, in order to 
determine what the different treatment should be Loenen is compelled to introduce the 
concept of a right to work. 
If one considers the treatment from the perspective of the right to work and the 
right to have a family, it seems clear that the treatment given is just "equal", be it 
that it is not the same. I do not think that there is anything "preferential" in 
guaranteeing women equal rights to work and family. In Aristotelian teIpls, the 
treatment is just proportional to the perceived difference in position of riilm and 
women and thus remains entirely within the concept of equality. 
Loenen starts from the position that women and men are unlike in terms of pregnancy. 
Therefore, they should receive different but proportional treatment. But in order to 
determine the different treatment to which women are entitled she needs to define the 
underlying right which she believes men have ie the right to work and have a family. 
Her argument therefore is not based on Aristotle's concept of different but proportional 
treatment but on the underlying normative standard that women and men should have the 
right to work and have a family.22 
An alternative formulation of equality is the idea of equality of opportunity. This 
formulation is used when there are insufficient goods or resources to meet demand. Due 
to its limited nature, not everyone can have the desired good. The notion of distributing 
the good on the basis of need or some other socially relevant criteria is replaced with the 
notion of an equal opportunity to compete for the limited good.23 There are both weak 
and strong forms of this concept. In its weak form equality of opportunity could be 
described as a requirement that the condition which determines allocation should be 
appropriate and rational for the good in question. For example, an employer could 
operate a policy under which promotion to a senior job requires a minimum number of 
21 'Comparative legal feminist scholarship and the importance of a contextual approach to concepts and 
strategies: the case of the equality debate' (1995) 3 Feminist Legal Studies p 7l. 
22 Loenen seems to accept this point later on in her article when she says that Aristotle's concept of equality 
is silent on the content of the treatment of likes and unlikes although she still argues that the idea has some 
use: "I do acknowledge, however, that the content of equality (or rather, the content of the treatment 
which should be equal) will depend on the overall values, principles and aspirations prevalent in a given 
society. We cannot escape our historic boundaries and think beyond them. In that sei.se, equality will 
always be contextually defined and thus ~ontingent. But tha~ is not t~e same a~ "empty:' .. Th~se values:, 
principles and aspirations must be our pomt of reference for mterpretmg equabty and glYmg It content. 
23 See Williams B, above, p 124. 
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years' service at a lower grade. On the face of it, the requirement for promotion is 
appropriate and rational. Assume that the employer operates another policy under which 
only people over 6ft tall are allowed to work as computer processors. If this criterion is 
neither rational nor appropriate there is no equality of opportunity. 
Equality of opportunity in its weak form will not result in an even distribution of 
goods as between different groups in society where the members of a group suffer from 
natural or social disadvantages which stop them from competing as effectively as the 
members of other groups. In this situation Williams recognises that genuine equality of 
',,"" 
opportunity is not achieved. 
It seelns then that a system of allocation will fall short of equality of opportunity 
if the allocation of the good in question in fact works out unequally or 
disproportionately between different sections of society, if the unsuccessful 
sections are under a disadvantage which could be removed by further reform or 
social action.24 
A strong form of equal opportunity would require society to remove disadvantages which 
prevent individuals from competing on the same level. For example, to ensure genuine 
equality of opportunity in the allocation of places at university, less intelligent children 
would receive additional schooling. In its stronger form, equal opportunity has more to 
do with distributing goods on the basis of people's differences than their similarities. To 
this extent, it has some similarities with the idea of distributive justice as it is used in 
social contract theory. 25 
Feminist concepts of equality 
A fundamental problem that has confronted feminists trying to apply traditional concepts 
of equality has been the sameness/difference between women and men. The difficulty 
seems to have been not so much whether they are different, but which approach, 
sameness or difference, is better at achieving the ultimate goal of equality. Bacchi argues 
that historically feminists have become divided on the sameness/difference point not 
because they disagree on whether there are differences (although they may disagree 
24 Williams B, above, p 127. ..' . . . . 
25 Williams B, above, p 120. For an explanation of the pnn~lples of dlS~l?utlVe Justl~e see: Rawls J, 
'Justice as fairness' in Laslett P and Runciman we eds, Phllosophy. POiztlCS and soclety, (1972) p 132 and 
Rawls J, A theory o/justice, (1971). 
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about the extent of the differences and whether they are biological or cultural) but on 
which approach is more likely to achieve the end result of improving women's lives?6 
The way in which the law treats a whole range of differences including acre race o , , 
gender, ethnicity, religion and disability has been studied by Minow who highlights what 
she calls the dilemma of difference.27 The stigma of difference can be created both by 
ignoring and focusing on difference. 
When does treating people differently emphasise their differences and stigmatise 
or hinder them on that basis? and when does treating people the same become 
insensitive to their difference and likely to stigmatise or hinder them ~,m that 
basis? ..... The dilemma of difference may be posed as a choice between 
integration and separation, as a choice between similar treatment and special 
treatment, or as a choice between neutrality and accommodation. Government 
neutrality may be the best way to assure equality, yet governmental neutrality 
may also freeze in place the past consequences of differences. 28 
Littleton divides feminist positions in the sameness/difference debate into 
symmetrical and asymmetrical responses.29 The former has two models. Assimilation, 
the model most often accepted by the courts, is that given a chance women could be just 
like men and, therefore, they should be treated just like men. Under the assimilation 
model any differences between women and men are minimised. The second model, 
androgyny, also argues that women and men are similar but argues that there should be 
some androgynous mean which both women and men are compared with. As Littleton 
explains: "In order to be truly androgynous within a symmetrical framework, social 
institutions must find a single norm that works equally well for all gendered 
characteristics." It is arguable whether it is really possible to find an androgynous norm 
given that the existing structure is already so male based. 
Asymmetrical approaches argue that differences should be accepted and dealt 
with. At one end of the spectrum is the accommodation model which argues that 
biological differences should result in different treatment but that cultural differences 
should be treated on an androgynous basis. Accommodationists argue that it is important 
to limit different treatment to biological differences because otherwise cultural 
differences will be used to limit women's spheres of activity. A second asymmetrical 
26 Same difference: feminism and sexual difference, (1990) P xi. 
27 Making all the Difference: Inclusion, exclusion, and American law (1990). 
28 Minow M, above, p 20. 
29 Littleton C, Reconstructing sexual equality, (1987) 75 Cal L Rev 1279. 
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approach is the special rights model. This model accepts that women and men are 
different in cultural and biological ways and that the cultural differences are rooted in 
biological differences. It argues that women should be entitled to special rights based on 
their different needs. 
Littleton puts forward her own asymmetrical model which she terms the model of 
equality as acceptance. 
The difference between human beings, whether perceived or real, and whether 
biologically or socially based, should not be permitted to make a difference in the 
lived-out equality of those persons. ..... To achieve this form of sexual equality, 
male and female "differences" must be costless relative to each other. 30 
Unlike accommodationists, Littleton would take into account biological and cultural 
differences. 
While not endorsing the notion that cultural differences betw~en the sexes are 
biologically determined, it does recognise and attempt to deal with both 
biological and social differences. Acceptance does not view sex differences as 
problematic per se, but rather focuses on the ways in which differences are 
permitted to justify inequality. It asserts that eliminating the unequal 
consequences of sex differences is more important than debating whether such 
differences are "real," or even trying to eliminate them altogether. 
A more radical approach is taken by MacKinnon who questions the relevance of 
sameness/diffference in the equality debate. MacKinnon points out that: "to treat issues 
of sex equality as issues of sameness and difference is to take a particular approach. I 
call this the difference approach because it is obsessed with the sex difference. ,,31 
Mackinnon questions Aristotle's formulation of equality that in order to get the same 
treatment two people should be the same. 
. What is missing in the difference approach is what Aristotle missed in his 
empiricist notion that equality means treating likes alike and unlikes unlike, and 
nobody has questioned it since. Why should you have to be the same as a man to 
get what a man gets simply because he is one?32 
MacKinnon's main argument against the sameness/difference debate is the lack of a 
gender neutral standard against which sameness/difference can be measured. 
Under the sameness standard, women are measured according to our 
correspondence with man, our equality judged by our proxi~ity to his measure. 
Under the difference standard, we are measured accordIng to our lack of 
correspondence with him, our womanhood judged by our distance from his 
30 Littleton C, above, p 1284. 
31 'Difference and dominance: on sex discrimination' in Feminism unmodified (1987) p 32. 
32 MacKinnon C, above, p 37. 
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measur.e. Gen?er. neutrality is thus simply the male standard, and the special 
protectIOn rule IS sImply the female standard, but do not be deceived: masculinity, 
or maleness, is the referent for both.33 
MacKinnon argues that in relation to practically every respect in which men are different 
from women, society is structured on the basis of the male norm. For example, men's 
needs define car insurance and male working patterns define career progression. 
However, because the male standard is considered to be natural, arguments that society 
should be changed to accommodate the female standard look like arguments for special 
treatment based on the difference in gender. For example, full-time working" is the 
standard but it is also the male norm. A woman who wants to work part-time appears to 
be asking for her sex in terms of her child caring responsibilities to be taken into account. 
On the other hand, full-time working that already accommodates the male norm is not 
perceived as offering special treatment to men. As a result, the sameness/difference 
debate inevitably results in women looking like they want special treatment. 
MacKinnon does not dispute that the sameness/difference approach has been 
effective in some spheres. It has, for example, got women into jobs which were 
previously closed to them. Arguably, the sameness/difference approach has been most 
successful in areas where it has been relatively easy for women to conform to the male 
norm. MacKinnon has an alternative approach. She sees equality not in terms of 
difference, but in terms of power; of male supremacy and female subordination. She 
calls this the dominance approach. It centres on the way in which women are relegated 
to a condition of inferiority in a whole range of spheres; poverty, violence against 
women, work segregation, prostitution and pornography. MacKinnon points out that 
these experiences can not be dealt with under the difference definition of equality 
because these matters almost uniquely happen to women. As a result, they are not 
considered to raise equality issues. MacKinnon points out that this approach has become 
the model for race discrimination. 
It was based on the realisation that the condition of Blacks in particular was not 
fundamentally a matter of rational or irrational differentiation on the basis of race 
but was fundamentally a matter of white supremacy, under which racial 
differences became invidious as a consequence.34 
33 MacKinnon C, above, p 34. 
34 MacKinnon C, above, p 42. 
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In the same way, MacKinnon sees gender inequality as a question of male supremacy. 
Inequality has arisen not out of the differences between women and men but the power 
which men have over women and men's ability to structure society to the disadvantage 
of women. MacKinnon's approach is summarised by Littleton in the following way: "If a 
law, practice, or policy contributes to the subordination of women or their domination by 
men, it violates equality. If it empowers women or contributes to the breakdown of male 
domination, it enhances equality. ,,35 
Equality and sex discrimination 
The kind of equality that underlies the legislation on sex discrimination can be 
discovered by examining the way in which the legislation deals with the three kinds of 
sex differences set out in the first part of this chapter ie categorical, unique and 
distribution sex differences.36 All sex discrimination legislation, either expressly or 
implicitly through case law, distinguishes between two forms of sex discrimination 
namely direct or indirect discrimination. The dividing line between the two forms of 
discrimination is somewhat unclear but broadly speaking direct sex discrimination is 
concerned with categorical sex differences, indirect discrimination deals with distribution 
sex differences and unique sex differences are split between the two. Thus, some unique 
sex differences come under the ambit of direct discrimination (eg pregnancy and 
maternity) while others (eg beards) are probably covered by indirect sex discrimination.37 
Direct sex discrimination is unlawful unless it is covered by one of the express 
exceptions in the legislation.38 This means that there is a general presumption that all 
detrimental treatment on the ground of any categorical sex difference (and some unique 
sex differences) is prohibited. By contrast, detrimental treatment that arises out of a 
distribution sex difference (and some unique sex differences) is only unlawful if the 
employer (or, where the treatment is enshrined in legislation, the government) fails to 
justify its actions. For example, if an employer decides to select part-time workers for 
redundancy before full-time workers the resulting detriment (ie the dismissals) will only 
35 Littleton, above, p 1300. . . ", 
36 Sex discrimination legislation is not the only legIslatIOn that has as Its aIm equalIty between the sexes, 
see for example the maternity provisions in Part ':III of ~e ERA 199,6., 
37 The treatment of unique sex differences is conSIdered III more detaIl III chapter 2. 
38 The four main legislative exceptions are considered in chapter 4. 
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be unlawful if the employer is unable to justify the selection policy. The mechanics of 
the justification defence are discussed in detail in chapter 5 but, in essence, it requires the 
employer to show that there is a reason for the difference in treatment that is not related 
to sex, there is no other less discriminatory way of achieving the same objective and the 
benefit to the employer outweighs the detriment to the employee. The result is that 
distribution sex differences are given a lower level of protection than categorical sex 
differences. 
Considered In terms of the differing theories of equality sex discrimination 
legislation is based upon a weak asymmetrical model of equality which aims to';elieve 
economic disadvantage in the workplace.39 Sex differences, both cultural and biological, 
are recognised and some effort is made to remedy any disadvantage suffered as a result. 
But, in the words of Littleton, they are not always rendered "costless". Categorical sex 
differences can result in detrimental treatment if one of the legislative ,exceptions applies 
and distribution sex differences are unprotected where the employer can justify the 
detrimental treatment. Thus, the legislation falls short of achieving total equality in the 
employment context. In order to render all sex differences "costless" some40 of the 
legislative exceptions would have to be repealed as would the justification defence in 
cases of indirect sex discrimination. The result would be that all sex differences would 
have to be accommodated by employers (although they could be assisted financially by 
the state as they already are in some areas eg statutory maternity pay). For example, 
employers would have to arrange working hours to fit in with women's childcare 
responsibilities. Inevitably, accommodating all sex differences is likely to lead to a loss 
of productivity for some employers. Although, the state could reduce the impact on 
employers either by direct financial assistance or by reducing the need for 
accommodation. For example, the state could reduce the need for flexible working by 
the provision of affordable and accessible childcare. 
Sex discrimination legislation represents a compromIse between complete 
asymmetrical equality where all sex differences are rendered "costless" and the need of 
39 S Ell" E 'The definition of discrimination in European Conununity sex equality law' (1994) 19 ELR 
563
e
;t 56~ a~d Bernard N, 'What are the purposes ofEC discrimination law?' in Dine J and Watt Beds, 
Discrimination law: concepts, limitations and justifications, (1996) 84.. . 
40 The reason why only some of the exceptions would have to be r~pealed IS that cert~~ of them allow 
1 t · &:avourable treatment to one sex on the baSIS of sex charactenstlcs eg the emp oyers 0 gIVe more 1, . . . ~ 
exceptions for pregnancy and maternity, and POSItIve actIon. 
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employers operating in a market economy to make a profit (or, if it is a non-profit 
making organisation, operate efficiently).41 Any attempt to introduce a stronger model of 
equality will inevitably have a financial impact on employers. Thus, the removal of the 
justification defence for indirect discrimination would strengthen the degree of equality 
sought by the legislation but, at the same time, it would reduce the ability of employers 
to make a profit. Similarly, making it easier for employers to justify indirect sex 
discrimination or widening the legislative exceptions detracts from the goal of equality 
while at the same time increasing the scope for employers to make a profit. At first 
, { 
glance it would appear that the introduction of a justification defence for cases of direct 
discrimination would weaken the goal of equality to a considerable extent because it 
would reduce the extent to which employers are obliged to accommodate sex differences. 
However, this is not necessarily the case. The impact of the defence depends on a 
number of factors. First, the scope of the defence and how often it is likely to be used. If 
the defence is worded in such a way that it only has a limited impact it is unlikely to 
undennine the goal of equality to any significant extent. Second, the extent to which the 
defence overlaps with the existing legislative exceptions. Third, the extent to which the 
defence could be used as a model for limiting the justification defence that applies in 
cases of indirect sex discrimination. These and other related issues are examined in later 
chapters in an effort to assess the impact on equality of an additional justification 
defence. 
CONCLUSION 
Sex discrimination legislation is based on an asymmetrical model of equality in that it 
aims to neutralise the negative impact of sex differences. However, it is a weak model of 
equality because not all sex differences are completely protected. Some categorical and 
unique sex differences are left unprotected by specific exceptions in th~ legislation. The 
extent to which distribution characteristics are protected depends on the ability of the 
41 ' of the limitin effects of economic arguments on equality see: Fredman S, 'European 
For an ~nalY,sls" ' L g, 'tl'que' (1992) 21 ILl 119 at 130, For the deference of the Eel to Commumty Dlscnmmatlon aw, a cn 
32 
employer to justify the detrimental treatment. Thus the existing rl0del of equality 
represents a compromise between the goal of equality and the financial needs of 
employers. The introduction of a justification defence for cases of direct sex 
discrimination is likely to have an effect on this balance. The key question is how large 
will the effect be and in what direction: towards or away from the goal of equality? 
. . k C 'The principle of equality between women and men as a 
economIC arguments see. Doc sey. 'I '(1991) 20 ILJ 258 at 275. 
fundamental rights under Commumty aw 
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2 
DIRECT SEX DISCRIMINATION 
INTRODUCTION 
In the SDA direct discrimination is defined as less favourable treatment on the ground of 
sex. The ETD refers to discrimination on the ground of sex but does not define it. The 
scheme under the EPA is slightly different in that an applicant must establish t1fat he or 
she is employed on work of equal value with a person of the opposite sex. A female 
applicant is then entitled to have no less favourable terms in her contract than those of 
her male comparator unless the employer can prove that the difference in treatment is for 
a reason umelated to sex. Article 141 sets out the principle of equal pay for work of 
equal value which is explained in the EPD as the "elimination of all discrimination on 
grounds of sex with regard to all aspects and conditions of remuneration". The EeJ has 
held that this covers both direct and indirect discrimination.! Despite the different ways 
in which these provisions are structured, for all of them the concept of direct 
discrimination can be reduced to the relatively simple formula of detrimental treatment 
on the ground of sex. This formula can itself be broken down into its three constituent 
elements namely detrimental treatment, sex and causation? The purpose of this chapter 
is to consider in detail these three constituent elements of a claim of direct sex 
discrimination.3 The chapter starts with a definition of sex based on sex differences then 
moves on to detriment and causation. The final section of the chapter deals with the 
burden of proof. 
1 See Jenkins v, Kingsgate [1981] 2 CMLR 24, ECJ and Bilka-Kaujhaus v, Hartz [1986] 2 CMLR 701, 
~~J her examination of the definition of sex discrimination in E~ropean Community law Evely~ Ellis 
'd t'f' 1 two elements namely adverse impact and causatIOn, as the elements that underpm any 1 en lIes on y, '1 ' " 1" 
t f t '-d'sc 'mination law, Although she does not mentIOn sex as a separate e ement It IS lffiP 1Clt sys em 0 an lIn d f 'Th d fi " f in her argument that the adverse treatment must be,on the ~roun 0 sex: see e e m1TIOn 0 
discrimination in European Community Sex EqualIty Law, (1994) 19 ELR ~63" 
3 There is another form of direct sex discrimination that anses from the applIcatIOn of a sex stereotypes, 
This form of direct discrimination is considered in chapter 3, 
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DEFINING SEX 
Despite the fact that sex is a fundamental element of direct discrimination it is not 
defined in the legislation. As a result, the courts have been left to apply their own 
definition of sex on a case by case basis. This section outlines the possible definitions of 
sex that could be used and considers how the courts have approached the issue. As 
indicated in chapter 1, the differences between women and men can be divided into three 
groups, namely categorical sex differences, unique sex differences and distribution sex 
-, -{ 
differences.4 Categorical sex differences relate to characteristics that apply to all the 
members of one sex and to no members of the other sex. The main categorical sex 
differences are chromosomal composition, the gonads and the sexual organs. Unique 
sex differences relate to characteristics that apply to some of the members of just one 
sex. Examples of female unique sex characteristics are pregnancy aIld menstruation. An 
example of a male unique sex characteristic is having a beard. Distribution sex 
differences relate to characteristics that apply to both sexes but in varying distributions. 
Distribution differences include characteristics such as height, weight, shoe size and a 
whole range of social differences such an income level and part-time work. 
Which of these three sex differences are included in the definition of sex? There 
is no doubt that categorical sex differences are included as they represent the narrowest 
possible definition of sex given that they relate to characteristics that apply to all the 
members of one sex. For example, it would certainly be sex discrimination to 
differentiate on a detrimental basis between employees with testes and employees with 
ovaries. On the other hand, distribution sex differences are excluded from the definition 
of sex because they are dealt with under the separate heading of indirect discrimination. 
Indirect discrimination deals with the situation in which a person is disadvantaged 
because he or she cannot comply with a condition or requirement because of the 
existence of a distribution sex difference. For example, a minimum height requirement 
for a job involves the application of a distribution sex difference and, therefore, it could 
. . . . 5 
give rise to a claim of indirect dlscnmlnatlOn. 
4 Fl' f the mam' types of differences between racial groups see Allport G, The nature of 
or an ana YSIS 0 
prejudice, (1958) p 94. . . . -
5 Indirect discrimination in considered m more detaIl ill chapter). 
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What is less clear is whether the definition of sex extends to some or all of the 
unique sex characteristics. If the definition of sex does not include unique sex 
differences, characteristics such as pregnancy can only give rise to a claim of indirect 
discrimination with the potential of a justification defence by the employer. To date, the 
debate has almost entirely focused on the unique characteristic of pregnancy. 6 The 
initial reaction of the domestic courts was to find that pregnancy was not covered by the 
definition of direct discrimination in the SDA.7 This position was subsequently reversed 
but, at the same time, the courts limited the protection afforded by the .SDA by 
.,.,. 
disassociating pregnancy from its consequences and finding that the reason for the 
treatment was not pregnancy per se but the consequences of pregnancy in terms of the 
woman's absence from work. 8 This analysis was subsequently approved by the HL in 
Webb v. EMO Air Cargo before the case went to the ECl 9 
There can be no doubt that in general to dismiss a womap because she is 
pregnant or to refuse to employ a woman of childbearing age because she may 
become pregnant is unlawful direct discrimination. Childbearing and the 
capacity for childbearing are characteristics of the female sex. So to apply these 
characteristics as the criterion for dismissal or refusal to employ is to apply a 
gender-based criterion, which the majority of this House in [James v. Eas tIe igh ] 
held to constitute unlawful direct discrimination. 10 
The position of the EC] has always been that in relation to the ETD detrimental 
treatment on the ground of pregnancy is direct discrimination. In the case of Dekker v. 
Stichting the EC] held that "As employment can only be refused because of pregnancy to 
a woman, such a refusal is direct discrimination on grounds of sex." 11 The EC] 
confirmed this approach when it gave judgment in the Webb 12 case although it expressly 
rejected the use of the sick man comparison and the attempts of the domestic courts to 
limit the protection afforded to pregnancy women by disassociating pregnancy from its 
consequences. However, the EC] has not adopted a consistent position in relation to 
Article 141. In Gillespie v. Northern Health and Social Services Board the EC] was 
6 The pregnancy cases are considered in much more detail in chapter 8. 
7 Turley v. AUders Department Stores Ltd [1980] IRLR 4, EAT. 
8 Hayes v. Malleable Working Men's Club [1985] IRLR 367, EAT. 
9 [1993] IRLR 27, HL. . ' ' . . 
10 The comparison with James v, Eastleigh IS not strIctl~ correct as the gende~-based cntenon ill James 
d 'f'C: t ~or free admittance for women and (Ie a categoncal sex dIfference) men and not a was 1 leren ages I' th ' ~ th ., h d' 
, h t 'stl'c such as pregnancy It is not therefore. au onty lor e proposItlon t at rrect unIque sex c arac en . . , . , 
, . " detrun' ental treatment on the ground of a uruque sex charactenstlc, dlscrunmahon covers 
11 [1991] IRLR 27, Eel 
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asked to rule on whether an employer can reduce a woman's pay during maternity 
leave.13 Reducing a woman's pay during maternity leave is of course a detriment. The 
primary issue therefore, is whether the treatment is on the ground of sex. The EC] held 
that as a woman is not in a comparable position with a man the treatment is not on the 
ground of sex. 
The present case is concerned with women taking maternity leave provided for 
by national legislation. They are in a special position which reC}uires them to be 
afforded special protection, but which is not comparable either with that of a man 
or with that of a woman actually at work. 
.,..-€ 
On this basis the EC] held that it is not contrary to Article 141 to reduce a woman's pay 
during her period of maternity leave. 14 The decision in Gillespie means that for the 
purposes of pregnancy the Ee] has applied a different interpretation of sex to the ETD 
and Article 141. 
The Gillespie case demonstrates that the courts are unlikely to adopt a consistent 
, 
approach to unique sex differences and therefore it is very difficult to predict where they 
will draw the line. For example, menstruation and growing a beard are both unique sex 
differences and, therefore, there is no logical reason for distinguishing between the two 
but the courts are unlikely to treat them in the same way. The r:onsequences of 
including a beard within the definition of sex is illustrated by the race case of Panesar v. 
the Nest! e Co Ltd. 15 The applicant was a male Sikh who was refused employment in the 
respondent's chocolate factory on the ground that he wore a beard. The tribunal 
accepted that the requirement for men to be clean shaven was a condition with which a 
smaller proportion of Sikhs could comply. However, they accepted the employer's 
argument that the condition was justifiable on hygiene grounds. In particular, the 
respondent was concerned that strands of hair would fall into the food where they could 
be a source of infection. Had the applicant chosen to bring a sex discrimination claim it 
is unlikely that the court would have classified the case as direct discrimination thereby 
removing from the employer the possibility of justifying the treatment on hygiene 
12 [1994] IRLR482, ECl. 
13 [1996] IRLR 214, ECl 
14 The reasoning of the ECl was followed by the domestic courts in Clark v. Secretary of State for 
Employment [1996] IRLR 578, CA. . _,;; 
15 [1980] IRLR 64, CA. See also Singh v Rowntree MacKzntosh Ltd [1979] ICR )~-+, EAT. 
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grounds. On the other hand, the courts may accept that an employer's refusal to hire a 
woman on the ground that she menstruates constitutes direct sex discrimination. 
III health is another area that has been problematic for the courts. Is it direct 
discrimination to dismiss a person because he or she has a medical condition that relates 
to a categorical or unique sex characteristic eg breast cancer or prostrate cancer? The 
illnesses themselves are unique sex characteristics even though they may relate to 
categorical characteristics. Not all women suffer from cervical cancer despite the fact 
that all women have a cervix. The approach that the courts seem to have taken5s that it 
is possible to disassociate ill health from its consequences, in particular absence from 
work. If a woman is dismissed after being absent from work due to a hysterectomy her 
dismissal is by reason of her absence and not the fact that she has haC: a hysterectomy. 
As a result, as long as a man absent from work for a similar period of time would also 
have been dismissed, the reason for the dismissal is not related to S~X.16 Similarly, it is 
not directly discriminatory to impose a disciplinary sanction against a woman absent 
from work due to period pains. 17 The one exception to this rule is pregnancy related 
illness. In Hertz v DansJ(8 the Ee] held that pregnancy related illness cannot be 
disassociated from the pregnancy itself. As a result, a dismissal or any other detriment 
imposed because the applicant has a pregnancy related illness amounts to direct 
discrimination. 
There have been no reported cases where an applicant has been dismissed or 
SUbjected to a detriment for an illness that is unique to one sex without there being some 
associated sickness absence. For example, a woman with breast cancer dismissed by an 
employer solely because of her illness. It is not clear what the courts would do in such a 
16 See for example Girlington Nursing Home v Bridgeman EAT, EOR Discrimination Case Law Digest No 
29, Autumn 1996, p 5. The Government has adopted a similar position in relation to al;>sence due to gender 
reassignment. The Sex Discrimination (Gender Reassignment) Regulations 1999, SI 1999 No 1102, insert 
a new s 2A into the SDA 1975 which prohibits less favourable treatment on the ground of gender 
reassignment. However, the new provision specificall~ states that i.n relation to ti~e off for medical 
treatment an individual is only treated less favourably Ifhe or she IS allowed less tIme than would be 
given to ~ person absent due to illness or some other cause, eg leave to nurse a si.ck relative. For more 
infonnation on the Regulations see: EOR No 85, May/June 1999, p 36 and A ~lde to the sex 
discrimination gender reassignment regulations 1999, Department for EducatIOn and Employment, 
(1999), . . . , ' ' 
17 Bo Ie v Falkirk District Council IT, EOR DISCrImmatIOn Case Law DIgest No 11, Sprmg 1992, p 5, See 
I YC enter v Business Link London EOR Discrimination Case La\\' Digest, No 40, Summer 1999, p-+, a so arp , 'd' , , 
h th tribunal held that dismissal for a reason related to a woman s menopause IS not Iscnmmatory, were e "f 'I h d f 
18 [1991] IRLR 31, ECl Although, this, only ,a~plies fro,m the be~mnmg 0 pregnancy unn teen 0 
maternity leave. The implications of thIS deCISIOn are dIscussed m chapter 8, 
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situation. On the one hand they may decide that as breast cancer IS a umque sex 
difference it gives rise to a claim of direct sex discrimination. On the other hand, the 
courts may take the view that there is no reason to separate breast cancer from any other 
illness and, as long as employees with other illnesses are dismissed in similar 
circumstances, they may find that the dismissal is not on the ground of sex. However, 
this would still mean that if women with breast cancer are dismissed but men with 
prostrate cancer or employees of either sex with lung cancer are not dismissed, the 
dismissal of the woman with breast cancer would be on the ground of sex. 
The definition of sex is a key issue because it determines the line between direct 
and indirect discrimination which in tum determines whether an employer will have the 
option of justifying a particular practice. However, until the courts have had an 
opportunity to consider some non-pregnancy case it is difficult to predict exactly where 
the courts will draw the line on unique sex differences. At the moment, all that can be 
said with any certainty is that sex includes categorical sex differences and, for the 
purposes of the ETD and the SDA, it also covers the unique sex differeL.ce of pregnancy. 
DETRIMENTAL TREATMENT 
Exactly what constitutes a detriment has been considered in two important appeal court 
decisions. In Jeremiah v. Ministry of Defence19 the employer operated a factory shop 
producing colour bursting shells. The work in the shop was dusty and dirty. The 
employees had to wear protective clothing and had to have a shower at the end of their 
shift for which they were paid overtime. As compensation for working in dirty 
conditions they were paid an extra 4p an hour "obnoxious pay". Working in this shop 
was compulsory for men who volunteered for overtime. No women had to work in the 
shop even if they volunteered for overtime. The applicant complained that this 
amounted to discrimination against men. 
The CA had no difficulty finding that a requirement to work in the shop 
amounted to less favourable treatment under s.1(1)(a) of the SDA. Since the complaint 
was of discrimination in the workplace, the applicant also had to demonstrate the 
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treatment amounted to a detriment under s. 6(2)(b) of the SDA. The CA held that the 
particular detriment was that work in the colour bursting shop was less pleasant than in 
some other shops although there were other shops which were also unpleasant. It made 
no difference that work in the colour bursting shop attracted an additional payment of 4p 
an hour. 
Lord Justice Brightman held that the correct test is whether a reasonable worker 
would find the treatment detrimental. 
The question before the Tribunal in my view would be whether a re~sonable 
male worker would or might take the view that there was a detl iment. .:," I think 
a detriment exists if a reasonable worker would or might take the view that the 
duty was in all the circumstances to his detriment. 
A similar test was applied by the HL in R v. Birmingham City Council ex parte Equal 
Opportunities Commission.20 The respondent council made provision for 540 boys and 
369 girls to attend grammar school each year. The CA and the HL upheld the decision 
of the HC that the girls were being treated less favourably. In the HL Lord Goff said the 
following about the test for less favourable treatment. 
[I]t is not, in my opinion, necessary for the commission to show that selective 
education is 'better' than non-selective education. It is enough that, by denying 
the girls the same opportunity as the boys, the council is depriving them of a 
choice which (as the facts show) is valued by them, or at least by their parents, 
and which (even though others may take a different view) is a choice obviously 
valued, on reasonable grounds by many others. 
One of the dangers of the reasonable worker approach to detriment is that the 
courts will consider the issue solely from the male perspective. There are areas where the 
same treatment is likely to be viewed differently by women and men. For example, 
sexual harassment is an area where women may have radically different views from men 
on whether a particular form of treatment is detrimental. 21 A woman may be deeply 
19 [1979] IRLR 436, CA. See also Automotive Products Ltd v. Peake [1977] IRLR 365 ",:here women and 
men stopped work at the same time but women were allowed.t~ leave the factory five mmutes before the 
men. The CA held that any difference in treatment was de mmnnus. 
20 [1989] IRLR 173. See also Gill and Coote v. El Vinos Company Ltd [1983] IRLR 207 in which the CA 
held that the respondent's policy of banning women drinkers from the bar area amounted to less favourable 
treatment. 
21 See the discussion on this issue by Cornell D in The imaginary domain, abortion, pornography and 
sexual harassment, (1995), P 177. However, the courts have not always accepted this point. See, for 
example, Stewart v Cleveland Guest (Engineering) Ltd [1994] ~R 440, where the EAT upheld the. 
finding of the tribunal that a display of pictures of naked women ~ the workplace could be as ~ffenslve to 
men as to women. For criticism of the tribunal's approach see 'Pm-ups and sexual harassment, EOR no 
40 
upset by a picture of a nude woman on an office wall while a man may be totally 
unconcerned by the same picture. The danger of the courts viewing detriment from a 
male perspective is highlighted by Ellis in her analysis of European sex discrimination 
law. Ellis suggests that a level of objectivity can be achieved by the use of a 
comparator.22 
It is submitted that an element of comparability is important to the component of 
adverse impact: if direct discrimination is defined simply as "nasty treatment" on 
the ground of sex, enormous discretion is placed in the hands of courts and 
tribunals, who remain overwhelmingly male in composition, to decide w,hat is to 
the detriment or advantage of complainants, the majority of whom are female 
For reasons of objectivity, it is preferable if the adversity of the treatment 
received by the complainant is measured by means of a comparison with the 
treatment received by a member of the opposite sex, placed in broadly the same 
circumstances as the complainant. 
The difficulty with this argument is that the use of a comparator does not actually 
demonstrate that an applicant's treatment is adverse, merely that it is different from that 
of the comparator. However, not all different treatment is discriminatory. A rule that 
women have to wear blue overalls while men have to wear black overalls constitutes a 
difference in treatment but it is unlikely to be considered a detriment by either party. 
The use of a comparator does not, therefore, remove the problem of the courts 
considering detriment from a male perspective. This problem can only be solved by the 
courts accepting that detriment should be measured on the basis of a reasonable person 
of the applicant's sex.23 
Considering detriment from the perspective of a reasonable person of the 
applicant's sex does not mean that the test is entirely subjective. 24 In Burrett v. West 
57, September/October 1994, P 24 and McColgan A, 'Sexual harassment, sex discrimination and unfair 
dismissal' (1995) 24 ILJ 181. 
22 See Ellis E, above, p 571. .. . .. . 
23 The fact that women and men can have different perspectIves on detrIment IS conSIdered m more detaIl 
in the section on dress codes in chapter 8. 
24 It seems that sexual harassment cases may be an exception to this rule. In the recent case of Reed and 
Bull Information Systems Ltd v Stedman [1999] IRLR 299, th~ EAT indicated that: "Because it is ~or each 
. d· idual to determine what they find unwelcome or offenSIve, there may be cases where there IS a gap 
::een what a tribunal would regard as acceptable and what the individua! in question was prepared to 
t 1 t " (para 28) However this contradicts an earlier fmding of the EAT m Scott v Combined Property o era e., 94th th &" d· . 
S . Ltd EOR Discrimination Case Law Digest No 32, Summer 19 7, P , at e test lor etnment IS ervlces fi ° b·· I I 
b th b · to d sub1ective. According to the EAT the tribunal must Irst ascertam on an 0 Jectlve eve o 0 Jec lve an J o· f th . . fi d th ·b 1 
whether the behaviour complained of is capable of bemg offenSIve .. I at tes~ IS satls Ie e trl una 
t th t consider on a subiective level whether the applIcant was m fact offended. For a mus en go on 0 J . 0 0 ° DO J d W B 
discussion of the overlap between sexual harassment and sex dlscrunmatlOn see: me an att, 
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Birmingham Health Authority25 the applicant was a nurse who was required to wear a 
uniform and a starched linen cap which served no practical purpose. The applicant 
objected to wearing the cap because she found it to be demeaning. Male nurses were 
required to wear a different uniform including a white tunic and epaulettes. The EAT 
rejected the applicant's argument that her honestly held belief that the cap was 
demeaning was sufficient to demonstrate less favourable treatment. 
We are quite unpersuaded that there is any warrant in the terms of the 1975 Act 
for any such SUbjective interpretation of its provision that a person discriminates 
against a woman if on the ground of her sex he treats her less favourabtythan he 
treats or would treat a man. There has to be shown less favourable treatment and , 
the fact that the complainant considers that she or he is being less favourably 
treated or is being demeaned does not of itself establish that there is less 
favourable treatment. 
Another issue is whether it is possible to consider the overall treatment of an 
individual or whether it is necessary to consider each element separately. This is a 
problem that has arisen mainly in the context of equal pay and the various elements of a 
pay package. For example, is it a detriment to get a lower salary but more holiday if the 
result is that the hourly rate for the number of hours actually worked is the same? The 
approach of the domestic courts and the EC} has been to find that It is necessary to 
consider each element of the remuneration package separately rather that to see if the 
overall package is less favourable. Thus, in Hayward v Cammell Laird Shipbuilders 
Ltd26 the applicant was paid lower hourly and overtime rates than her comparator but she 
received more favourable sickness benefits and meal breaks. The respondent argued that 
her overall package was no less favourable than that of her comparator. However, the 
HL rej ected this approach and held that the EPA requires a term for term comparison in 
order to determine whether the applicant has suffered a detriment. The EC} made the 
same point in Barber v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group27 when it held that 
in order to ensure transparency and the effective implementation of Article 141 "The 
application of the principle of equal pay must be ensured in respect of each element of 
'Sexual harassment: moving away from discrimination' (1995) 58 MLR 343 and McColgan A, ' Sexual 
harassment, sex discrimination and unfair dismissal' (1995) 24 ILJ 18I. 
25 [1994] IRLR 7, EAT. 
26 [1988] IRLR 257, HL. 
27 [1990] IRLR 240, ECJ. 
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remuneration and not only on the basis of a comprehensive assessment of the 
consideration paid to workers." 
A slightly different but related question is the extent to which account can be 
taken of treatment by persons other than the employer. For example, is it a detriment if 
part of one sex's income is made up by payments from the state. This issue has arisen a 
couple of times in cases before the Eel The first time was in the context of bridging 
pensions in the case of Birds Eye Walls Ltd v Roberts. 28 The difference in treatment 
arose out of a bridging pension operated by the employer under which employe~~ forced 
to retire early due to ill health were paid an additional sum to make up the difference 
between the pension they actually received and the pension they would have received 
had they continued to work until the state retirement age. From the age of 60 the 
bridging pension for a woman was reduced by the amount of the state pension. The 
same reduction was made for a man at the age of 65. Thus, the overall amount received 
by a man and a woman on an ill-health pension was the same but, in the case of a 
woman aged between 60 and 65, part of the income was supplied by the state. The Ee} 
side-stepped the issue of whether there was any discrimination by finding that there was 
no discrimination for other reasons. However, an alternative approach would have been 
for the EeJ to find that there was no detriment because the overall level of income (state 
and occupational package combined) was the same.29 
The issue arose for the second time the Pedersen case.30 In this case pregnant 
women absent from work for a pregnancy related illness were not entitled to sick pay but 
they were entitled to pre-maternity benefits paid by the Danish state. The issue was 
whether this amounted to direct discrimination under Article 141. The Ee} held that it 
would be unless the benefits paid by the state were equal to the amount of pay. 
Thus, the fact that a woman is deprived, before the beginning of her maternity 
leave, of her full pay when her incapacity for work is the result of a pathological 
condition connected with the pregnancy must be regarded as treatment based 
essentially on the pregnancy and thus as discriminatory. 
It would be otherwise only where the sums received by employees by 
way of benefits were equal to the amolmt of.their pay. If s~ch were the case, it 
would still be for the national court to ascertaIn whether the CIrcumstance that the 
28 [1994] IRLR 29, ECJ. . . ' .. 
29 This case and the issue of whether there was any detriment IS consIdered ill more detaIl ill chapter 8. 
30 [1999] IRLR 55, ECl 
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benefits are paid by a local authority is such as to bring about discrimination in 
breach of [Article 141] of the Treaty. 
In other words, the EC] held that there would be no discrimination if the state makes up 
the applicant's income as long as the way in which the benefit is paid does not 
disadvantage the applicant. (For example, the applicant might be worse off if there is a 
long delay before the benefit is paid.) On this basis it would seem that although each 
element of the package must be considered separately, in relation to an individual 
element it is possible to take account of any state provision in determining whether the 
difference in treatment is detrimental. 
CAUSATION 
In order for direct discrimination to exist, there must be a causal link between the 
detrimental treatment and the applicant's sex. The exact nature of the requisite causal 
link was considered by the EAT in 0 'Neill v. Governors of St Thomas More RCVA 
Upper School. 31 The case revolved around whether the applicant had been dismissed 
because she was pregnant or because she was pregnant as a result of a relationship with a 
Roman Catholic priest. On appeal, the EAT set out the relevant principles for 
determining causation in discrimination cases.32 
First, the subjective mental processes of the respondent ie its intentions or 
motives are irrelevant to the question of liability. The correct test is the objective test set 
out by the HL in James v. Eas tie igh, ie would the applicant have received the same 
treatment but for his or her sex?33 In other words, it makes no difference that the 
respondent had no conscious desire to disadvantage one sex. For example, a rule that 
women can leave work five minutes early may be motivated by health and safety 
considerations. However, it is still a case of direct sex discrimination because there is a 
causal link between the detrimental treatment of being made to work five minutes longer 
and the categorical sex difference of being male.34 
31 [1996] IRLR 372, EAT. 
32 These comments were approved by the CA in the case of Smith v. Gardner Merchant Ltd [1998] IRLR 
510, CA. 
33 [1990] ICR 554, HL. . 
34 These facts arose in the case of Automotive Products Ltd v. Peake [1977] IRLR 365. The CA found that 
the difference in treatment was de minirnus. 
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Second, it is not necessary that sex is the sole reason for the detrimental 
treatment as long as it is an effective cause of the treatment. Quoting from the decision 
of the CA in Banque Bruxelles v. Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd35 the EAT said: 
The basic question is: what, out of the whole complex of facts before the 
tribunal, is the 'effective and predominant' cause or the 'real and efficient cause' 
of the act complained of? As a matter of common sense not all the factors 
present in a situation are equally entitled to be treated as a cause of the crucial 
event for the purpose of attributing legal liability for consequences. '" The 
approach to causation is further qualified by the principle that the event or factor 
alleged to be causative of the matter complained of need not be the only.or even 
the main cause of the result complained of (though it must provide morerfhanjust 
the occasion for the result complained of) .... It is enough if it is an effective 
cause. 
The key point here is that sex does not have to be the main cause of the detrimental 
treatment as long as it is an effective cause. For example, a woman has a long history of 
unsatisfactory performance at work. She announces that she is pregnant and this is the 
effective cause of the employer's decision to dismiss although the main reason for the 
dismissal is her bad work record.36 
Finally, in terms of existing law it is not necessary for the causal link to be 
between the detrimental treatment and the applicant's sex. Section l(1)(a) of the SDA 
states that the treatment must be "on the ground of sex", it does not say "on the ground 
of her sex". Similarly, the BTD is not restricted to detrimental ground on the ground of 
the applicant's sex. As a result, it is possible for A to discriminate against B on the 
ground of C's sex.37 For example, it would be direct discrimination for an employer to 
give nursery vouchers to parents with male children but not to parents with female 
children. 
35 [1995] 2 WLR 697, CA. . ' .. 
36 There have been a number of race discrimination cases whIch have adopted this pO:)l~on: 0w.en & 
Briggs v. James [1982] IRLR 502, CA; Nagarajan v. Agnew [1994] IRLR 61, EAT, Selde v. Glllette 
Industries Ltd [1980] IRLR 427, . . . 
37 Alth h th are no sex discrimination cases on thIS pomt, there have been race cases where whIte 
oug ere . f 1 . . d'" . 
1· t h b en dismissed for refusing to carrymg out an unlaw u mstruction to lscrumnate agamst app lcan save e . th f h tho d . ffi' 
third parties and the courts have held that a causal connection WIth e race 0 t e Ir party IS su ICIent 
to establish race discrimination against the applicant: see Weathersfield Ltd V. Sargent [1998] IRLR 14, 
EAT and Showboat Entertainment Centre Ltd V. Owens [1984] IRLR 7, EAT. 
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BURDEN OF PROOF 
Article 4(1) of the BPD contains the following provision on the burden of proof in 
discrimination cases. 
Member States shall take such measures as are necessary, in accordance with 
their national judicial systems, to ensure that, when persons who consider 
themselves wronged because the principle of equal treatment has not been 
applied to them establish, before a court or other competent authority, facts from 
which it may be presumed that there has been direct or indirect discrimination it , 
shall be for the respondent to prove that there has been no breach of the;principle 
of equal treatment. 
Article 4(1) is based on the existing case law of the ECJ in equal pay cases. In Enderby 
v Frenchay Health Authority38 the ECJ held that that where the pay of one group is 
significantly lower than that of another group and the fonner group is almost exclusively 
women and the later group predominantly men, this raises a prima facie case of sex 
discrimination. The burden of proof then shifts to the employer to demonstrate that 
there is no discriminatory reason (direct or indirect) for the difference in pay.39 Under 
the EPA, once the applicant has established that he or she is employed on equal work 
and that there is a difference in pay, the burden is on the employer to prove that the 
difference in pay is due to a material factor which is not the difference in sex (s 1(3)).40 
Thus, the provisions of the EPA are already more favourable to the applicant than the 
provisions of the BPD. The same cannot be said of the SDA. Under the SDA the 
burden is on the applicant to prove unlawful discrimination.41 Although, the courts have 
held that if the applicant can show a difference in treatment and a difference in sex, the 
tribunal may look to the employer for an explanation. If that explanation is 
unsatisfactory, the tribunal may infer that the difference in treatment is on the ground of 
sex.42 The BPD goes further than this as it states that if an applicant establishes facts 
38 [1994] 1 CMLR 8, ECl . 
39 See also Specialarbejderforbundet i Danmark v. Dansk Industn [1995] IRLR 648, ECl 
40 See also the decision of the EAT in The Financial Times v Byrne [1992] IRLR 163. 
41 Oxford v Department of Health and Social Secu~ity [~997] IRLR 225, EAT.. . . . 
42 Most of the cases on the burden of proof have ansen m the context of race dlscnmmatIon: see for 
1· K' g v The Great Britain China Centre [1991] IRLR 513, CA and Noone v North West Regional examp e, m . . 1 h 1 
Health Authority [1988] IRLR 195, Court of Appeal. However, th~ same pr~clp es ave a so been 
applied to sex discrimination: see Wallace v South Eastern Edu~atlOn and Lzbral)' ~oard [1980] IRLR 
193, NICA. On problems of proof generally see: Lustgarten L, Probl~ms of pro~f ~ e~pl?y~ent 
discrimination cases' (1977) 6 ILJ 212 and Bindman G, 'Proof and eVIdence of dIscnmmatIon ill Hepple 
Band Szyszczak E eds, Discrimination: the limits of the law, chp .. L (1992). 
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from which it can be presumed that direct or indirect discrimination has occurred, the 
burden shifts to the employer to prove that there has been no discrimination. It is not 
clear what an applicant has to prove in order to raise a presumption of discrimination. 
However, in the light of the Enderby decision it may well be sufficient for the applicant 
to prove a difference in treatment together with a difference in sex in order to raise a 
presumption of direct discrimination. It will then be for the employer to prove that there 
is a non discriminatory reason for the difference in treatment. 
.. ,.. . ,. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter looks at the three constituent elements that make up a claim of direct sex 
discrimination namely sex, detrimental treatment and causation. Of the three elements 
causation is the most straightforward and presents no particular problems. With regard 
to detriment, two issues are highlighted. First, determining detriment on the basis of the 
views of the reasonable worker has the danger that the courts will consider the issue 
solely from the male perspective. In order to avoid this problem detriment needs to be 
viewed from the perspective of a reasonable person of the applicant's sex. Second, it is 
not clear whether account can be taken of treatment by persons other than the employer. 
This is important because it affects the extent to which employers can take advantage of 
benefits paid by the state eg maternity benefits in determining whether one sex has been 
treated detrimentally. Perhaps the most problematic of the three elements is the 
definition of sex and the extent to which it includes unique sex differences. The position 
appears to be that some unique sex differences eg pregnancy and maternity are covered 
by the definition of sex while others are not with the result that unique differences are 
split between direct and indirect discrimination. 
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3 
STEREOTYPES 
INTRODUCTION 
There is a second and entirely discrete form of direct discrimination that involves the use 
of sexual stereotypes. In the leading case of Skyrail Oceanic Ltd v Coleman l the CA 
accepted that to dismiss a woman because of an assumption that men are rrio~e likely 
than women to be the primary breadwinner can amount to discrimination under s 1 of the 
SDA. The EAT subsequently confirmed that the definition of direct discrimination in the 
SDA covers all cases where the reason for the detrimental treatment is a generalised 
assumption that people of a particular sex possess or lack certain characteristics.2 
Although there have been no reported cases involving stereotypes under the EPA or 
European law, there is no reason to assume that the situation is any different. Thus, it is 
not open to an employer to defend an equal pay claim on the basis that yomen in general 
are less reliable than men. The situation, therefore, is that the use of sexual stereotypes 
or generalisations is always unlawful if it results in detriment to the applicant. (There is 
one exception which is that employers can rely on generalised assumptions about the life 
expectancy of women and men in the context of occupational pension benefits. This 
exception is considered in more detail in chapter 4.) This chapter considers stereotypes 
from the perspective of social psychology. It examines the cognitive processes involved 
in stereotyping, the origins and accuracy of stereotypes and the extent to which they 
influence decisions about individuals.3 The chapter concludes by asking whether the 
blanket prohibition on the use of sex stereotypes is indeed warranted and, if it is not, the 
circumstances in which employers should be allowed to rely on them. 
I [1981] ICR 864, CA, _ 
2 Horsey v Dyfed County Council [1982] ICR 75), EAT, ,,_ 
3 For a general overview of this subject see: Al1po~ G, The Nature of Prejlldl,Ce, (19)~),; Brown R, 
Prejudice _ Its Social Psychology, (1995): Augoustmos M and W~lker I, SocI,al Cogn,ltLOn: An Intergr~ted 
Introduction, (1995); Oakes P, Haslam S and Turner J, Stereotypmg ,an~ Soczal Reaizty, (1994); Lee 'r -T, 
Jussim L and McCauley C eds, Stereotype accuracy: toward appreczatmg stereotype accuracy, (1995) and 
Ehrlich H The Social Psychology of Prejudice, (1973), 
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DEFllITNGSTEREOTYPES 
A stereotype is a generalisation about a group of people or objects and stereotyping can 
be defined as "the process of ascribing characteristics to people on the basis of their 
group membership. ,,4 A stereotype does not have to be either false or negative. The idea 
that men tend to be heavier than women is still a stereotype despite its lack of negative 
connotations or its veracity.s It is important to realise that stereotyping is not 
synonymous with prejudice. Prejudice is usually defined as a negative and false 
··~'r. 
generalisation. Allport uses the following definition of ethnic prejudice: "Ethnic 
prejudice is an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalisation. It may be felt 
or expressed. It may be directed towards a group as a whole, or towards an individual 
because he is a member of that groUp.,,6 More recently, Brown has questioned whether a 
generalisation needs to be false in order to be prejudicial. He defines prejudice as "the 
holding of derogatory social attitudes or cognitive beliefs, the expression of negative 
affect or the display of hostile or discriminatory behaviour towards members of a group 
on account of their membership of that group.,,7 
Stereotyping can be broken down into two elements: the delineation of a category 
or group and the attribution of characteristics on the basis of group membership. Thus, a 
remark along the line of "Germans are ..... " involves the mental creation of the category 
Germans. This category is then used to infer characteristics about individuals in the 
group. 8 These two elements of the stereotyping process are considered in detail below 
together with some of the effects of categorisation. 
Categorisation 
Category creation is dependent upon two factors. The first and more significant factor is 
the purpose of the perceiver. As the purpose of the perceiver varies so will the category 
4 Oakes P et aI, above, pl. Although they are often shared by other members of a group, a, generalisation 
held b just one member group is still a stereotype. For example, a person m~y h~ld the VIew that bananas 
are pi~. Even if no other person shares this view it is still a stereotype (albeIt an mac curate one) of 
bananas. 
5 Lee Y-T, above, p 7, 
6 Allport G, above, p 10. , ", ' 
7 B R b p 8 Brown refrains from defmmg prejUdICe m terms of falseness because he IS 
rown ,a ove, . , f I' 
concerned that in most cases there is no standard by whIch to measure ~e corr~ctness 0 a be Ief. The 
h ' h 't' ossI'ble to measure the correctness of a stereotype IS conSIdered below, extent to w Ie 1 IS P 
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selection. For example, a school teacher may group a class of pupils on the basis of 
mathematical ability for maths class, athletic ability for games and vocal range for choir 
practice. The second factor that affects category selection is the dctual differences 
between the stimuli being perceived. While it may be sensible for a maths teacher to 
group a class on the basis of mathematical ability, if the class are all of comparable 
ability the selection criterion will not be effective. In this case the teacher must find a 
criterion that effectively divides the class into the number of groups required. In the 
absence of a meaningful criterion the teacher may adopt any criterion that matches the 
, < 
actual differences between the children in the class and which is readily accessible.9 
Although there are an infinite number of criteria by which stimuli can be 
categorised, it seems that some criteria are more basic than others. In particular, it has 
been suggested that "social perception is strongly influenced by generic categories such 
as gender, race and age which are activated more or less automatically at the beginning 
of the impression formation process. ,,10 For example, there have been numerous studies 
in which children as young as five have been asked to sort a pile of photographs. 
Potentially, the children could sort the photographs on the basis of a number of criteria 
such as dress style, hair colour, age, height, sex and gender. The results show ethnicity 
as the most popular selection criterion with gender being the next most popular. In 
addition, local circumstances may make certain criteria particularly important. For 
example, religion is much more likely to feature as a relevant category in Northern 
Ireland than in the south of England. 
There are two conflicting theories about why categorisation takes place. II The 
first, which has been dubbed 'the cognitive miser approach', is that it is a mechanism for 
dealina with information overload. 12 The human brain can only deal with so much 
o 
information at anyone time. However, it is constantly being besieged by innumerable 
stimuli. In order to cope with this situation the brain uses a system of classification in 
order to reduce the stimuli to a manageable number. As Brown explains: 
8 Brown, above, p 40. . .. . 
9 Accessible in this context means ease of bringing to mind rath~r than prachcablh~. Thus, Ifth~ teacher 
h d · t b ought a new pair of shoes, shoe size might be a critenon that would readily come to mmd a JUs r . .. . 1 th h' .. th despite the fact that it might not be very prachcallf It would fIrst mvo ve e teac er ill ascertammg e 
size of each child's feet. 
10 Oakes P et aI, above, p 53. . . . . . 
11 Another possibility is that both theories are correct and categonsaTIon has a dual cogmnve functIOn. 
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... the world is simply too complex a place for us to be able to survive without 
some means of simplifying and ordering it first. Just as biologists and chemists 
use classification systems to reduce nature's complexity to a more manageable 
number of categories linked together in scientifically useful ways, so too do we 
rely on systems of categories in our everyday lives. We simply do not have the 
capability to respond differently to every single person or event that we 
encounter. Moreover, even if we did have that capacity, it would be highly 
dysfunctional to do so because such stimuli possess many characteristics in 
common with each other, as well as attributes which distinguish them from other 
stimuli. 13 
In other words, in order to reduce the amount of information flowing through ~1;le brain 
people are perceived on the basis of their social category rather than as individuals. 14 
The alternative theory is that categorisation arises because of a deficit of 
information. The proponents of this theory argue that it would be dysfunctional for 
people to react to every stimulus as if they had never seen a similar object before. They 
suggest that the problem lies not in the limited capacity of the brain to process 
information but in the practical difficulties of obtaining the information. The purpose of 
categories is to facilitate the drawing of inferences. As Pinker explains: 
Obviously we can't know everything about every object. But we can observe 
some of its properties, assign it to a category, and from the category predict 
properties that we have not observed. If Mopsy has long ears, L...:--is a rabbit; if he 
is a rabbit, he should eat carrots, go hippety-hop, and breed like, well, a rabbit. 15 
Thus, categories allow people to draw inferences and assign properties to people and 
objects without the need for further investigation. This explanation sees the tendency to 
categorise as something beneficial rather than as a defect in the cognitive process. By 
putting things into categories individuals are able to access more information than they 
would do otherwise thereby improving the quality of their decision making. 
So far, no researcher has devised an experiment that establishes which is the 
12 Oakes P et aI, above, p 38. 
13 Brown R, above, p 41. 
14 The cognitive miser approach does not imply that the human mind is inf1e~ible. BIllig likens th~ 
process of categorisation to decision making in a bur~aucracy. The popular lTI1age.o~ a b~eaucrat IS of a 
faceless official mindlessly filling in forms and applymg the rules. However, as BIllIg pomts out, even 
bureaucratic thinking involves occasions when the bureaucrat has to make out a special case. "Because the 
d es cannot specify in advance every small detail about every case, the bureaucrats must be left a proce ur I b d fi' h d . 
certain amount of latitude. As a result the bureaucrats will themse ves e e mmg t e proce ures m 
practice, thus building up not only a knowledg.e ?f the ,rule~ ~emselves, ~ut ~ knowledg~ abou.t h~w to, 
bend the rules to create a special case." See BIllIg M, PreJudIce, categor~satlOn and partIculansatIon: from 
a perceptual to a rhetorical approach' (1985) 15 European Journal of SocIal Psychology, 79 at p 89. 
15 Pinker S, How the mind works, (1997) P 307. 
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correct explanation. There is some evidence that people are more likely to use categories 
if their mind is distracted on other tasks. This would tend to imply that categorisation is 
a mechanism for dealing with information overload rather than a deficit of information. 16 
However, other experiments show that there is mixed support for the hypothesis that 
mental busyness increases the use of stereotypes. In some cases stereotyping has been 
more prevalent in non-busy conditions. 17 For the present at least, the question of whether 
categorisation is a result of information overload or a deficit of information remains 
unresolved. 
The effects of categorisation 
Categorisation affects the way in which people behave in a number of respects. Perhaps 
the most important of these is a tendency towards in-group bias. For most people the 
smallest and most important in-group is the family. People have what the philosopher 
Spinoza described as a "love-prejudice" or bias towards members of their own family. IS 
What . is more surprising is that "virtually any basis for categorisation can lay the 
foundations for in-group favouritism" .19 This seems to be the case even when the 
categories or in-group are determined by something as mundane as the toss of a coin and 
the members of the group are unknown to one another. 
In order to test this hypothesis Tajfel et al devised a number of experiments using 
the Minimal Group Paradigm.20 In these experiments the groups are devoid of any 
human interaction. The members of the group are selected in a random fashion, such as 
the toss of a coin or their preference for a particular painting. The subjects have no idea 
who else is in their group or any other group. Subjects are then asked to allocate a fixed 
sum of money to various pairs of people who are identified only by their number and 
group, eg member 24 of group A and member 37 of group B. 
The experiment is devised in such a way that it is not possible to give equal 
amounts of money to each person. The subject is faced with three options. First, give 
each recipient as far as possible the same amount. Second, allocate the money randomly. 
16 Brown R, above, p 103. 
17 Oakes P et aI, above, p 66. 
18 Allport G, above, p 24. 
19 Oakes P et aI, above. p 43. -
20 These experiments are summarised in Oakes P et aI, above, p .f 1 and Brown R, above, p .f). 
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Third, show a preference to one group over another. A number of experiments using the 
Minimal Group Paradigm have consistently demonstrated a pattern of distribution that 
involves an element of fairness combined with a reliable preference towards the in-
group. Surprisingly, in one experiment the researchers found that subjects were willing 
to sacrifice maximum in-group gain in order to achieve relative in-group gain.21 
It seems, therefore, that one effect of categorisation is for people to have a bias in 
favour of other people in the same group. The flip side of the coin is a bias against 
members of an out-group. This does not mean that people necessarily have any intense 
">f 
feelings against the members of an out-group. But, if people are asked to make a 
decision that involves allocating a benefit between an in-group member and an out-group 
member, in the absence of any other motivation, people have a natural tendency in act in 
a way that favours the in-group member and disadvantages the out-group member.22 
As indicated above, stereotyping is a two stage process involving the formation of 
categories followed by the application of characteristics on the basis of category 
membership. However, it is possible that the tendency towards in-grclp bias gives rise 
to a separate form of direct discrimination that does not involve the second element 
traditionally associated with stereotyping, the application of category characteristics. In 
other words, an individual may treat another person detrimentally solely on the basis of 
category membership and not because of any characteristics generally associated with the 
group. For example, a male manager refuses to appoint a female employee because he 
perceives women as the out-group. As tribunals do not use the terminology of in-groups 
and out-groups it is not possible to tell from the decisions whether, in any particular case, 
this is the basis for the respondent's behaviour as opposed to the application of a more 
traditional stereotype. A common theme in sex discrimination cases and one that often 
rings alarm bells with tribunals is a view on the part of the employer that an employee of 
21 Oakes P et aI, above, p42. . ' .., . 
22 A number of explanations have been put forward to expla.in in-gro~p bIas: One possIbIlIty IS that It 
derives from inter group conflict. The main proponent of thIS theory IS Shenff who .conducted a n~be: of 
.c: . ts known as the 'summer camp studies'. The results of these studies are summansed m lamous expenmen ., . l'd . th Th' h 
B R b 164 A second explanation for in-group bIas IS SOCIa 1 entIty eory. IS t eory rown ,a ove, p , ., I d h . .c: th'd'f 
th t 1 otI'vated to evaluate themselves POSItIve y, an t us Illsolar as ey 1 entl y assumes a peop e are m . '. . . 
h I 
'th they wI'II be motivated to evaluate the m-group pOSItlvely III relatIOn to out-t emse ves WI a group, 
groups: see Oakes P et aI, above, p 82 and Allport G, above, p 45, 
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a particular sex would "fit in" better with the organisation.23 The concept of "fitting in" 
may indicate one of two things. It could reflect a generalised assumption that the 
particular characteristics necessary for the successful accomplishment of the job are only 
held by one sex. Alternatively, it could indicate a preference for the members of the in-
group and a bias against the members of the out-group. There is clearly no rational use 
for in-group bias in an employment situation. It is entirely irrational for an employer to 
refuse to hire a woman solely because she is a member of the out-group. As a result, 
there would appear to be no basis for allowing this particular form of direct sex 
discrimination. 
A second effect of categorisation is a tendency to enhance the differences 
between groups. This effect has been demonstrated in relation to physical stimuli in a 
famous experiment by Tajfel and Wilkes.24 The experiment involved eight lines printed 
on cardboard increasing in length by one centimetre each. Subjects were asked to 
estimate the length of each line. Subjects in the control group were able to estimate the 
lengths of the lines quite accurately. The four shorter lines were then labelled 'A' and the 
four longer lines labelled 'B'. Subjects in the experimental group continued to estimate 
the lengths of the three shortest and three longest lines quite accurately. The one 
variation comes with the estimates of the longest 'A' line and the shortest 'B' line. 
Subjects consistently perceived the difference to be twice its actual size, ie two 
centimetres. In a human situation this effect is likely to mean that in-group members 
think that they are more different from the out-group than they really are. For example, 
the English think that they are more different from the Scots than they really are and 
women think that they are more different from men than they really are. 
A third, but less than universal effect, is perceived out-group homogeneity or a 
tendency to think that out-group members are more similar than they actually are. The 
idea that "they all look alike" is an example of this tendency.25 For example, one study 
investigated how White residents of an American neighbourhood perceived White and 
Black families moving into the area. The results showed that the Black families were 
23 S fi pIe Taylor v Freemans Mail Order EOR Discrimination Case Law Digest No 27, Spring 
ee or exam . . . . C L D' " T 27 1996, P 8 and Marrington v University of Sunderland EOR DIscnmmatIon ase aw Igest ~~o , 
Autumn 1995, P 7. . . 
24 The results of the experiment are summansed ill Brown R, above, p 43. 
25 Oakes P et aI, above, p 161. 
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more categorised than White families and that White families were more individually 
perceived. In another experiment members of university clubs rated members of their 
own club as having a greater variety of personality traits than members of other clubs. 26 
However, in certain contexts, in-groups display greater homogeneity than out-groups. In 
particular, minority groups appear to perceive themselves as more similar than the out-
group. This has been found to be the case both with ethnic minorities and with women 
academic staff in an environment where women were outnumbered by men by a ratio of 
8: 1. Similarly, another study found that homosexual men consider themsely~s to be 
more similar than heterosexual men.27 Both the tendency to enhance the differences 
between groups and the perception of out-group homogeneity can have an impact on the 
accuracy of stereotypes which in tum has an impact on their rational use. The issue of 
stereotype accuracy is discussed in more detail below. 
THE APPLICATION OF STEREOTYPICAL CHARACTERISTICS 
The second element of stereotyping involves the application of characteristics on the 
basis of group membership. How do certain characteristics become associated with 
particular groups? There are two main theories that explain the origins of stereotypical 
characteristics. The first is that they reflect the existing social arrangements and actual 
differences between people. For example, the stereotype that men are taller than women 
derives from the fact that men are generally taller than women.28 This is not to say that 
all stereotypes are accurate representations of groups. However, many psychologists 
would accept that there is at least 'a kernel of truth' in many stereotypes. 
A study by Eagly and Wood investigated whether the popular belief that men 
exert influence more easily than women stems from two factors (i) the fact that women 
tend to occupy lower status positions than men and (ii) the belief that ability to influence 
is linked to status.29 The subjects of the experiment read a scenario in which an 
employee of one sex attempted to influence an employee of the other sex. In some cases 
26 Brown R, above, p 55. 
27 Brown R, above, p 57; Lee Y-T et aI, above, p 12. . 
28 Men are on average 7% taller and 20% heavier than women. NIcholson J, lHen and women: How are 
they different?, (1984), p 42. 
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the job titles of the communicator and recipient were omitted. In other cases job titles 
were included and the status of the job title varied. SUbjects were asked to predict the 
reaction of the recipient. For the scenarios that omitted job titles the researchers found 
that compliance was perceived as being more likely when the communicator was male 
and the recipient was female. In contrast, when job titles were indicated subjects did not 
use sex as a basis for predicting influence. The researchers concluded from this that one 
source for the gender stereotype that men exert influence more easily than women is the 
fact that more men than women occupy high status roles. ..", 
''''~ 
In a later study Eagly and Steffen investigated the extent to which the belief that 
women are more communal (selfless and concerned with others) and less agentic (self-
assertive and motivated to master) than men can be attributed to the differing 
distributions of women and men into the roles of homemaker and employee.3o Each 
subject was asked to read a short description of a stimulus pers0l!' The person was 
described as being male or female and either a homemaker, employed or no occupational 
description was given. Where no occupational description was given subjects were 
asked to infer whether the stimulus person was employed or not. Subjects were also 
asked to predict the salary of the stimulus person. The researchers found that regardless 
of their sex, homemakers were perceived as more communal than employees. Where no 
occupation was specified, women were perceived as more communal than men. The 
female and male employees were not perceived to differ in communion, nor were the 
female and male homemakers. Employees were perceived as more agentic than 
homemakers, regardless of sex. For persons with no occupation, men were perceived as 
more agentic than women. The researchers described their findings as: "generally 
favourable to the hypothesis that a sex difference in the distribution of women and men 
into homemaker and employee roles underlies the stereotype that women are communal 
and men are agentic.I!31 The researchers also found that working women were perceived 
as being more agentic than working men. The results of an additional experiment 
produced evidence in favour of the hypothesis that this was a result of the subjects' 
29 Eagly A and Wood W 'Inferred sex differences in status as a determinant of gender stereotypes about 
. l' fluence' (1982) 43 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 915. 
SOCIa ill d' 'b' f d' . I 
30 Eagly A and Steffen V, 'Gender stereotypes s.tem from the Istn utlOn 0 women an men mto SOCia 
roles' (1984) 46 Journal of Personality and SocIal Psychology 735. 
31 Eagly A and Steffen V, above, p 743. 
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perception that women are more likely than men to have chosen to be employed. 
A second possible explanation for the origins of stereotypical characteristics is 
that they are used to justify the existing social arrangements. As Jost and Banaji 
explain:32 
System-justification is the psychological process by which existing social 
arrangements are legitimised, even at the expense of personal and group interests . 
... stereotypes emerge and are used to explain some existing state of affairs, such 
as social or economic systems, status or power hierarchies, distribution of 
resources, divisions of social roles, and the like .... 
In other words, stereotypes have a function in maintaining the status-quo evirl though 
this may have negative consequences for the individual and be detrimental to self 
esteem.33 
. Hoffman and Hurst looked at the extent to which stereotypes are used to 
rationalise, justify and explain the division of labour. 34 
The differential participation by women and men in the roles of homemaker and 
breadwinner (as well as a few other key roles such as soldier) is a social fact of 
such pervasive significance that it would be very odd indeed if cultures and 
individuals did not feel some need to explain or rationalise that fact. And the 
most powerful rationale imaginable is probably the simple assumption that there 
are inherent differences between males and females that make each sex better 
suited for its role - that each sex has, in other words, a greater capacity for the 
qualities thought to be necessary to the performance of its traditional function. 
In order to test this hypothesis, subj ects were given written information about two 
fictional groups of intelligent life on another planet, the Orinthian~ and Ackmians. 
Subjects were told that there were no male or female sexes on the planet and that any 
individual could mate with any other individual. Subjects were also told that the adults 
in both groups contained child raisers and city workers. Subjects were then given a brief 
description of 15 Orinthians and 15 Ackmians. Each description contained the name of 
the stimulus person, the person's category, ie Orinthian or Ackmian and three personality 
traits (eg Damorian, an Orinthian who works in the city, is resourceful, individualistic 
and soft-spoken). The traits were selected as being agentic, communal or neutral. Each 
32 Jost J and Banaji M, 'The role of stereotyping in system-justification and the production of false 
consciousness' (1994) 33 British Journal of Social P~ychology 1. " " 
33 Th" nt is consistent with the body of SOCial psychologIcal research whIch finds that people are 
IS argume " " " h I h' 1·· J J dB"" 
very resistant to change and tend to imbue the eXlstmg system WIt an oug t qua Ity ost an anaJI ~vI, 
above, p 10. " "1"" 'I' (1990) 58 J 1 f 
34 Hoffman C and Hurst N, 'Gender stereotypes: perceptIOn or ratIOna IsatIOn. ourna 0 
Personality and Social Psychology 197. 
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description contained one agentic, one communal and one neutral trait. The result being 
that there was no correlation between the personalities of the targets, social role and 
categorisation. 
Subjects were asked to provide a possible explanation for the role distribution. 
Almost three-quarters attributed the distribution to differences in personality between the 
two categories of child raisers and city workers. The researchers concluded that: "the 
responses clearly confirmed our expectation that the preferred explanation for the role 
distribution would be simply that each category's personality causes it to be well_suited to 
its predominant role."35 
One of the reasons why stereotypes are so enduring is the tendency of individuals 
to ignore information that contradicts an existing stereotype. For example, a woman has 
a stereotype that Germans are efficient. An encounter with just one inefficient postal 
clerk is unlikely to have any impact on her view of Germans because she knows that the 
stereotype is only a generalisation and, therefore, there are bound to be exceptions. 
However, even if she meets several inefficient postal clerks her stereotype of Germans is 
unlikely to change. She is more likely to re-define the stereotype in order to exclude 
postal clerks. This phenomena is known as refencing a stereotype. However, there are 
two instances when this is unlikely to happen. First, some people are habitually open 
minded and will readily adjust their stereotypes and second, when changing a category is 
in an individual's self-interest. If a person has a stereotype that Rome is a safe city to 
visit and hears that a tourist has been murdered in Rome, the person may change his or 
her view and conclude that Rome is no longer a safe city.36 
STEREOTYPES AS SELF-FULFILLING PROPHESIES 
There are two ways in which stereotypes can become self-fulfilling prophecies. First, by 
people seeking self-confirming evidence. Second, by the effect of the stereotype on the 
person being perceived. In relation to the first way, there is some evidence that 
35 Hoffman C and Hurst N, above, p 202. The researchers were conc,erned that subjects may have equated 
th t ' 'th human sexes They therefore asked each subject to guess the real purpose of the e two ca egones WI . , 
study, Only 12% of the subjects made any reference whatsoever to gender. Thus, most people \\-ere 
unaware that the study related to gender. 
36 Allport G, above, p 23; Brown R, above, p 113. 
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individuals have a tendency to select infonnation that will confinn their expectancies. 
This was demonstrated in a study using the 'ambiguous shove'.37 The researcher prepared 
a number of video tapes showing a heated argument which culminated in one man 
shoving the other. The tapes were similar save that the race (BlacklWhite) of the 
perpetrator and victim were changed. Subjects were asked to watch the tape and interpret 
what had happened. The results are summarised by Brown. 
In the versions with the Black perpetrator over 90 per cent of tte subjects judged 
the action to be 'violent' or 'aggressive' and tended to attribute it to some internal 
cause; in the White perpetrator versions less than 40 per cent coded it as violent 
or aggressive and were more inclined to believe in some situational cause for the 
action. 
Another study showed a similar result in an interview situation.38 Interviewers were told 
that the candidates they were about to interview were either introverts or extroverts. The 
interviewers were given a list of questions to select from during the interview. The 
researchers found that when interviewing ostensibly extrovert candidates the interviewers 
selected questions which were more likely to reveal extrovert tendencies. For example, 
the interviewers would select questions such as "What would you do if you wanted to 
liven things up at a party?" Similarly, with ostensibly introvert candidates the 
interviewers would select introvert questions such as "What factors make it hard for you 
to really open up to people?" In other words, the interviewers were actively seeking 
information that would confinn their pre-existing conceptions. 
The second way in which stereotypes can become self-fulfilling is by their effect 
on the person being perceived. Individuals tend to react to other peoples perceptions of 
themselves. Thus, if a woman is speaking to someone whom she suspects is antagonistic 
towards her, her language, tone of voice and body language are likely to come across as 
being hostile. This, in turn, is likely to cause the person to whom she is speaking to 
adopt a hostile attitude towards her, thereby confinning her initial perception of 
antagonism. 
A number of experiments have looked at this phenomena in an interview 
situation. A study by Word et al looked at the effect of colour on interviewers.39 A 
group of interviewees, half Black and half White were trained to react in a standardised 
37 The results of this study are summarised in Oakes P et aI, p 58 and in Brown R. above, p 100. 
38 The results of this study are summarised in Brown R, above, p 94 and Oakes P et aI, above, p 59. 
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way. White subjects were asked to role play the position of interviewer. Observation of 
the interviewers' behaviour showed subtle differences in behaviour with Black and White 
interviewees. The interviewers tended to sit further away from the Black interviewees 
and to lean further back in their seats, the interviews were on average 25 per cent (or 
three minutes) shorter and contained more speech disfluencies (for example, stuttering, 
hesitations). A second experiment looked at the effect of these differences on the 
performance of the interviewees. The researchers found that the interviewees' behaviour 
seemed to reciprocate that of the interviewers. For example, if the interviewer adopted a 
"-(j 
friendly attitude and spoke fluently the interviewees behaved similarly. This, in tum, 
affected the interviewers' assessment of the interviewees' suitability for appointment.40 
THE VERACITY AND RATIONALITY OF STEREOTYPES 
One of the main problems with measuring the veracity of a stereotype is finding an 
objective standard against which the stereotype can be judged. For example, height can 
be measured in centimetres, weight can be measured in kilos and speed can be measured 
in distance travelled in a given time. However, many stereotypes relate to characteristics 
that can only be measured subjectively eg physical attractiveness or frugality. 
Conceptions of beauty differ from person to person as well as between cultures and over 
time. What is perceived as being thrifty in one culture may be perceived as being stingy 
in another culture. Moreover, characteristics change depending on whom the comparison 
is made with. The English may be described as thrifty when compared with Italians but 
profligate when compared with the Scottish. 
Leaving these problems aside, there are two points that can be made about 
subjective characteristics. First, it may be possible to identify objective criteria that are 
evidence of the subjective criteria. For example, it may be rational to make a link 
between being thrifty (subjective characteristic) and the saving to spending ratio of a 
particular group (objective characteristic). If there are two groups of people with 
approximately the same average mcome and it is known that group A saves 
39 The results of this study are summarised in Brown R, above, p 106., , 
40 h h b ber of studies which have looked at whether academIC perfOlmanc~ IS affected by T ere ave een anum , 
teacher expectation: see Brown R, above, p 107 and Le~ Y-T et aI, above, p _-+8. 
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proportionately more than group B it would be reasonable to conclude from this 
infonnation that group A is thriftier than group B. In this way, while it may not be 
possible to directly measure the accuracy of a particular stereotype there may be evidence 
which supports it one way or the other. Second, some characteristics are generally 
accepted as being inherently subjective but this does not detract from their usefulness in 
some contexts. If the readers of a magazine vote a particular model as the most beautiful 
woman in the world the fact that this assessment is sUbjective may be immaterial to the 
marketing director of a perfume company. What is important to the director, is that a 
-"'~ 
significant percentage of the popUlation consider the model to be attractive. 
Another problem that arises in relation to measuring the accuracy of stereotypes 
is that in some circumstances people apply different standards to different groups. For 
example, a 5 ft, 9 in man may be perceived as being average while a 5 ft, 9 in woman is 
perceived as being tall despite the fact that they are objectively the same height. 
Similarly, people may apply shifting standards when measuring attributes such as verbal 
ability, competence and aggression in men and women. Thus the sterec type that men are 
more aggressive than women might mean that on any objective standard a man rated as 
"very aggressive" is actually more aggressive than a woman rated as "very aggressive" .41 
In practice, this phenomena means that when people are judged on an impressionistic 
basis there is a danger that different standards will be used. For example, if a selection 
board is asked to judge a candidate's level of confidence on the basis of his or her 
perfonnance at interview there is a possibility that a woman rated as very confident may 
actually be no more confident than a man judged to be average. 
41 The use of subjective standards can obscure the use of stereotypes. Biernat demonstrated this in an 
experiment using a number of full-body photos of men and women. Unknown to the "Ubjects the photos 
were matched so that for every man there was a woman of the same height. Some of the subjects were 
asked to judge height in feet and inches (objective condition) and o~her,s were a~~ed to judge ~eight, on ~e 
basis of a seven point response scale ranging from short to tall (sUbjectIve condItIon). The subjects Judgrng 
on the basis of the objective condition of feet and inches showed a greater tendency to over predict the 
height of the men than the subject using the subject condition. In other words, the use of the subjective 
standard of measurement tended to obscure the subjects use of the stereotype that men a~e taller than 
women. Biernat found similar results with skills such as competence. For example, subjects were asked 
to judge an article for competence. The author of the article was changed from m~le to female. Subjects 
. d' th article on an obiective standard of measurement revealed a greater relIance on the stereotype 
JU gmg e J , 'd' b" d d B' ~ 
th t ore competent than women than the subjects JU gmg on a su ~ectlve stan ar: lernat 1\'1. a men are l' d "L 
'Th h'ft' standards model: implications of stereotype accuracy lor SOCIa JU gment m ee Y-T, 
e s I mg d .' diffi h 1 Jussim L and McCauley C eds, Stereotype accuracy: towar appreclatmg group I erences, c p .... 
( 1995). 
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There is no evidence that people think stereotypes are 100% true.42 Although a 
person may say, "Blacks are athletic," when asked if this is a characteristic of all Black 
people the answer will inevitably be no. People clearly understand that stereotypes are 
generalisations and as such, they do not apply to every member of a group. Even if a 
stereotype is not 100% accurate it can still be rational if it has a reasonable probability of 
predicting an event happening.43 Scientific laws are examples of rational categories. For 
example, a person can rely on Newton's second law of motion to predict that the force 
exerted by an object is equal to its mass multiplied by its acceleration. In the absence of 
~~ 
any information other than sex, a person can rationally predict that a woman will live 
longer than a man and that a man will be heavier and taller than a woman. However, it 
would be less rational to predict that a man is corrupt because he is a politician or that a 
woman comes from Essex because she is called Sharon. The key issue is not whether a 
stereotype is a 1000/0 accurate but whether group membership is a reasonable basis for 
predicting that an individual member of the group has a particular characteristic. 
It is often assumed that many stereotypes are exaggerations of real differences. 
McCauley has reviewed some of the more significant studies that provide evidence for 
and against the exaggeration hypothesis.44 The main difficulty with testing the 
exaggeration hypothesis is obtaining accurate figures for group differences against which 
stereotypes can be measured. For example, one study that McCauley ~'eviews examines 
whether people tend to exaggerate the differences between male and female personality 
traits.45 The subjects were asked to estimate the percentage of male and female 
university students having each of 16 male and 16 female personality traits. The 'actual' 
distribution of these traits was obtained by asking the same students whether each of the 
32 traits was true of themselves. The study found that the students made substantial 
errors in estimating personality traits but the tendency to exaggerate was not strong. 
However, as McCauley points out, the researchers' method for ascertaining actual 
differences was not necessarily reliable. Many of the personality traits were value laden 
42 J . L Lee Y-Tand McCauley C, 'Why study stereotype accuracy and inaccuracy' in Lee Y-T, 
us sun , d ., diffi h 1 Jussim L and McCauley C eds, Stereoiype accuracy: towar appreczatmg group 1 erences, c p , 
(1995). 
43 Allport G, above, p 21. .... 
44 McCauley C, 'Are stereotypes exaggerated? A samplmg of racIal, gender, acaderruc, occupatIOnal and 
political stereotypes' in Lee Y -T et aI, above, chp 9. 
45 McCauley C, above, p 223. 
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and many people would prefer not to admit that they have negative personality traits such 
as being aggressive or lack positive personality traits like being warm. It is possible, 
therefore, that the subjects were accurate in their estimations and that any error lay with 
the subj ects perceptions of their own attributes. 
McCauley himself conducted a study that used the American census statistics in 
order to measure the degree of exaggeration. Five groups of White subjects were asked 
to estimate the percentage of Black Americans and the percentage of all Americans with 
seven characteristics. Percentages for each characteristic were available from the 
American census. The results of the study are set out below. 
Criterion differences and mean estimated differences 
between Black Americans and all Americans 
Characteristic Criterion High School College Union Choir MSW 
students 
n 10 17 12 10 13 
1. completed 
-21 -22 -IS -IS -23 -22 
high school 
2. illegitimate 23 14 5a 12a 16 loa 
3. unemployed 7 9 5 9 16 7 
last month 
4. victim of 2 -5 6 7 7 S 
violent crime 
5. family on IS 22 Sa 6a 15 6a 
welfare 
6. family with 7 13 6 9 7 7 
4+ children 
7. female head 21 lOa l1 a Sa sa 12 
of family 
Note: Criterion is data from U.S. census. MSW = master of social work 
a Mean estimated difference differs from criterion difference by 10 or more percentage points 
The second column of the table shows the difference in the percentage of Blacks 
and all Americans according to the United States census, ie the percentage of Blacks 
minus the percentage of all Americans. In the case of the criterion completed high 
school, 600/0 of all Americans completed high school compared with 390/0 of Black 
Americans. The difference between the two is therefore -21 percentage points. With the 
. . '11 't'mate 11 % of all Americans are illegitimate compared with 3.+0/0 of Black cntenon 1 egl 1 , 
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Americans. The difference between the two is therefore 23 percentage points.46 Of the 
35 comparisons, only ten (marked with a superscript a) departed from the census figures 
by ten or more percentage points. All ten were underestimates rather than exaggerations. 
Three out of the five groups of subjects underestimated the percentage of Black 
American families on welfare, three groups underestimated the percentage of illegitimate 
Black Americans and four out of the five groups underestimated the percentage of Black 
American families with a female head. Overall, the results show considerable accuracy 
in the subjects' ability to predict the differences between all Americans and Black 
Americans.47 
A recent study by Jussim and Eccles looked at the accuracy of teachers' 
perceptions of sex, class or ethnic differences in student performance.48 The study found 
that teachers perceived girls as performing slightly better than boys and middle-class 
students as performing slightly better than lower-class students. The results on ethnicity 
were mixed. In segregated districts teachers perceived no differences between Black and 
White students. In integrated districts they evaluated White students more highly. The 
study also found that for the most part the teachers' perceptions were accurate. The one 
exception to this pattern was for ethnicity in the segregated areas. Teachers perceived 
Black students as favourably as other students when in fact their test scores were not as 
high. It seems therefore, that there is insufficient evidence of a large and consistent 
exaggeration effect in group stereotyping. The studies show that while significant 
exaggeration does occur, so does under estimation of group differences. 
STEREOTYPES VERSUS INDNIDUATING INFORMATION 
Despite the fact that it is irrational to do so, some studies have shown that people rely on 
stereotypes even when information is available about an individua1.49 In one study a 
number of business managers were asked to comment on the likelihJod of inviting a 
46 The actual percentage points are given in a table in McCaule~ C, a?ove, p 229.. . 
47 S I Pink S above p 313 who states: "Ordinary people s estimates of these dIfferences are fauly 
ee a so er, , . ., h' I 
t d · some cases people with more contact WIth a mmonty group, suc as SOCIa workers, have accura e, an III , . . 
. . t' d un~ortunately more accurate estimates of the frequency ofnegahve traIts such as more pessImls IC, an l' , 
illegitimacy and welfare dependency." 
48 Lee Y -T et ai, above, p 249. 
49 Brown R, above, p 92. 
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candidate for interview on the basis of a brief curriculum vitae. The curricula vitae 
identified the sex of the candidate and indicated either traditionally masculine, feminine 
or neutral interests. The researchers found that the sex and interests of the candidates 
influenced managers. Male candidates were more likely to be short-listed for a sales 
manager job and females for a dental receptionist position.50 
However, other studies on the effect of gender stereotypes have found that a 
minimal amount of subjectively diagnostic infonnation about an individual's actual 
behaviour can be sufficient to displace stereotypical judgements. A study by LQc,ksley et 
-,. i 
allooked at the effect of individuating infonnation on the stereotype that men are more 
aggressive than women. 51 In the first experiment subjects were given a five page 
fictitious but ostensibly real transcript of a telephone conversation between two college 
students that described three experiences which the student had had over the past week. 
The behaviour of the student was either passive or assertive. The sex of the student was 
either identified as male or female or not identified to the subjects. The experiences 
involved being harassed by a seedy character while shopping, interrupting a student in 
class and breaking into a group conversation at a party. Subjects were asked to predict 
the characteristics of the student and to predict how he/she would react in a number of 
novel situations. 
The researchers hypothesised that the subjects' assessments of the student would 
be affected by the stereotypical view that men are more likely to be assertive than 
women. Contrary to their expectations, the researchers found no evidence for this 
hypothesis. Instead, "subjects relied on available behavioural infonnation to predict the 
target's behaviour in novel situations and to rate the target on a set of personality trait 
dimensions.,,52 The researchers concluded that: "a strong implication of this research is 
that a minimal amount of diagnostic target case information would be sufficient to 
eliminate the impact of stereotypical beliefs on judgements of the target individuals."s3 
The researchers conducted a second experiment in which subj ects were first asked 
to indicate their beliefs about the percentage of males who are assertive and the 
50 Brown R, above, p 93. . ., " 
51 Locksley A et aI, 'Sex stereotypes and socIal Judgement (1980) 39 Journal of Personality and SocIal 
Psychology 821. 
52 Locksley A et aI, above, p 825. 
53 Locksley A et aI, above, p 826. 
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percentage of females who are assertive. The mean percentage for the number of males 
judged to be assertive was 56.1 % whereas the mean estimate for women judged to be 
assertive was 43.5%. A difference of almost 13 percentage points. The subjects were 
then asked to make trait judgements on the basis of (a) sex alone, (1') sex and a brief 
description of a single behavioural event which was intended to be non-diagnostic in 
relation to the trait of assertiveness and, ( c) sex and a brief description of a single 
behavioural event which was intended to be diagnostic in relation to the trait of 
asserti veness. 54 
The researchers found that when subjects only had information about the target's 
sex they were more likely to find that male targets were assertive than female targets. 
This pattern continued when the subjects had additional non-diagnostic information 
about the targets. In contrast, when the subjects were given diagnostic information about 
the targets their judgements about male and female targets were vi!iUally identical. In 
other words, the subjects no longer relied on their stereotype about the relative 
assertiveness of women and men. The researchers concluded that "a single instance of 
moderately diagnostic information is sufficient to swamp the effects of social category 
information. ,,55 
A second study by Locksley et al investigated the effect of strong and weak 
diagnostic information on stereotypical beliefs. 56 The study considered both 
stereotypical views on levels of male and female aggression and stereotypical beliefs 
about 'night people' and 'day people'. Both experiments in the study found that 
stereotypical beliefs were ignored whether the case information was strongly or only 
weakly diagnostic of the criterion. 57 The Locksley studies provide some evidence for the 
hypothesis that even weakly diagnostic information about an individual can lead an 
individual to disregard a pre-existing stereotype. 58 
54 The non-diagnostic descriptions included the following example: "Yesterd~y Tom went to get his hair 
c t. He had an early morning appointment because he had classes that day. Smce the place where he gets h~s hair cut is near the campus, he had no problem getting to class on time." The diagn?stic descriptions 
included: "The other day Nancy was in a class in whic~ sh~ wanted to m~ke se:eral pomts about the 
d' being discussed. But another student was donunahng the class dISCUSSIOn so thoroughly that she 
rea mgs . th d' . d h ." had to abruptly interrupt this student in order to break mto e ISCUSSIOn an express er own VIews. 
55 Locksley A et aI, above, p 830. . . ..' , 
56 Locksley A et aI, 'Social stereotypes an~ Judgements of mdivIduals: an mstance of the base rate fallacy 
(1982) 18 Journal of experimental and SOCIal psychology 23. 
57 Locksley A et aI, above, p 38. 
58 For criticisms of the Locksley studies see Brown R, above, p 90. 
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IS THE BLANKET PROHmITION ON SEX STEREOTYPES WARRANTED? 
Much of the bad press associated with stereotyping derives from the assumption that they 
are inaccurate or, as best, contain only a kernel of truth. Quite clearly, there is no logical 
basis for acting on the basis of wholly inaccurate assumptions. Thus, in relation to a 
particular model of car there is no point in buying a green car as opposed to a blue car on 
the assumption that green cars go faster than blue cars. In this context, the stereotype in 
question (ie that colour has an impact on speed) is wholly inaccurate. However, some 
stereotypes, although not 100% accurate are true about a relatively high proportion of the 
members of the group. For example, the stereotype that women do not have the strength 
to lift heavy weights is true about a relatively high proportion of women. 59 Thus, the 
stereotype is a reasonable basis for predicting whether a particular w?men has the ability 
to lift heavy weights. Furthermore, there is evidence to support the hypothesis that, in 
relation to some characteristics at least, ordinary people's estimates of the degree of 
difference are fairly accurate. It is not the case that all stereotypes are necessarily 
exaggerated and, in some cases, there is a tendency to under estimate group differences. 
How accurate does a stereotype have to be before an employer should be able to 
rely on it? If the issue is whether an individual has a particular characteristic or not, it is 
only rational to rely on a stereotype if it is over 50% accurate as this indicates that it is 
more likely than not that the characteristic applies. If it is known that 4% of men are 
colour blind and the only information known about a person is his sex, it would be 
irrational to assume that a particular man is colour blind. To the contrary, the rational 
assumption to make would be that the man is not colour blind. Thus, 51 % is the 
minimum level of accuracy that can give rise to a rational decision. 
The position is slightly different if the issue is whether it is more likely that a man 
or woman has a particular characteristic. In this situation the important factor is the size 
of the difference between the two figures rather than the absolute numbers. Assume the 
characteristic in question is nimble fingers. Is the stereotype accurate enough if 900/0 of 
women and 20% of men have flexible fingers? What if the figures are 70% and 30% or 
59 One study found that women had an average of 44% of the upper body strength of men and 72% of the 
leg strength: Baker M ed, Sex differences in human performance, (1987) P 109. 
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even closer at 54% and 52%? It is almost certainly impossible to fix on a figure that will 
apply in all cases. Another way of looking at the problem is to analyse the level of risk 
that an employer should have to take that a particular employee will lack a particular 
characteristics. Considered from this perspective the answer is probably that it depends 
on the consequences of the characteristics being lacking in relation to the job in question. 
If the characteristic is nimble fingers and the job is sewing shirts, the consequences to the 
employer of a lack of nimbleness is a lack of productivity. By comparison, if the job in 
question is micro surgery the consequences for the employer are potentially more 
serious. It is arguable that a lower level of accuracy is warranted in the latter case than in 
the fonner case. Thus, the impact on the employer is likely to be the one of the factors 
that detennines the level of accuracy required in any particular case. 
Accuracy is only one of the factors that needs to be taken into account. Also 
relevant is the question of individuating information. An employer may be accurate in its 
assumption that 90% of women are incapable of operating a particular piece of 
machinery because they lack the requisite body strength. However, it would be irrational 
for an employer to rely solely on that assumption in the face of evidence that a particular 
woman has previously operated the same kind of machinery for another employer. This 
additional information clearly means that the employer's stereotype, although highly 
accurate, does not apply in this particular case. 
This raises the question of how far an employer should have to go in obtaining 
individuating information. Some anthropometric characteristics such as height, strength 
and flexibility are relatively straightforward to assess. However, many characteristics 
that are deemed desirable in a work environment are more difficult to measure. For 
example, an employer may be looking for a highly assertive personality. Not only is this 
difficult to measure on an objective basis but there is the associated problem of shifting 
standards to content with. A job may involve a high level of training and investment on 
the part of the employer. In return, the employer may be looking for an employee who is 
willing to stay in the job for a substantial period of time. The employer may be aware of 
a relatively accurate stereotype that women tend to stay in the same job for longer than 
men. Obviously, this is affected by a large number of personal factors such as age, the 
state of the job market and family circumstances. However, the impact of these factors 
on a particular individual is difficult to predict particularly over the long term. 
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Therefore, in the absence of any specific information that indicates an individual is 
unlikely to stay in the job for a substantial period, it would be rational for the employer 
to rely on the stereotype. 
Accordingly, there are two hurdles confronting an employer wishing to rely on a 
sex stereotype. The first is that the stereotype is sufficiently accurate and the second is 
that there is no reasonably accessible individuating information. In practice, there are 
likely to be very few situations in which these two criteria are satisfied. In terms of 
accuracy, the vast majority of sex differences are not particularly large60 and, therefore, it 
~{ 
is unlikely that an employer will be able to show that it is rational to rely on them. Even 
where the differences are at their largest, for example differences in physical strength, in 
most cases individuating information is relatively easily accessible. Thus, it seems that 
there is little scope for employers to use sex stereotypes on a rational basis. However, 
that does not mean that there is no scope for their rational use. It is possible that there 
are some circumstances where the two criteria set out above are satisfied. This would 
make the use of a sex stereotype rational and could form the basis for an exception to the 
blanket prohibition. However, rationality by itself is not a suffi~ent basis for an 
exception to the prohibition. In the context of indirect discrimination the use of measures 
that have a disproportionate impact on one sex may be rational but they are only lawful if 
the employer can demonstrate that the practice is objectively justified. The justification 
defence is discussed in more detail in chapter five but one of its key elements involves a 
balancing exercise between the benefit to the employer and the detriment suffered by the 
employee. It is arguable that any exception or defence to the use of a sex stereotype 
would have to incorporate a similar proportionality test. The exact format of a possible 
justification defence for direct sex discrimination is discussed in detail in chapter 7. For 
the purposes of this chapter it is sufficient to make the point that there is scope for the 
rational use of sex stereotypes by employers which could give rise to the basis for an 
exception or defence to the blanket prohibition against their use. 
60 See Baker M, above and Archer J and Lloyd B, Sex and gender, (1985) for an overview of the main 
physical and cognitive sex differences. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is often assumed that stereotyping arises from a defect in the cognitive processes of the 
brain. In fact, there are two competing theories that explain why stereotyping takes 
place. The first theory sees categorisation as a way of dealing with information overload 
by putting people and objects into categories in order to reduce the stimuli to a 
manageable number. The second theory sees categorisation as a positive development on 
the part of the mind that allows for the drawing of inferences thereby giving the 
"',y 
individual more information on which to make rational decisions. Whichever theory is 
correct, it is clear that categorisation is part of the normal cognitive pr~cess and does not 
constitute any malfunction or wrong thinking on the part of the individual. To the extent 
that there is a problem with stereotyping it arises from the second part of the process, the 
attribution of characteristics on the basis of group membership. Even then, in many 
circumstances it is entirely rational to infer that a person has a particular attribute on the 
basis of group membership because the stereotype is highly accurate. However, even if a 
stereotype is highly accurate, it is irrational to rely on it in the presence of individuating 
information that contradicts the stereotype. 
The use of sex stereotypes in the employment context needs to be examined in 
the light of these two conditions on the rational use of stereotypes. The stereotype must 
be accurate and there must be an absence of additional information abtmt the individual 
that contradicts or undermines the stereotypes. In practice, there are likely to be few 
situations in which these conditions are satisfied in an employment context because the 
closeness of the relationship means that it is possible for employers to access 
individuating information. In an appointment situation the employer can test whether an 
individual has a particular characteristic in interview, through the use of psychometric or 
other tests, or by taking-up references from a previous employer. Individuating 
information is even more accessible for existing employees particularly if they have 
worked for the employer for a considerable period of time. Thus the need for employers 
to second guess whether an individual has a particular characteristics on the basis of his 
or her sex should be very limited. However, there may be situations if' which sex is the 
only available indicator of whether an individual has a particular characteristic. If that 
situation arises, and if the stereotype relied upon is sufficiently accurate, there is an 
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arguable case that the use of the stereotype should be lawful subject to the application of 
an appropriate justification defence. 
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4 
LEGISLATIVE EXCEPTIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter considers the main existing legislative exceptions that ~pply to cases of 
direct discrimination in order to determine their scope and underlying rJtionale<;.~The four 
exceptions considered are sex as a genuine occupational qualification, positive action, 
pregnancy and maternity, and, in the field of occupational pension schemes, actuarial 
factors and bridging pensions. 1 
SEX AS A GENUINE OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATION 
European Law 
The ETD has a general exception for situations in which the sex of the worker constitutes 
a determining factor. There is no similar exception in Article 141, no doubt because the 
rationale underlying the exception warrants the exclusion of one sex from certain jobs 
rather than paying them less once they are in ajob. Article 2(2) of the ETD states: 
This Directive shall be without prejUdice to the right of Member States to exclude 
from its field of application those occupational activities and, where appropriate, 
the training leading thereto, for which, by reason of their nature of the context in 
which they are carried out, the sex of the worker constitutes a determining factor. 
Furthermore, article 9(2) provides that member states shall periodically review any 
occupations excluded under article 2(2) to see if the exclusions should be maintained in 
the light of social developments. 2 
The ETD does not define when sex constitutes a determining factor. There is 
very little case law on the scope of the derogation although, in the three cases that have 
1 Although there are other Exceptions in the legislation they relate to employment in particular professions 
and, therefore, they do not disclose any general principles in terms of their underlying rationale. The three 
Exceptions are: police officers (5 17), ministers of religion (s 19) and prison officers (s 18). 
2 For the combined impact of articles 2(2) and 2(3) see: Fenwick H. 'Special protections for women in 
European Union Law' in Hervey T and O'Keeffe D ed5, Sex equality in the European Union, chp 5 
(1996). 
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come before the EeJ the Court has held that the following jobs are covered; armed police 
officers/ midwives4 and prison warders. 5 In addition, it is possible to derive a few 
principles about the scope of the derogation from the case law. First, as the article is a 
derogation from the rights of the Directive it should be interpreted strictly.6 Second, as 
with all derogations the article is subject to the principle of proportionality. Exactly what 
that principle means in the context of article 2(2) was explained by the ECJ in the case of 
Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary. 7 The applicant was 
dismissed from her job as a result of the respondent's decision not to arm female police 
''''>{; 
officers. The applicant complained of sex discrimination and the tribunal referred to the 
ECJ the question of whether employment as an armed member of a police force is a job 
for which the sex of the worker constitutes a determining factor under article 2(2). The 
ECJ held that given the situation in Northern Ireland, it was possible to argue that the 
carrying of firearms by policewomen might create additional r:isks of their being 
assassinated and, therefore, it might be contrary to the requirements of public safety.8 In 
those circumstances it may be that the sex of the police officer constitutes a determining 
factor subject to the application of the proportionality principle. 
It must also be borne in mind that, in determining the scope of any derogation 
. from an individual right such as the equal treatment of men and women provided 
for by the directive, the principle of proportionality, one of the general principles 
of law underlying the Community legal order, must be observed. That principle 
requires that derogations remain within the limits of what is appropriate and 
necessary for achieving the aim in view and requires the principle of equal 
treatment to be reconciled as far as possible with the requirements of public 
safety which constitutes the decisive factor as regards the context of the activity 
in question. (para 38) 
In other words, as in cases of justification of indirect discrimination, the European test of 
proportionality involves an investigation as to whether there is a causal link between the 
3 Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] 3 CMLR 240, ECl For a note of 
this case see Shrubsall V, 'Protective practices and the Equal Treatment Directive' (1987) 16 ILJ 118. 
4 Re Equal Treatment Directive: EC Commission v United Kingdom [1984] 1 CMLR 44, ECl 
5 Re Sex Discrimination in the Civil Service: EC Commission v France [1989] 3 CMLR 663, ECl 
6 Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, see above. 
7 See above. 
8 The Court appears to have accepted at face. value. the re~pondent's argument that policewomen are more 
likely to be assassinated than policemen. It IS not rrnmedlately apparent why thlS should be the case: see 
Ellis E, EC Sex Equality Law, (1998) p 238. 
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aim of the employer and the means chosen to achieve that aim and whether there is any 
other non-discriminatory means of achieving the same aim. 
Third, the derogation only applies to specific jobs and not to wider categories 
such as employment in a private household. The ECJ made this point in Re Equal 
Treatment Directive: EC Commission v United Kingdom 9 when the European 
Commission complained about the exception in s 6(3) of the SDA for private households 
and employers employing five or less employees. The United Kingdom government 
argued that the former exception fell within the scope of article 2(2) because ewployment 
in a private household or by a small employer involves close personal relationships and it 
would not be legally possible to prevent employers from employing a person of a certain 
sex. The ECJ rejected this argument on the basis that while there may be some jobs in 
private households and with small employers that are of a personal nature and fall within 
article 2(2), it is not the case for all kinds of employment. The final,principle that can be 
extracted from the cases is that any exceptions must be transparent so that it is possible to 
identify exactly which jobs are being restricted to one sex.IO Thus, it is not permissible to 
use quotas in the recruitment of all police officers on the basis that some police jobs can 
be performed only by one sex. II 
Domestic Law 
In contrast to the European derogation, s 7 of the SDA sets out a precise list of the 
circumstances in which sex can be a genuine occupational qualification. Section 7 is an 
attempt to deal with all of the physical and social differences between the sexes that can 
be relevant to the performance of any particular job. As the Government conceded at the 
second reading of the Bill, this was "inevitably a difficult drafting job".12 However, the 
Government resisted the attempts of the Opposition to insert a more general defence that 
would apply whenever the tribunal was satisfied that sex was a genuine occupational 
qualification "having regard to equity and the substantial merits of the case".13 The 
opposition argued that it was necessary to have a safety-net exception in order to prevent 
9 [1984] 1 CMLR 44, ECJ. 
10 Re Sex Discrimination in the Civil Service: EC Commission v France [1989] 3 CMLR 663, ECl 
II For the implementation of article 2(2) in other members states see: Docksey C, 'The principle of equal 
treatment between women and men as a fundamental right under Community law' (1991) 20 ILJ 258 at 
267. 
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the measure from comIng into disrepute by some unforeseen case. However, the 
government successfully defeated the proposed amendment on the basis that if some 
justifiable exception came to light in the future, it could be introduced into the SDA by 
statutory instrument under s 80. 14 
The exceptions only apply to appointments, promotions, training and transfer (s 
7(1 )). They do not apply to dismissals l5 or to terms and conditions of employment. 16 
Furthermore, it is not necessary that all of the duties of a job fall within one of the 
exceptions as long as some of the duties are covered (s 7(3)). In a case on the .. s.imilarly 
worded provisions in the RRA, the EAT held that the genuine occupational qualification 
will apply if the relevant duty is "not so trivial that it can properly be disregarded 
altogether". 17 
The exceptions in s 7 cover a multitude of situations. 18 However, it is possible to 
identify four separate rationales underlying the exceptions. 19 These are artistic licence, 
decency, social utility and financial considerations. The scope of the various exceptions 
is considered in more detail below under these four headings. 
12 Roy Jenkins (Secretary of State for the Home Department) 889 HC 511. 
13 Ian Gilmour, Standing Committee B, 1 May 1975, 178. 
14 Under s 80(1) the Secretary of State can amend s 7 by an order the draft of which has been approved by 
both Houses of Parliament. The likelihood is that any general exception would have been struck down by 
the ECJ in the same way that the general exception for small employers and private households was 
rejected by the Court (see above). 
15 In a redundancy situation where the job content of the remaining job is to be altered in order to add 
duties that constitute a genuine occupational qualification, it is possible to separate the transfer to the new 
job from the dismissal of the remaining employees. In this way, it is possible to take advantage of s 7 
despite the fact that it does not apply to dismissals: Timex Corporation v. Hodgson [1982] ICR 63, EAT. 
16 As there is no parallel provision in the EPA or Article 141 it is not possible to give an employee less 
favourable contractual benefits on the basis of a genuine occupational qualification. 
17 Tottenham Green Under Five's Centre v. Marshall (No 2) [1991] IRLR 162, EAT. 
18 There are four additional exceptions that only apply in cases of discrimination on the ground of gender 
res assignment. These are intimate physical searches under statutory powers, working in a private home, 
shared accommodation and the provision of personal services to vulnerable individuals. The latter two 
exceptions are only temporary in that they cease to apply once the gender reassignment process is 
complete: Sex Discrimination (Gender Reassignment) Regulations 1999, SI 1999 No ~.102. 
19 There is one exception that does not appear to have any obvious rationale. The exception applies when a 
job is one of two to be held by a married couple (s 7(2)(g)). As it is not contrary to the SDA to 
discriminate against an unmarried person, the effect of the exception is to allow an employer to specify 
which of two jobs should be held by each member of a married couple. In other words, an employer can 
advertise for a cleaner and a gardener and stipulate that the former is done by the wife and the latter by the 
husband. It is not clear why such an exception exists given that in any other context, an employer cannot 
stipulate that a cleaner should be a woman and a gardener a man. 
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Artistic licence 
The exception in s 7(2)(a) provides for what can loosely be described as a degree of 
artistic freedom. The section applies to dramatic performances or other entertainment 
where, for reasons of authenticity, the essential nature of the job would be materially 
different if carried out by a person of the other sex.20 The result is that producers of 
dramatic performances or other forms of entertainment are given a relatively free hand 
when it comes to casting decisions. Thus, if a play is written with a part for a male 
doctor, the producer is not obliged to consider women actors for the part despit~. the fact 
""'i, 
that women can act as men and visa versa. Or, if the entertainment on offer is live 
telephone chat with "girls", the employer is entitled to reject any applications from men.21 
In theory, the exception is limited to cases where a man or woman is needed for reasons 
of authenticity. However, in practice the authenticity requirement iE: often ignored in 
cases involving conceptual casting.22 This is where a woman is ca~t in a man's role to 
make a point (eg Fiona Shaw as Richard II at the National Theatre) or purely for artistic 
effect (eg the production of the ballet Swan Lake using male swans). 
Decency 
The second category of exception balances the anti-discrimination principle against the 
individual rights of privacy and decency. Although both of these words appear in the 
SDA, in fact privacy does not appear to play any part in the rationale for the defence. 
The right to privacy implies a right to solitude or seclusion, the idea that individuals 
have, in some circumstances, a right to be left alone. In fact, this right is not protected at 
all by s 7. The legislation does not give an individual a right to undress in private, only a 
right not to undress in the presence of someone of a particular sex. As a result, the 
exceptions are primarily aimed at the preservation of decency rather than any right to 
pnvacy. 
There are no less than three sub-sections devoted to the preservation of decency. 
Section 7(2)(b) ensures that people do not have to undress or use sanitary facilities in the 
20 Section 7(2)(a) also applies in other situations which are considered below under the heading of social 
utility. 
21 Cropper v UK Express Ltd EOR Discrimination C~se Law Dig~st No 12 S~mmer 1992, p.2. ,. . 
22 Pitt G, 'Madam Butterfly and Miss Saigon: reflechons on genume occupatIOnal quailficatIOns m Dme J 
and Watt B, eds, Discrimination fmv: concepts, limitations andjustifications, chp 15, (1996). 
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presence of someone of the opposite sex. Thus this exception applies to shop assistants 
whose work involves measuring and fitting customers23 and care attendants whose 
responsibilities include the provision of intimate care.24 One of the main uses of this 
section is to restrict women from working in men's toilets and visa versa.25 
Section 7(2)(ba) applies where an employee either works or lives in a private 
household. A householder can make reasonable objection to a person of a particular sex 
working in the house where the job involves a degree of physical or social contact with a 
person living in the home or the employee is likely to gain knowledge of a.person's 
intimate details.26 There is a considerable overlap between this section and s 7(2)(b). For 
example, a home help who helps an elderly person with getting dressed would be 
covered by s 7(2)(b). In practice, there are unlikely to be many cases that do not satisfy 
the decency test of s 7(2)(b) but have a sufficient degree of physical or social contact or 
knowledge of intimate details in order to come within s 7(2)(ba).17 One situation that 
might come within s 7(2)(ba) but not s 7(2)(b) is where physical contact is required but 
the recipient is not in a state of undress or using sanitary facilities, for example an elderly 
person who requires help with eating. 
Section 7(2)(c) deals with the situation where due to the nature or location of the 
establishment, the job holder has to live in premises provided by the employer. Two 
conditions have to be satisfied for the section to apply. First, the premises are not 
equipped with separate sleeping accommodation or sanitary facilities that could be used 
by women in privacy from men. Second, it is not reasonable to expect the employer to 
equip the premises with separate accommodation and facilities. This section is meant to 
cover jobs where there is degree of residence required for example work on ships, 
23 Rowson v. Contessa (Ladieswear) Ltd EOR Discrimination Case Law Digest No 23 Spring 1995 p 4. 
Although, the exception won't apply where it is possible to reallocate the measuring or fitting part of the 
job to another employee without causing undue inconvenience to the employer: Wylie v. Dee & Co 
(Menswear) Ltd [1978] IRLR 103 IT. 
24 Salisbury v. Aster House Nursing Home EOR Discrimination Case Law Digest No 14 Winter 1992, p 4. 
25 See for example Carlton v. Personnel Hygiene Services Ltd EOR Discrimination Case Law Digest No 3 
Spring 1990, p 3. 
26 This section replaces the previous exemption in s 6(3) for private households after the Ee] ruled that a 
general exclusion for private households infringed the provisions of ar.ticle 2(2) of the ETD. See Re Equal 
Treatment Directive: EC Commission v United Kingdom, above. SeCTIon 6(3) was repealed by s 1(2) of 
the SDA 1986. 
27 See for example Neal v. Watts EOR Discrimination Case Law Digest No 3 Spring 1990 P 2. 
77 
lighthouses and remote construction sites. It does not cover shift work even if the shifts 
are long enough for the employee to sleep on the premises. 28 
Social utility 
Three of the exceptions in s 7 are to some extent based on social utility arguments. In 
other words, in some circumstances direct discrimination enhances some benefit to 
society and that benefit outweighs the goal of sex equality. Thus, it may be preferable to 
discriminate in the recruitment of sex education counsellors if the result is a reduction in 
the number of unwanted pregnancies. This is the same social utility argument that is 
sometimes used in the context of reverse discrimination and positive action. 29 
First, as well as providing for a degree of artistic licence, s 7(2)(a) also applies 
where "the essential nature of the job calls for a man for reasons of physiology 
(excluding strength or stamina". 30 This exception covers the few jobs where the 
existance of a categorical or unique sex difference means that only one sex can 
physically perform the job. The rationale for these jobs tends to be a social utility one 
although it can also cover situations where one sex is needed to do a job for financial 
reasons (see below). Obvious social utility examples are surrogate mothers and sperm 
donors. 
Second, there is an exception In s 7(2)(e) that applies where the job holder 
provides individuals with personal services31 such as the promotion 0':: their welfare or 
education and those services can most effectively be provided by a person of that sex. 
The references to welfare and education indicate that this is mainly, if not wholly, a 
social utility exception. In practice, the courts seem to be reluctant to accept that a 
service can most effectively be performed by one sex except in the most limited 
28 Sisley v Britannia Security Ltd [1983] ICR 628 EAT. 
29 Pitt G 'Can reverse discrimination be justified' in Hepple Band Szyszczak E eds, Discrimination: the 
, 
limits of law, chp 16 (Mansell, 1992). . . . . . 
30 Physiology is an odd word to use as it means the study of the bodIly functIOns ?f hvm~ orgamsms. . 
Pannick suggest that the word physique might more accurately capture what ParlIament mtended: Panmck 
D, 'When is sex a genuine occupational qualification' (1984) ~ OJLS 198 at 20~. . 
31 The defmition of personal ser:i~es does not extend to cleanmg rooms,. em~tJ:mg. bms and co~?des o~ 
collecting personal laundry: Phzllzps v. The Chaseley Rest Home EOR DIscnmmatIOn Case La\\- Digest)Jo 
30 Winter 1996 p 4. 
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circumstances. 32 No doubt this is partly because customer preference in these cases 
largely consists of certain stereotypical views about the sexes eg the view that women 
find it easier to talk to women about their personal problems. For example, in 
Roadburgh v Lothian Regional Councip3 the tribunal refused to accept that the post of 
volunteer services officer with the respondent's social work team could be performed 
more effectively by a man given that women were performing the same job in other 
areas. 34 Similarly, in Moult v Nottingham County Councip5 the tribunal rejected the 
argument that the post of teaching and counselling women with no confidenc~.Jmd low 
,1',,,,,-
self-esteem on a women only training course could be performed more effectively by a 
woman. In fact, there appear to be no reported cases where the exception for personal 
services has been successfully relied upon although this may be because some of the 
more obvious examples of situations in which the defence could be used (eg a rape 
counsellor or a sex therapist) have not been challenged. 
The third exception that appears to be social utility based is the exception in s 
7(2)( d) for single sex establishments. The sub-section only applies if three conditions are 
met. First, the establishment must be a hospital, prison or other establishment for people 
requiring special care, supervision or attention.36 Second, all of the people must be of one 
sex although it is possible to disregard a person of the other sex if his or her presence is 
exceptional. 37 Third, it is reasonable, having regard to the essential character of the 
establishment, that the job should not be held by a person of that sex. Decency and the 
need for certain personal services to be provided by a person of the same sex are already 
dealt with elsewhere in s.7. As a result, this sub-section must be directed at people are 
who not coming into physical contact with the inmates of the establishment, are not 
32 The correct comparison is between a woman and a man, both with the right personality and 
qualifications: Greenwich Homeworkers Project v Mavrou EOR Discrimination Case Law Digest No 8 
Summer 1991 p 3. 
33 [1976] IRLR 283 IT. The tribunal also pointed out that there is nothing in s 7 or any other part of the Act 
which allows discrimination on the ground of sex "simply because there happens to be an imbalance of the 
sexes in the team in which the vacancy exists". 
34 See also Fanders v. St Mary's Convent Preparatory School where the respondent failed to convince the 
tribunal that teaching infant girls was a service that could most effectively be performed by a woman: EOR 
Discrimination Case Law Digest No 3 Spring 1990 p 3. 
35 EOR Discrimination Case Law Digest, No 22, Winter 1994, p 4. 
36 In relation to children, special must be measured in relation to normal children of that age: see Fanders 
v. St Mary's Convent Preparatory School EOR Discrimination ~ase Lav.: Digest No 3 Spring 1990 P 3. 
37 Not surprisingly, in Phillips v. The Chaseley Rest Home the tnbunal rejected the r~spondents argument 
that having five male residents in a nursing home out of a total of 24 was not exceptIonal: EOR 
Discrimination Case Law Digest"Ko 30 Winter 1996 p.f. 
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likely to see them in a state of undress and are not providing them with personal services. 
The question then is what job could they be doing that requires them to be the same sex 
as the inmate? There have been no reported cases where a respondent has successfully 
relied upon this section. However, the kind of situation where the section might apply is 
in relation to a shelter for female victims of domestic violence where the psychological 
state of the women is such that they would be disturbed by the presence of any men on 
the premises.38 
Financial 
In the White Paper that preceded the SDA the Government stated that exceptions would 
not be allowed on the basis that one sex is more costly to employ.39 However, financial 
considerations can be a factor where the physiological differences between the sexes 
(other than physical strength or stamina40) mean that sex is essential, to the nature of the 
job. This exception is wide enough to cover not only categorical or unique sex 
differences but also physiological distribution differences such as body shape. There are 
likely to be few jobs where physical characteristics such as these are essential to the 
nature of the job but one possible example is fashion models. It is pos".-ible to argue that 
because women and men have different body shapes the effect of a man modelling a 
dress is materially different from the effect of a woman modelling the same dress. 
However, it is important to distinguish between situations where sex is essential to the 
nature of the job and attempts by employers to use sex appeal in order to increase profits. 
For example, it would not be open to an employer to refuse to hire waiters on the basis 
that waitresses attract more customers. 41 
The other exception that is financially based is the exception for working abroad 
In s 7(2)(g). This section applies where the job involves the performance of duties 
outside the United Kingdom in a country whose laws or customs are such that the duties 
could not, or could not effectively, be performed by one sex.42 This section was 
38 Although, during the Committee state of the Bill, Dr Summerskill stated that the section ~id not pro:,ide 
a blanket exception for all of the jobs in a single sex institution: House of Commons, Standmg CommIttee 
B,l May 1975, 17l. 
39 Equality/or women, cmnd 5724, (1974), para 48. 
40 See for example Thorn v. Meggitt Engineering Ltd [1976] IRLR 241, IT. 
41 See Pannick, above, p 209. 
42 As the SDA does not apply where an employees does his or her work \vholly or mainly outside Great 
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introduced to deal with what was referred to as the "Middle East export salesman 
problem".43 The rationale behind the section is that it is not right to injure the country's 
prospects of trading abroad by making it possible for a woman to claim that she should 
be employed as an export salesman to Saudi Arabia.44 This is perhaps the clearest 
example of a situation in which the financial interests of employers are allowed to take 
precedence over the non-discrimination principle. 
Proportionality 
Under article 2(2) of the ETD, any derogations from the principle of equal treatment are 
subject to the principle of proportionality. In other words, there must be a causal link 
between the aim of the employer and the means chosen to achieve that aim, and there 
must be no other less discriminatory means of achieving the same aim. Although there is 
no express proportionality test in s 7 there are several conditions that have a similar, 
albeit more limited, effect. The causation test can be detected in several of the 
exceptions although the standard of the test varies. In section 7(2)(a) (which applies in 
cases of artistic licence, social utility and financial considerations) the employer has to 
show that certain physical characteristics are essential to the nature of the job. In order to 
do this the employer has to establish that there is a causal link between its aim and the 
sex of the employee. 
The causal link is much weaker in the decency exceptions. The employer just has 
to demonstrate that a reasonable person might object to the presence of a person of the 
offending sex (save in cases of communal accommodation where even this weak test is 
lacking). Thus, there is no need for the employer to show that the presence of a person of 
the offending sex actually would result in a lack of decency. In relation to the exception 
for personal services (which is primarily a social utility exception) the employer has to 
show that a person of one sex can most effectively perform the job in question. This 
requires strong proof of a causal link between sex and ability to do the job. Finally, the 
financial exceptions also require some evidence of a causal link. As indicated above, 
Britain (s 10) the exception only applies where an employee mainly works inside Great Britain but some of 
the work is done abroad. 
43 John Fraser (Under-Secretary of State for Employment) House of Commons, Standing Committee B, 1 
May 1975, 173. 
44 See above at 174. 
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where the exception falls under s 7(2)(a) the employer has to show that the particular 
physical characteristic that makes one sex more financially successful are essential to the 
nature of the job. And, where the exception is working abroad, the employer has to show 
that the job could not effectively be done by a person of the other sex. 
The means test exists in the form of s 7(4). Under this section the tribunal must 
be satisfied that the employer does not already have employees of that sex who could 
reasonably do the duties without causing undue inconvenience to the employer.45 For 
example, sex is not a genuine occupational qualification for being a shop assistant if the 
-"'4 
duties involving personal contact with customers in the changing room could be 
allocated to another assistant.46 Arguably, the test of undue inconvenience is weaker than 
the European means test. For example, it seems that there is no scope for a tribunal to 
consider whether the duties could be dispensed with altogether rather than allocated to 
another employee. In Lasertop Ltd v Webster it was held that the job of showing 
prospective clients around the changing rooms and toilets of a health club could not be 
allocated to another member of staff on the basis that it would undermine the selling 
function of the job. In unisex health clubs it is often the case that women show men 
around and leave them to look at the changing rooms and toilets themselves. 47 In this 
particular case the tribunal found that the tour of the prohibited areas only occupied a 
comparatively small amount of time. While it may have been inconvenient for these 
parts of the tour to have been done by another employee, there is no evidence that it 
would have had any impact on employer's business if prospective members were left to 
view these areas on their own. Similarly, in Sisley v. Britannia Security Ltd48 the male 
applicant was refused a job as a security operator so that the existing female operators 
could strip to their underwear while resting and thereby prevent their uniforms from 
creasing. The EAT rejected the argument that the problem could be avoided by the 
operators resting fully dressed.49 
45 Section 7(4) does not apply to s 7(2)(ba) (private households) or s 7(2)(h) (married couples). It also 
does not apply in relation to employees who are yet to be recruited: Lasertop Ltd v. Webster [1997] IRLR 
498, EAT. 
46 Etam pic v Rowan [1989] IRLR 150, EAT. However, see also Timex Corporation v Hodgson [1982] 
ICR 63 in which the EAT failed to apply the provisions of s 7(4) but commented instead that it was not for 
the tribunal to tell the employer how to organise its business. 
47 EOR No 75 September/October 1997 p 52. 
48 [1983] ICR628 EAT andPannick, above, p 218. . . . . . 
49 Although, contrast the case of Phillips v The Chaseley Rest Home EOR DIscnmmatlOn Case Law DIgest 
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The other area where it is possible to detect a means test is in the exception for 
single sex accommodation. The employer has to satisfy the tribunal that it is not 
reasonable to equip the premises with additional accommodation facilities. As a result, a 
tribunal must consider whether it is reasonable for the employer to build extra facilities 
but not whether it would be reasonable to make the existing accommodation unisex. The 
section does not give any guidance on the points to be taken into account in determining 
reasonableness but relevant factors are likely to include the cost of the building work 
(including any indirect costs that may arise eg as a result of disruption to the .husiness) 
.,. . .,: 
and the ability of the employer to accommodate the cost. 50 
POSITIVE ACTION 
Introduction 
The second, and potentially most extensive category of exceptions: centres around the 
concept of positive action. Positive action is a phrase that can cover a multitude of things 
and, therefore, it is helpful to provide a more precise definition of what it means. 
McCrudden has identified four types of measure that could come under the heading of 
positive action. 51 The first form of action he identifies is removing existing 
discriminatory practices. This involves the eradication of all forms of direct and indirect 
discrimination. For example, the removal of an age limit that cannot be justified on the 
basis of business need would be a form of positive action as would the removal of a rule 
preventing women from doing certain forms of work. 
The second form of positive action involves using facially neutral criteria in order 
to increase the proportion of an under represented sex in a particular job or profession. 
For example, the creation of childcare facilities or the reorganisation of working time. 52 
The third form of positive action involves outreach programmes that are designed to 
No 30 Winter 1996 p 4 where the tribunal held that a male cleaner could avoid seeing a female resident in 
a state of undress or using the toilet by knocking on the door before entering the room. 
50 Tribunals are likely to draw parallels with the test for reasonable adjustments under the DDA as it is 
logical that if an adjustment is reasonable under the DDA it should also be r~ason~ble under the SDA. 
51 McCrudden C, 'Rethinking positive action' (1986) 15 ILJ 219. In fact he IdentIfies five types of 
positive action. His fifth type of positive action involves redefming merit so that membership of a 
particular group becomes a job related qualification. The scope for this kind of positive action is dealt 
with in the social utility section on genuine occupational qualifications above. 
52 Prechal argues that "it is inappropriate to use the "term positive action" in relation to this type of 
measure, since it amounts to unnecessarily inflating the concept": 'Case note on Kalanke '(1996) CML 
Rev 1245 at 1252. 
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attract candidates from an under represented group either by bringing jobs to their 
attention and encouraging them to apply or by providing members of the under 
represented group with relevant training that will improve their employment prospects. 
The final type of positive action is preferential treatment or reverse discrimination. 
McCrudden describes this fonn of positive action as using membership of an under 
represented group as a criterion in selection, promotion or redundancy decisions. Group 
membership may be the sole criterion, one of several relevant criteria or a tie-break 
criterion, for example where women are preferred over equally qualified men. However, 
"'"" 
it can also extend to the award of beneficial treatment or training. For example, a rule 
giving only one sex childcare vouchers or providing single sex training can also be a 
fonn of reverse discrimination. What distinguishes reverse discrimination from any 
other fonn of direct discrimination is the motivation behind the treatm~nt. With reverse 
discrimination, sex is used in order to improve the position of memb~rs of a group that is 
currently disadvantaged or under represented in relation to some aspect of employment. 53 
European Law 
The main European provision on positive action is contained in article 2(4) of the ETD 
which provides: 
This directive shall be without prejudice to measures to promote equal 
opportunity for men and women, in particular by removing existing inequalities 
which affect women's opportunities in the areas referred to in article 1(1). 
In addition, there is a Council Recommendation on the promotion of positive action for 
women. 54 The Recommendation recommends Member States to take arpropriate general 
and specific measures in order to counteract or eliminate the prejudicial effects on 
women in employment and to encourage the participation of women in those sectors of 
working life where they are presently under represented (article 1). A number of specific 
measures are recommended including encouraging women candidates, the recruitment 
and promotion of women in sectors and professions where they are under represented, 
53 For some of the arguments for and against reverse discrimination see McCrudden C, above, p 237; Pitt 
G 'Can reverse discrimination be justified' in Discrimination: the limits of law (1992) eds Hepple B and 
S~yszczak E; Fullinwider F, The reverse discrimination controversy (1980) and Dworkin R, A matter of 
principle, (1986) chp 14. . . . .. 
5484/635/EEC. This recommendation was passed after the COmmISSIOn and the CouncIl of Mllllsters 
failed to pass a binding directive on the matter: see Charpentier L, 'The European Court of Justice and the 
rhetoric of affirmative action' (1998) 4(2) ELJ 167 at 178. 
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adapting working conditions and working time and encouragIng social measures 
designed to foster greater sharing of occupational and social responsibilities. The 
Recommendation is not itself legally binding but it can be used as an aide to interpreting 
the scope of article 2(4) of the ETD. 
Possible scope of Article 2(4) 
Prior to looking at the cases on article 2(4), it is worth considering the potential scope of 
the article in terms of the four forms of positive action set out above, bearing in mjnd that 
the provision is extraneous unless it covers a form of positive action that is prohibited by 
the ETD and that is not allowed by some other derogation. 55 In other words, the article 
must cover a form of treatment that would otherwise be unlawful. The first of the four 
fonns of positive action is the eradication of existing discriminatory practices both direct 
and indirect. Member states are already mandated to undertake this ~rst form of positive 
action by article 2(1) and, therefore, there is no need for a derogation in order to make 
this form of action lawful. As a result, this form of positive action cannot come within 
the scope of article 2(4) unless the provision is otiose. The second form of positive 
action is the use of facially neutral criteria in order to increase the proportion of an under 
represented group. In order to have this effect, the measure in question must have a 
disproportionate impact on one sex. The use of a measure that has a disproportionate 
impact on one sex can give rise to a claim of indirect discrimination unless the practice is 
justified. As a result, the lawfulness of the measure depends on whether its use can be 
justified by an employer for a reason other than sex. If the measure is justified it is 
lawful and there is no need for a derogation from the principle of equal treatment under 
article 2(1). On the other hand, if the measure is not justified, it is unlawful unless it 
comes within the scope of article 2(4). Thus, the unjustified use of a measure that has a 
disproportionate impact on one sex is the first possible use for article 2(4). 
The third type of positive action is the use of outreach programmes such as 
encouraging applicants of one sex to apply for jobs or the provision of single sex 
training. To the extent that these programmes are only open to one sex they are directly 
discriminatory and are unlawful under articles 2(1) and 4.56 As a result, outreach 
55 See Prechal S, above, at p 1252. 
S6 Article 4 applies the principle of equal treatment to all types and levels of vocational guidance and 
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programmes are the second kind of measure that could come within the scope of article 
2( 4). The final form of positive action is preferential treatment or reverse discrimination. 
Measures of this kind are unlawful under article 2(1) and, therefore, they could also come 
within the scope of the derogation in article 2(4). To summarise, there are three types of 
positive action which could come within the scope of article 2(4). These are unjustified 
indirect discrimination, outreach programmes and reverse discrimination. 
Interpretation of Article 2(4) by the ECJ 
The ECJ has had three opportunities to delineate the scope of article 2(4). In the first 
case, Re Protection of Women: EC Commission v France,57 the Commission brought an 
action under Article 169 for a declaration that France had failed to implement fully the 
provisions of the ETD. In particular, the French implementing legislation left in place 
various protections for women. These included a reduction in workip.g hours for women 
aged 59, time off for sick children, additional holiday, a day off on the first day of the 
school term, some hours off on Mothers' Day, daily breaks for women working on 
computer equipment or as typists or switchboard operators, the grant of bonuses from the 
birth of the second child for pension calculation and the payment of allowances for the 
cost of childcare. The French government argued that these rights were covered by 
article 2(4) because they aimed "to protect women and secure their de facto equality with 
men". The position of the Commission was that some of the rights may 'indeed fall 
within the scope of article 2(4) but that the overall impact of the legislation was to leave 
in place some inequalities that were not lawful under the ETD. 
The ECJ ruled in favour of the Commission and held that the French Government 
had not succeeded in demonstrating that the unequal treatment was within the limits laid 
down by the ETD. In relation to the scope of article 2(4), the ECJ held that it is limited 
to removing inequalities which exist in actual working life. 
training. 
As regards the exception provided for by article 2(4) it has the precise, limited 
object of authorising measures which, although discriminatory in appearance, 
actually aim to eliminate or reduce de facto inequalities which may exist in actual 
working life. However, there is nothing in the file to indicate that the general 
retention of particular rights for women in collective agreements may correspond 
to the situation envisaged by this provision. 
S7 [1989] 1 CMLR 408, EeJ. 
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In other words, it is not pennissible under article 2( 4) to compensate women for 
discrimination by giving them special rights as part of an evening-up process. 58 The 
measures must be aimed at eliminating or reducing actual instances of inequality. This 
does not mean that the ECl found that all of the measures left in place by the French 
legislation were unlawful. It is possible to read the judgment as a decision that France 
had failed fully to implement the ETD because some, but not necessarily all, of the 
measures were outside the scope of the derogation. Unfortunately, the Court did not 
indicate which of the measures were lawful and which were unlawful. It is arguable that 
~-6 
some of the measures, for example, help with the cost of childcare and flexible working 
time, are in fact measures designed to reduce existing inequality. 59 However, because the 
ECl did not distinguish between the lawful and unlawful measures, the case is not 
particularly helpful in determining the scope of article 2(4) save for the general principle 
that measures must relate to actual inequality rather than a general ev~ning-up process. 
The ECl had its second opportunity to interpret article 2(4) in the case of Kalanke 
v Freie Hansestadt Bremen. 60 This case, and the later Marschall case, both involved the 
use of positive action in the German civil service. In order to understand the background 
to the cases it is necessary to explain how promotion operates in the German civil 
service. 61 Under the German Constitution, civil servants can only be promoted on the 
basis of personal aptitude, abilities and qualifications. In addition, the Framework Law 
governing state legislation on public employment imposes an obligation on public 
employers to select without regard to sex. These dual obligations are referred to as the 
merit principle. In theory, all employment and promotion decisions in the public service 
are governed by the merit principle, However, competitive promotion tends to be limited 
to higher level positions. With lower level jobs merit is determined by reference to staff 
reports. In order to avoid conflict between staff and supervisors, these reports tend to be 
homogeneous in nature and, therefore, they do not provide an effective basis for 
differentiating between employees. As a result, promotion decisions are often based on 
auxiliary selection criteria with the most common being length of service, age and 
58 This was the argument used by the Advocate General in his Opinion: p 413. 
59 This point is made by the Advocate General in the Kalanke case, below, at footnote 14 to his Opinion. 
60 [1995J IRLR 660, ECJ. For general comment on the case s~e Loenen -; and Veldman A, 'Preferenti,al 
treatment in the labour market after Kalanke: some comparatIve aspects (1996) IJCLL&IR 43 and 0 Hare 
U 'Positive action before the European Court of Justice' (1996) 2 Webb JCLI. 
61 'Schiek D, 'Sex equality law after Kalanke and Marschall' (1998) 4 ELJ 148. 
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number of dependants. Some employers facilitate the promotion process by producing 
promotion lists based on staff reports and the auxiliary criteria. The use of promotion 
lists means that civil servants can estimate the length of time before their next promotion. 
The German equality laws of individual states contain a large number of positive 
action measures. However, the rules on hiring and promotion can be divided into four 
main groups namely flexible quotas, strict quotas, result quotas and non-binding goals 
and timetables.62 A flexible quota prescribes preferential treatment for women if two 
conditions are met. First, there must be an under representation of women and.second, 
""~' 
the woman must be equally qualified. With the exception of two states including 
Bremen, the flexible quota is subject to an exception if preferential treatment for a 
woman would result in hardship for a male competitor. Strict quotas reserve a set 
percentage of positions for women over a certain period of time. Result quotas oblige 
employers to set goals and timetables in order to achieve a gender balance and to give 
preference to equally qualified women in order to achieve the goals set. Result quotas do 
not give rise to an individual right which can be enforced in court proceedings. Finally, 
there is the use of non-binding goals and timetables whereby organisations set goals for 
increasing the proportion of women in categories where they are unds'!;"'represented but 
no quotas are used. 
The positive action measure at issue in Kalanke was a flexible quota without an 
exception. The German court requested the ECJ to give a preliminary ruling on the 
compatibility of the Bremen law on equal treatment in the public service and article 2(4) 
of the ETD. Under the Bremen law, women who have equal qualifications to those of 
their male co-applicants are given priority if women are under represented. Under 
representation exists if women represent less than half the persons in the individual pay, 
remuneration and salary brackets in the relevant personnel group of an official body. The 
law also states that qualifications shall be evaluated exclusively in accordance with the 
requirements of the job and that experience or capability acquired as a result of family 
work or unpaid activity are to count as qualifications if they are relevant to the job in 
question. 
In this particular case Mr Kalanke was employed by the City of Bremen in the 
Parks Department. He applied and was shortlisted for the post of section manager. The 
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other candidate was a female employee in the same department, Mrs Glissmann. When it 
was determined that the two candidates were equally qualified, Mrs Glissmann was 
appointed under the positive action provisions of the Bremen law on equal opportunities. 
Mr Kalanke himself argued that he should have been given precedence over Mrs 
Glissmann because of his status as a breadwinner for three dependants and his length of 
service. 63 
The ECJ found that the Bremen law was contrary to the ETD. In relation to the 
scope of article 2(4) the court held: 
It thus permits national measures relating to access to employment, including 
promotion, which give a specific advantage to women with a view to improving 
their ability to compete on the labour market and to pursue a career on an equal 
footing with men. (para 19) 
The ECJ rejected the validity of the Bremen quotas on the following basis: 
National rules which guarantee women absolute and unconditional priority for 
appointment or promotion go beyond promoting equal opportUnities and overstep 
the limits of the exception in article 2(4) of the Directive. 
Furthermore, in so far as it seeks to achieve equal representation of men 
and women in all grades and levels within a department, such a system substitutes 
for equality of opportunity as envisaged in article 2(4) the result which is only to 
be arrived at by providing such equality of opportunity. (paras 20-21) 
In other words, the Court rejected the use of "absolute and unconditional" quotas but 
gave no indication as the validity of other form of positive action involving reverse 
discrimination. 
The decision of the ECJ in Kalanke had a limited impact in the United Kingdom 
because any kind of employment quota is unlawful under the SDA. However, the 
decision was of considerable impact in Germany, several other European countries and 
the European Commission.64 The decision was interpreted by the German courts as only 
applying to women's quotas without exceptions thereby leaving unaffected quotas with a 
savings clause.65 The European Commission issued a communication on the 
interpretation of the judgment which similarly indicated that, in its opinion, the judgment 
62 Szyszczak E, 'Positive action after Kalanke' (1996) 59 MLR 876. 
63 Schiek, above, p 154. 
64 For an analsys of the impact of Kalanke in other Member States see Senden L, 'Positive action in the EU 
put to the test. A negative score?' (1996) 3 MJ 146. The European Commission operates a system by 
which services are encouraged to give priority to equally qualified female candidates I,lrhere women are 
under represented in given grade or category: see Commission Communication COM (96) 88 [mal. 
65 Schiek, above, p 152. 
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only affects quotas which guarantee women absolute and unconditional priority for 
appointment and that less rigid quotas are untouched by the Court's judgment.66 
The ECl had its third look at the scope of article 2(4) in the case of Marschall v. 
Land Nordrhein- Wes tfa len. 67 Mr Marschall was employed as a teacher at a Gennan 
school. He applied for promotion to a higher graded post but was infonned by the 
relevant authorities that since women were under represented at that grade, an equally 
qualified woman would be appointed to the post. The quota rule operating in the Land of 
North Rhine-Westphalia was as follows: .... 
"'",., . ,-
Where in the sector of the authority responsible for promotion there are fewer 
women than men in the particular higher grade post in the career bracket, women 
are to be given priority for promotion in the event of equal suitability, 
competence and professional perfonnance, unless reasons specific to another 
candidate predominate. 
According to the observations of the Land, the rule was intended to combat the use of 
two secondary selection criteria by which a man would tend to be appointed over a 
woman, namely, length of service and number of dependants. 
The ECl used the presence of the savings clause to distinguish its earlier decision 
in Kalanke and find that the quota was lawful. In particular, the Court used an argument 
that does not appear to have been relied upon by any of the parties, namely that the use of 
quotas could compensate for the use of sexual stereotypes in selection decisions. The 
relevant parts of the judgment are set out below. 
As the Land and several governments have pointed out, it appears that even 
where male and female candidates are equally qualified, male candidates tend to 
be promoted in preference to female candidates particularly because of prejUdices 
and stereotypes concerning the role and capacities of women in working life and 
the fear, for example, that women will interrupt their careers more frequently, that 
owing to household and family duties they will be less flexible in their working 
66 See Commission Communication above, p 9. The Commission subsequently proposed an interpretative 
amendment to Article 2(4) in order to make it clear that positive action measures short of rigid quotas are 
permitted by Community law. The proposed amendment added the following wording to the end of the 
Article: "Possible measures shall include the giving of preference, as regards access to employment or 
promotion, to a member of the under represented sex, provided that such measures do not preclude the 
assessment of the particular circumstances of an individual case": 96/C 179/07. The proposed amendment 
was rejected by the Economic and Social Committee on the basis that it failed to provide any defmitive 
clarification and that the whole matter was already being considered by the Intergovermental Conference 
to see if it could be incorporated into the primary legislation of the Community: Opinion of the Economic 
and Social Committee 97/C 30/19. 
67 [1998] IRLR 39, ECl For a case note on Marschall see Schiek D, 'More positive action in community 
law' (1998) 27 ILl 155. 
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hours, or that they will be absent from work more frequently because of 
pregnancy, childbirth and breastfeeding. 
For these reasons, the mere fact that a male candidate and a female 
candidate are equally qualified does not mean that they have the same chances. 
It follows that a national rule in terms of which, subject to the application 
of the saving clause, female candidates for promotion who are equally as 
qualified as the male candidates are to be treated preferentially in sectors where 
they are underrepresented may fall within the scope of article 2(4) if such a rule 
may counteract the prejudicial effects on female candidates of the attitudes and 
behaviour described above and thus reduce actual instances of inequality which 
may exist in the real world. (paras 29 to 31) 
Unlike the rules at issue in Kalanke, a national rule which, as inJhe case 
in point in the main proceedings, contains a saving clause does not exceed those 
limits if, in each individual case, it provides for male candidates who are equally 
as qualified as the female candidates a guarantee that the candidature will be the 
subject of an objective assessment which will take account of all criteria specific 
to the individual candidates and will override the priority accorded to female 
candidates where one or more of those criteria tilts the balance in favour of the 
male candidate. In this respect, however, it should be remembered that those 
criteria must not be such as to discriminate against female candidates. (para 33) 
The basis of the EeJ's judgment is the argument that one of the obstacles facing 
women is the use of sexual stereotypes in selection decisions. In particular, the EeJ 
suggests that where men and women are equally qualified, there is a tendency for 
employers to prefer men because of assumptions that they make about the effect of 
women's family responsibilities on their performance at work.68 The us.-cofthe quota rule 
is a method of counteracting the effect of these sexual stereotypes. 
The main criticism that can be made against the judgment of the EeJ is that it 
failed to apply any test of proportionality. In the case of Johnston v. Chief Constable of 
the Royal Ulster Constabulary69 the EeJ held that the derogation in article 2(2) of the 
ETD for situations where the sex of the worker constitutes a determining factor is subject 
to the principle of proportionality. There is no logical reason why that test should not 
also apply to the derogation in article 2(4).70 If the principle of proportionality is applied 
68 The ECJ does not go so far as to argue that stereotypes make it more difficult for women to obtain a 
good merit rating and, therefore, when a man and a woman are rated as being of equal merit, the woman is 
in fact more meritorious than the man. This argument is put forward by Schiek who suggests that 
"standards evaluating professional qualifications are gendered. Thus, a man would mere easily rate as 
qualified in a profession that is gendered masculine and a woman in a profession that is gendered 
feminine: see Schiek D, above, p 157. A similar point is made by Shaw J, 'Positive action for women in 
Germany: The use of legally binding quota systems' in Hepple Band Szyszczak E eds, Discrimination: 
the limits of the law, chp 20, (1992) at p 397. 
69 [1986] 3 CMLR 240 ECl 
70 In Marschall the Advocate General argued that gender specific measures could only be lawful under 
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to the Marschall case the employer would have to demonstrate that the quotas were 
appropriate and necessary in order to achieve the aim in question. 
According to the ECJ, the function of the quotas is to counter balance the use of 
sexual stereotypes by employers. But, this does not appear to have been the reason why 
the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia introduced a quota system. According to the 
observations of the Land, the quotas were introduced in order to combat the use of two 
secondary selection criteria namely length of service and number of dependants. As the 
Advocate General pointed out, both of these selection criteria are potentially indirectly 
discriminatory as they tend to have a disproportionate impact on women. In other words, 
the hurdle to equality of opportunity that had been identified was not the use of sexual 
stereotypes but the use of potentially indirectly discriminatory selection criteria. As a 
result, the problem of under representation could have been dealt with by the Land 
complying with its existing obligations under article 2(1) and eliminating all forms of 
indirect sex discrimination.71 On this basis, the test of proportionality was not satisfied.72 
The attempt to distinguish the earlier Kalanke judgment is also problematic. 
First, it is not clear that there was no scope for exceptions in the Bremen law. As the 
Advocate General pointed out, in paragraph 9 of its judgment in Kalanke the ECJ 
referred to a finding of the national court that the rule must be interpreted as providing 
for exceptions in appropriate cases.73 It seems, therefore, that there was scope for 
individual criteria specific to a male candidate to be taken into account under the Bremen 
law although this was not expressly stipulated in the law itself. Second, even if the 
savings clause was unique to Marschall, as the Advocate General pointed out in his 
article 2(4) if two conditions were met. First, the measures must be directed at removing existing 
inequality. Second, the principle of proportionality applies which, in this context, means that it must not 
be possible to achieve the aim of equality through the use of gender neutral measures, 
71 Another argument on the proportionality point is that there is some evidence that the quotas that have 
been used by German states have only had a limited impact on the problem of under representation: see 
Schiek above, p 149; Schiek, 'Positive action in community law' (1996) ILl 239 and Shaw l, above, p 
397. 
72 The argument that reverse discrimination should only be used as a last resort has also been made by 
several commentators: see McCrudden C, above, p 242 and Pitt G, above, p 286. 
73 In para 9 of the judgment the ECl held: "The national court, c?nsiders that th~ quota system is 
compatible with the German constitutional and statutory proVIsIOns referred to ill paragraph 6 above. 
More specifically, it points out that para 4 of the LGG must be interpreted in accordance with the 
Grundgesetz with the effect that, even if priority for promotion if to be given in principle to women, 
exceptions must be made in appropriate cases." 
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Opinion, the savings clause merely displaces the rule giving priority to women in certain 
cases, it does not alter the discriminatory nature of the rule in general. 
Third, it is not clear that the savings clause has any real application. According to 
the Advocate General, the Land observed that the traditional secondary criteria of service 
and number of dependants could come within the scope of the proviso. However, as the 
Advocate General pointed out, these criteria are potentially indirectly ciiscriminatory and 
the Ee] made it clear in its judgment that the savings clause could not be used to 
introduce discriminatory criteria.74 The candidates must already be of equal merit for the 
'".',.' 
quota rule to apply and, therefore, no factors relating to their ability to do the job could 
be used. Two factors which have been suggested by some commentators are race and 
disability.75 However, many Member States have legislation dealing with race and 
disability discrimination and it is likely that the use of these characteristics in selection or 
promotion decisions will already be covered by that legislation. for example, under 
domestic law it would be unlawful to prefer a male candidate over a female candidate 
because of his race although it would be lawful to select a male candidate on the ground 
of his disability. 
Given the limited scope for the practical application of the savings clause, it is 
difficult to see why its presence should make the difference between a quota rule being 
lawful or unlawful under article 2(4). One possibility is that the Ee] was unwilling to 
continue to block the use of quotas and therefore it used the presence of the savings 
clause in Marschall to reverse its previous decision in Kalanke but without appearing to 
do so. Another possibility is that the vagueness of the savings clause gives the quota rule 
a political acceptability that was lacking in the so called automatic quota rejected by the 
Ee] in the Kalanke case.76 The Marschall case is not the end of the road. There is a third 
German quota case currently pending before the Ee] in the form of the Badeck case. 
74 Schiek has argued that there is still a way in which the traditional selection criteria could have an impact 
on selection decisions. Because prior to the introduction of the quota system it was possible for civil 
servants to predict with a reasonable degree of certainty how long it was likely to be before they were 
promoted, some civil servants have budgeted their expenditure on this basis. The introduction of the quota 
system inevitably means that some male civil servants will have to wait longer for promotion and, as a 
result, they may encounter financial difficulties. Schiek suggests that this financial hardship could be 
taken into account as a relevant criterion under the savings clause. The problem with this argument is that 
because the financial hardship is mainly going to affect men the criterion is potentially indirectly 
discriminatory and it is difficult to see how it can be justified: see Schiek,D, ~~ove, p 156. 
75 See Shaw J, above, p 405 (race) and Schiek D, (1998), above, p 156 (dIsabIlIty). 
76 Charpentier L , above, at p 184. 
93 
Under review are strict quotas for trainee academic positions and a requirement that 
every second interview candidate must be female. 77 Hopefully, the EeJ will take this 
opportunity to clarify the exact scope of article 2(4) in relation to promotion and 
selection decisions. 
Finally, it is worth noting the provisions of sub-article (4) which was inserted into 
Article 141 by the Amsterdam Treaty with effect from 1 May 1999. 
With a view to ensuring full equality in practice between men and women in 
working life, the principle of equal treatment shall not prevent any Member State 
from maintaining or adopting measures providing for specific advantages"in order 
to make it easier for the under represented sex to pursue a vocational activity or to 
prevent or compensate for disadvantages in professional careers. 
The new sub-article is substantially the same as Article 6(3) of the Agreement on Social 
Policy concluded between all the Member States of the European Union other than the 
United Kingdom and annexed to the Maastricht Treaty on European Union with protocol 
No 14. The main difference is that Article 6(3) only refers to women while the new 
Article 141 (4) refers to the under represented sex and therefore allows positive action 
measures in favour of men. It remains to be seen whether the EeJ will interpret Article 
141(4) in the same way as article 2(4) of the ETD or whether it will give it a wider 
application. 78 
Domestic Law 
In contrast with the European position, the domestic provisions on positive action are 
extremely precise although they are also much more limited. In particular, there is no 
scope whatsoever for any form of reverse discrimination in appointments. As a result, 
the kind of quotas that were used in Kalanke and Marschall would be unlawful in the 
UK. Instead, the main focus of the domestic provisions is outreach programmes. 
Sections 47 and 48 of the SDA permit employers and trainers79 to take two forms of 
action in circumstances where one sex is under represented in relation to a particular kind 
77 Case C-158/97: Schiek D, (1998), above, at p 153. 
78 Arguably, the fact that Member States are given the a~ility to compensate for disadvantage means that 
Article 141(4) is intended to have a wider scope than ~rtlcle.2(4). Although, see para:;raph ~1.ofthe . 
Opinion of the Advocate General in the Kalanke case ill .whIch he argues that the same restrictlons WhICh 
apply to article 2(4) of the ETD should also apply ~o ArtIcle 6(3). 
79 The requirement that the training had to be prOVIded by a deSIgnated body was removed by SDA 1986, s 
4. The training can now be provided by "any person". 
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of work.80 The first fonn of action is the provision of training that would help to fit the 
trainees or employees for the particular kind of work in respect of which their sex is 
under represented. Training is defined in s 82 as any form of education or instruction 
although apprenticeships are expressly excluded because they are deemed to be a form of 
employment. 81 
The second form of action is encouraging members of one sex to take advantage 
of opportunities for doing that work in respect of which they are under represented. This 
could encompass adding words to advertisements that indicate applications from 
members of one sex are particularly welcomed. Another possibility is advertising in 
papers that are aimed at one sex or circulating lists of vacancies to organisations 
providing single sex training or having single sex open days. It could also cover 
organising access courses to encourage one sex to take up training courses. In relation to 
existing employees, employers could encourage employees of one sex to apply for jobs 
either by infonnal encouragement or by sending them details of suitable vacancies. 
However, this form of action is limited to encouraging applicants to apply for jobs, it 
does not extend to providing job opportunities.82 
The extent to which the positive action provisions in the SDA have been used by 
trainers and employers in the public sector has been studied by Sacks.83 In relation to 
trainers, her research project looked at the range of single sex courses available and 
matters relating to the accessibility of the courses eg the existence of child care facilities, 
age limits, fees etc, rather than how many public sectors trainers provide single sex 
training. 84 Her research revealed that courses offered by colleges of further education 
tended to be within a narrow range and concentrated on information technology, 
80 Under representation exists where it reasonably appears to the person discriminating that at any time 
within the 12 months immediately proceeding the doing ofthe act there were no persons of the sex in 
question doing that work in Great Britain (or a particular area of Great Britain) or the number of persons of 
that sex doing the work was comparatively small: see s 47 (1) and (2). 
81 Employment is defmed as employment under a contract of service or of apprenticeship or a contract 
personally to execute any work or labour: s 82, For the difference between a training contract and an 
employment contract see: Wiltshire Police Authority v, Wynn [1980] ICR 401, CA and Daley v, Allied 
Suppliers Ltd [1983] ICR 90, EAT. 
82 See Hughes v. London Borough of Hackney, EOR No 7, (1986) P 27, IT, a case on the parallel 
provisions in the Race Relations Act 1976. 
83 Sacks V, Tackling Discrimination Positively in Britain' in Discrimination: the limits of the 1mi', Hepple 
Band Szyszczak E eds, (1992). The study was conclud~d in Augus~ 1,989. , . 
84 Her study considered 60 training bodies that o,ffered smgl~ s,ex ~am~g, Presuma~ly her deCISIon not to 
study how many public sector trainers provide smgle sex trammg ,ID1phes that there ,It IS a relatively 
frequent occurrence although she does indicate that the coverage IS not comprehensIve: p 371, 
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electronics and management training. A much wider range of courses was offered by 
women's skills centres which generally provided training for traditionally male trades. 
In relation to s 48, the study looked at the civil service, the NBS and twelve local 
authorities. She found "little evidence of positive efforts to train women in the Civil 
Service" and the training that was available was limited to management training. Most 
of the local authorities surveyed offered some single sex training although in several 
cases this was limited to assertiveness training which, on its own, is of doubtful legality 
as it is not training for particular work. In general, "councils are more interested in 
/',", 
schemes which will alleviate their employees shortages by keeping women in their 
present jobs than in developing their workforce's potential." 85 With regard to the NHS, 
guidance from the Department of Health on changing the employment profile of the 
Service and increasing career opportunities for women contained little about women only 
training and "enquiries made from a small number of authorities showed little knowledge 
of such possibilities".86 In general, Sacks found that employers and trainers seemed to be 
unaware of the limitations in the SDA. In particular, a significant number of the 
organisations researched were either totally unaware of the requirement for statistical 
evidence of under representation or somewhat hazy as to the precise conditions. s7 
Finally, the SDA has one example of using facially neutral criteria in order to 
increase the proportion of an under represented sex. Section 47(3) provides that any 
person can provide training to people who are in special need of training because they 
have been "discharging domestic or family responsibilities to the exclusion of regular full 
time employment". This section is aimed at women who have taken time off work in 
order to in order to care for children but it uses as its criterion something that can apply 
to both sexes. As result, the section provides a defence to claim of indirect 
discrimination rather than direct discrimination. 
85 Sacks V, above, p 373. 
86 Sacks V, above, p 375. . . . ... . 
87 It seems that employers are more likely to use the pOSItl~e ~ctlon prOVISIOns m the RRA: see the gUIde 
produced by the eRE, Positive action and equal opportumty m employment, (1991). 
96 
MATERNITY AND PREGNANCY 
Introduction 
Both the EPA and the SDA contain derogations for pregnancy and maternity. Section 
6(1 )(b) of the EPA states that an equality clause shall not operate in relation to terms 
"affording special treatment to women in connection with pregnancy or childbirth". 
Materially the same wording is used in the derogation in s 2(2) of the SDA. There is no 
derogation for pregnancy or maternity in Article 141 although the ETD does have a 
derogation that is contained in article 2(3) and which states: "This Directive shall be 
without prejudice to provisions concerning the protection of women, particularly as 
regards pregnancy and maternity." The fact that there is an exception in the EPA but not 
Article 141 probably reflects the difference in scope between the two provisions. The 
EP A covers all contractual benefits while Article 141 covers contractual and non-
contractual remuneration. For example, a contractual right to annual leave would be 
covered by the EPA but not Article 141. The Community legislators appear to have 
reasoned that any special treatment needed to protect women in relation to pregnancy or 
maternity would arise in the context of treatment rather than pay. 
The one obvious area of variance between the ETD derogation and the domestic 
derogations is the fact that the ETD uses the word maternity while the EPA uses the word 
childbirth. Childbirth means the process of giving birth to a child and, therefore, on a 
literal interpretation it only has a limited temporal application. Maternity, on the other 
hand, means "the quality or condition of being a mother", a much wider concept with a 
much greater temporal application. 88 In practice, the difference in language is not 
significant as the domestic exceptions were clearly intended to extend beyond the point 
of actually giving birth and to cover at least the initial states of motherhood while the 
exception in the ETD has been interpreted as having a reasonably restricted application 
time wise. 
A derogation for pregnancy and maternity can potentially provide a defence to 
claims of both direct and indirect sex discrimination depending on whether the treatment 
in question is more or less favourable for the "vomen. Where a woman is SUbjected to 
less favourable treatment because she is pregnant or on maternity leave eg dismissal, her 
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treatment is based on the fact that she has a unIque sex difference. The case law 
indicates that detrimental treatment on this ground can give rise to a claim of direct sex 
discrimination. 89 Where a woman is afforded more favourable treatment eg additional 
annual leave the detriment is suffered by those employees who are not pregnant or on 
maternity leave. The states of not being pregnant or not being on m~ternity leave are 
both distribution sex characteristics in that they apply to some women and all men. As a 
result, more favourable treatment for pregnancy and maternity gives rise to a claim of 
indirect rather than direct discrimination. In this context, therefore, the d~~ogation 
-;'-t 
operates by removing from employers the need to justify the difference in treatment. As 
beneficial and detrimental treatment give rise to different forms of discrimination, it is 
helpful to consider the two forms of treatment separately. 
More favourable treatment 
There is a singular lack of case law on the scope for more favourable treatment under the 
domestic derogations. However, there are several cases that look at the scope of article 
2(3). The EC] first considered the issue in the case of Re Italian sex equality laws: EC 
Commission v Italy.90 The case concerned, amongst other things, the grant of adoption 
leave. Under the relevant Italian provisions, women who have adopted a child or 
obtained custody of a child with a view to adoption are entitled to three months maternity 
leave including the financial benefits relating thereto as long as the child is under 6 years 
of age. However, the adoptive father is not given the same right. The Advocate General 
rejected the argument that the provision came within the scope of article 2(3) on the basis 
that "leave after adoption benefits the child above all in so far as it is intended to foster 
the emotional ties necessary to settle the child in the family adopting it." However, the 
EC] disagreed with this analysis and held that adoption leave does comt" within the scope 
of the derogation. 
88 The Oxford English Dictionary, (second edition). 
89 See the discussion on this point in chapter 2. 
90 [1984] 3 CMLR 169, ECl 
98 
[T]he adoptive father does not have the right given to the adoptive mother of 
maternity leave for the first three months following the actual entry of the child 
into the adoptive family. That distinction is justified, as the Government of the 
Italian Republic rightly contends, by the legitimate concern to assimilate as far as 
possible the conditions of entry of the child into the adoptive family to those of 
the arrival of a newborn child in the family during the very delicate initial period. 
The fact that the ECJ was willing to apply article 2(3) to adoption leave for children 
under the age of six years of age is the clearest indication to date of the fact that the 
derogation extends beyond a narrow interpretation of maternity and into the wider sphere 
of motherhood. 
The ECJ applied a similar analysis in the case of Hofmann v. Barmer 
Ersatzhasse. 91 German legislation prevented the employment of women for a protective 
period of eight weeks following childbirth. At the end of the eight weeks and until the 
child was six months old women were entitled to a further period of maternity leave 
during which they were paid an allowance funded by the State. In this case the parents 
agreed that at the end of the protective period the father would take unpaid leave from 
work in order to remain at home with the child and the mother would return to work. 
The father's claim for maternity allowance was refused on the basis that the allowance 
was only payable to working mothers. 
The father argued that the primary purpose of the further period of maternity 
leave was childcare and not to protect the health of the mother. As a re.:;ult, the refusal to 
pay him a maternity allowance was outside the scope of the derogation contained in 
article 2(3) of the ETD. The Commission argued that the derogation in article 2(3) 
should have a restrictive interpretation and should only apply to provisions that are 
objectively necessary for the protection of the mother. The ECJ rejected a narrow 
interpretation of the derogation and held that its purpose is to protect a woman in two 
respects. First, to protect her biological condition both during pregnancy and after. 
Second, to protect the special relationship between a woman and her child in the period 
that follows childbirth. On this basis the ECJ held that the German provisions were 
within the scope of the derogation.n In Hoffmann the period of maternity leave was six 
months after the birth of the child. The question that remains unanswered by this and 
91 [1986] 1 CMLR 242, Eel .. 
92 Despite winning the case Gennany subsequently opened the further penod of maternIty ~eave to both 
sexes: Docksey C, 'The principle of equality between women and men as a fundamental nghts under 
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any other case is what further period of leave, if any, is covered by article 2(3). 
On the other hand, the derogation does not extend beyond ~llowing women an 
initial period of time in which to bond with their newborn or adopted child. For 
example, it does not extend to giving women time off work in order to facilitate their 
childcare role. The ECJ made this clear in the case of Re Protection of Women: EC 
Commission v France. 93 The French Government sought to argue that the following 
rights were covered by article 2(3): a reduction in working hours for women aged 59, 
time off for sick children, additional holiday, a day off on the first day of the scho.ol term, 
'." 
some hours off on Mothers' Day, daily breaks for women working on computer 
equipment or as typists or switchboard operators, the grant of bonuses from the birth of 
the second child for pension calculation and the payment of allowances for the cost of 
childcare. The ECJ repeated its finding in Hoffmann that the derogation is concerned 
with protecting the special relationship between a woman and her c~ild over the period 
that follows pregnancy and maternity. With regard to the particular rights granted by the 
French legislation the ECJ held that they were not covered by article 2(3). As the Court 
pointed out, "the particular rights which are kept in force sometimes aim to protect 
women in their capacity as aged workers or as parents, although male workers can be in 
these positions as well as female workers". 
As the ECJ indicated in the Hoffmann case there are two separate rationales for 
granting women more favourable treatment on the grounds of pregnancy and maternity. 
The first rationale is that more favourable treatment may be necessary to protect the 
health and safety of the woman and child. Thus, a period of maternity leave can be 
explained on this basis. A similar idea underlies some of the provisions of the Pregnancy 
Directive (92/85/EEC) including, for example, the right of a pregnant woman to be 
suspended from work on full pay if she is unable to perform her job on health and safety 
grounds (art 5). The second and more contentious rationale is that there is a special 
relationship between a mother and her child that requires protection. It is this rationale 
which underlies the extended period of maternity leave. The idea that the relationship 
between a mother and her child warrants more favourable treatment for women can be 
Community law' (1991) 20 ILJ 258 at 272. 
93 [1989] 1 CMLR 408, Eel 
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criticised on a number of grounds. 94 First, it perpetuates the existing gender stereotype 
that women have the primary responsibility for looking after the baby. Second, by 
giving these rights to women only it makes it more difficult for men to share the 
childcare role with women. Third, it makes women more expensive to employ thereby 
creating a potential disincentive to female employment. 
Less favourable treatment 
'- .' 
The extent to which the domestic derogation under the EPA allows for d6thmental 
treatment on the ground of pregnancy or childbirth was considered by the tribunal in the 
case of Coyne v. Exports Credits Guarantee Department.95 Under the tenns of her civil 
service contract the applicant was entitled to three months maternity leave on full pay. 
At the end of her maternity leave she was certified as not fit for work for a reason 
connected with her confinement for a period of two weeks and two days. Thereafter, she 
took a period of unpaid leave before returning to work. The respondent's sick pay 
scheme provided that all staff were entitled to a period of six months sick pay on full 
leave in any period of twelve months but that any maternity leave on .rcrll pay was to be 
set-off against this entitlement. Furthennore, the sick pay rules provided that women 
were only entitled to sick leave following maternity leave if the illness was unconnected 
with the confinement. As a result, the applicant was refused sick pay for her sickness 
absence following her return from maternity leave. At the tribunal the respondent argued 
that the case was covered by the maternity derogation in s 6(1 )(b) of the EPA. The 
tribunal rej ected this argument and held that the expression 'special treatment' should be 
construed as meaning specially favourable treatment and not in its wider meaning of 
favourable or unfavourable treatment.96 Thus, it appears that the EPA exception does not 
allow for any less favourable treatment on the ground of pregnancy or maternity. 
The position under the SDA and article 2(3) appears to be slight~y different in that 
94 See for example Fredman S, 'A difference with distinction: pregnancy and parenthood reassessed' 
(1994) 110 LQR 106 at 120. 
95 [1981] IRLR 51, IT. 
96 The tribunal was persuaded by the argument that if the exception covered unfavourable treatment an 
employer would be entitled to put a clause in a woman's contract providing that if she became pregnant 
her pay could be cut by 50% and the EPA would be powerless. to prevent tha~ .. ~ot surprisingly given the 
year of the decision, the tribunal does not appear to have conSIdered the pOSSIbIlIty that such a cut would 
be contrary to Article 141. 
101 
employers can rely on the derogations as a defence to imposing detrimental treatment as 
long as the aim is to protect the health and safety of the mother or child. There are two 
situations in particular where the EC] has held that article 2(3) can cover detrimental 
treatment. The first is a prohibition on night work and the second is compulsory 
maternity leave. The issue of night work arose in the case of Habermann-Beltermann v. 
Arbeiterwohlfahrt.97 The applicant was employed as a night nurse in a home for the 
elderly. Shortly after she was employed it became apparent that she was pregnant. 
German law prohibited night work for pregnant or breast feeding women. The 
JII-I,. 
applicant's employment was terminated on the basis that contravention of the law 
rendered the contract of employment void. Without any analysis wh2tsoever, the EC] 
held that the prohibition on night work was "unquestionably compatible with Article 
2(3)". The Court then went on to consider whether the termination of employment was 
contrary to the Directive. 
As the Court has held (see Hoffmann judgment cited above, paragraph 27), the 
Directive leaves Member States with a discretion as to the social measures which 
must be adopted in order to guarantee, within the framework laid down by the 
Directive, the protection of women in connection with pregnancy and maternity 
and to offset the disadvantages which women, by comparison with men, suffer 
with regard to the retention of employment. 
In this case, the questions submitted for a ruling relate to a contract 
without a fixed term and the prohibition on night-time work by pregnant women 
therefore takes effect only for a limited period in relation to the total length of the 
contract. 
In the circumstances, to acknowledge that the contract may be held to be 
invalid or be avoided because of the temporary inability of the pregnant employee 
to perform the night-time work for which she was engaged would be contrary to 
the objective of protecting such persons pursued by Article 2(3) of the Directive, 
and would deprive the Directive of its effectiveness.98 (paras 22 to 24) 
In other words, a prohibition on night work was lawful because it was necessary to 
protect the health and safety of the mother and child. However, the termination of the 
woman's employment was unlawful because it's purpose was to benefit the employer 
97 [1994] IRLR 364, ECl 
98 The explicit reference to the fact that the applicant was employment on a contract without a fixed tenn 
means that the ECJ left open the possibility that it could be within the scope of article 2(3) to dismiss a 
woman on a fixed tenn in similar circumstances if the period of her unavailability for ',vork either wholly 
or substantially corresponds with the tenn of her contract. On the questi,on of ,whether the nature of, the 
employment relationship can affect the application of the ETD see the dIscussIOn of the Webb case ill 
chapter 5, 
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rather than protect the mother.99 
The second way in which a woman can be subj ected to less favourable treatment 
is that she can be forced to take a period of time off work around the time of the birth. It 
is not clear how long this period is but if the issue is ever tested the courts are likely to 
follow the provisions of the Pregnancy Directive which stipulates that a woman must 
take at least two weeks of maternity leave around the date of confinement (art 8).100 
Where a woman remains on full pay it may not be much of a detriment to have to take 
time off work. However, if the absence is unpaid the detriment is much mor:e~ severe. 
The issue of compulsory maternity leave was touched upon by the Ee] in the case of 
Hertz v Dansk. lOl The point was not strictly relevant to the issues in the case which was 
concerned with the treatment of pregnancy related illness once the period of maternity 
leave has expired. In paragraph 15 of the judgment the Ee] made the following 
comment: "It is a matter for each Member State to fix the period of maternity leave in 
such a way as to allow female workers to be absent during the penod during which 
problems due to pregnancy and confinement may arise." 
Despite the reference to allowing women to be absent the comment was 
subsequently relied upon by the Ee] in the case of Boyle v EOCl02 as a basis for finding 
not only that women can be obliged to take a period of maternity leave but that 
employers can use the maternity leave period in order to avoid paying the woman sick 
pay. Boyle was a test case brought by several employees of the EOe in order to clarify 
various outstanding issues in relation to maternity rights. One of the questions referred 
to the EC] was the compatibility of s 72(l)(b) of the ERA 1996 with the ETD. Under 
this section, a woman's maternity leave automatically starts if she is absent from work 
for a pregnancy related illness in the six weeks before the expected w3ek of childbirth. 
The EC] referred to its earlier comment in Hertz and then held: 
National legislation may therefore, as here, provide that the period of maternity 
leave commences with the date notified by the person concerned to her employer 
as the date on which she intends to commence her period of absence, or the first 
99 The German law in question also prevented pregnant or breastfeeding women from doing overtime or 
working on Sundays or public holidays. However, the ECl did not comment on whether these measures 
were within the scope of article 2(3). 
100 The provision had been implemented into domestic law by the Maternity (Compulsory Leave) 
Regulations 1994 SI 2497 reg 2. 
101 [1991] IRLR31, ECl 
102 [1998] IRLR 717, ECl 
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day after the beginning of the sixth week preceding the expected week of 
childbirth during which the employee is wholly or partly absent because of 
pregnancy, should that day fall on an earlier date. 
In other words, article 2(3) not only allows for a degree of compulsory maternity leave 
but also permits employers to determine when the leave is taken. There can be little 
doubt that a minimum period of maternity leave is necessary to protect the health of the 
mother and child. What is less obvious is the health and safety benefits of forcing a 
woman a start her maternity leave if she is absent from work for a pregnancy related 
illness in the six weeks before her expected week of confinement. The impa~J of this 
decision is not to protect the mother but to save money for the employer as it prevents a 
woman from collecting sick pay in those six weeks. A protective measure would be to 
allow the woman to collect her sick pay and then take her full period of maternity leave 
afterwards. Thus, in this particular case the EC] appears to have extended the scope of 
article 2(3) to cover less favourable treatment for which the only rationale is the financial 
interests of the employer. In relation to what other less favourable treatment is necessary 
in order to protect the health and safety of the mother and child, the courts are likely to 
be influenced by the provisions of the Pregnancy Directive. As a result, if an employer 
can show that a particular measure comes within the scope of the Pregnancy Directive, 
the courts are unlikely to find that it falls outside the scope of article 2(..., r 
One area where article 2(3) does not apply is in relation to dangers that also affect 
men. This point was made clear by the EC] in the case of Johnston v Chief Constable of 
the Royal Ulster Constabulary. 103 This is the case in which the Chief Constable of the 
RUC decided that women police officers in Northern Ireland should not be armed 
because of fears that they might be attacked and their firearms stolen, to maintain the 
position of women officers in the community and to maintain, as far as the women 
officers were concerned, the ideal of an unarmed police force. Because of their unarmed 
status women were unable to undertake security duties. This resulted in the decision to , 
terminate the applicant's employment contract. The respondent argued, inter alia, that 
the termination of the applicant's employment was covered by articl~ 2(3). The Ee] 
disagreed and held that the derogation had to be interpreted strictly. 
It is clear from the express reference to pregnancy and maternity that the directive 
is intended to protect a woman's biological conditions and the special relationship 
103 [1986] 3 CMLR 240 Eel 
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which exists between a woman and her child. That provision, of the directive 
does not therefore allow women to be excluded from a certain type of 
employment on the ground that public opinion demands that women be given 
greater protection than men against risks which affect men and women in the 
same way and which are distinct from women's specific needs of protection, such 
as those expressly mentioned. 
Finally, there is the question of whether article 2(3) applies to situation where 
there are risks specific to women that are not pregnancy or maternity related. The use of 
the word 'particularly' implies that the article has a wider application. In practice, it is 
rather difficult to think of anything other than a somewhat improbable situatioJ1 where 
women face a risk that is not also applicable to men. One possible scenario is a high 
security prison holding offenders convicted of crimes against women where there is a 
real risk of a woman but not a man being assaulted. If an employer can show that there 
genuinely is a risk that is specific to women and not just a situation where public opinion 
demands that women should be afforded a greater degree of protection, the EC] may be 
willing to find that article 2(3) applies. 
OCCUPATIONAL PENSION SCHEMES 
Introduction 
There has traditionally been a considerable amount of direct sex discrimination in 
occupational pension schemes both in relation to scheme access and benefits. 104 
Although the Government accepted that pensions were pay when. the. EPA was first 
passed in 1970, pensions were excluded from the scope of the Act (s 6(1)).105 Separate 
legislation was subsequently introduced to deal with direct discrimination In access 
conditions but not indirect discrimination such as the exclusion of part-time 
employees.106 The main efIect of the legislation was to equalise entry ages for women 
104 For an introduction to pensions generally see Seres J, Pensions: A practical guide (1992) and Hosking's 
and Escolme et aI, Pension schemes and retirement benefits, (1991). 
105 For the reasons for the exclusion see: Secretary of State for Employment, Barbara Castle, Hansard, He 
Vol. 795, col. 923, 9 February 1970 and He Vol. 800, col. 740, 23 April 1970 
106 The equal access requirements in S8 53-56 of the Social Security Pensions Act 1975 ensured that 
membership of a scheme was open to women and me~ on the sa~e .te.~s as. re~ards age and length and 
service (s 53(2)). Regulations made under s.53 proscnbed that elIgibIlIty cntena must be th~ same , 
whether they are contained within the scheme ~les or the contract of emploY,ment: OccupatIOnal PenSIOn 
Scheme (Equal Access to Membership) Regulah?nS 197,6 SI 1976/142, SectIOn ?(1) of the EPA was 
replaced with a new s 6( 1A) that required complIance WIth the equal access requrremeuts, 
105 
and men. 107 
Initially, Article 141 was thought to have only a marginal effect on occupational 
pensions. lOB As a result, a separate body of legislation was put in place in order to apply 
the principle of equal treatment to occupational pensions schemes. In particular, in 1986 
the EC agreed Directive 86/278 on the implementation of equal trea1Jnent for women 
and men in occupational social security schemes (OSSD). The OSSD covers any scheme 
(other than one which is covered by the provisions of the Social Security Directive 7917) 
whose purpose is to provide protection against certain risks including .§!ckness, 
~""..J.> 
invalidity, old age and early retirement as long as the benefit constitutes consideration 
paid by the employer to the worker by reason of his or her employment (arts 2 and 4). 
On the face of it the Directive is very wide in that it prohibits direct and indirect 
discrimination in relation to the obligation to contribute, conditions of access, the 
calculation of contributions and the calculation of benefits (art 5). However, in its 
original form the Directive also contained an extensive list of exceptions and temporal 
restrictions. In particular, there were exceptions for pensionable age, survivors' benefits 
(art 9) and actuarial factors (art 6). However, there was no exception in the Directive for 
bridging pensions. 
The provisions of the OSSD (including all of the exceptions) were due to be 
implemented into domestic law by s 23 and schedule 5 of the Social Security Act 1989. 
The deadline under the OSSD for bringing schedule 5 into force was 1 January 1993. 
However, schedule 5 was never implemented because of the uncertainty caused by the 
Barber cases. 109 The Barber cases were a series of cases dealing with the applicability of 
Article 141 to occupational pension schemes. The scope of Article 141 is not restricted 
by the provisions of the OSSD and, therefore, the derogations in the OSSD are 
ineffective where the benefit in question is covered by Article 141.110 In the Barber cases 
the ECJ looked at the derogations and detennined whether or not they were contrary to 
107 Seres J, above, p 322. 
108 See for example, the preamble to Directive 86/278 on the implementation of equal treatment for 
women and men in occupational social security schemes. 
109 See the written answer given by Ann Widdecombe, Under Secretary of State for Social Security to the 
House of Commons on 10 December 1992 as reported in ;'>JAPF Parliamentary Bulletin ~o. 10 April 1993, 
p. l. 
110 Moroni v. Firma Colla GmbH [1994] IRLR 130 para 24 and Bestuur v. Beune [1995] IRLR 103 para 
65. 
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Art· 1 1 III IC e 41. The outcome of the Barber cases was that two of the exceptions in the 
OSSD, namely pensionable age1l2 and survivors' benefits1l3 were held to be contrary to 
Article 141 and the exception for actuarial factors was found to be partially in 
contravention. 114 In addition, the use of bridging pensions was held to be consistent with 
Article 141 despite the fact that the use of bridging pensions was not covered by an 
exception in the OSSD.lls 
In order to bring the OSSD in line with Article 141 the member states adopted an 
amending directive (96/97 lEe). The exceptions for pensionable age116 and ~llrvivors' 
-~''''' 
pensions previously contained in article 9(a) were removed (art 2 of the amending 
directive). In addition, the exception for actuarial factors was amended and an additional 
exception for bridging pensions inserted into the Directive. The end result is that there 
are currently only two legislative exceptions in the area of occupational pensions namely 
bridging pensions and actuarial factors. The scope and rationale of the two exceptions is 
discussed in more detail below. 
111 For the impact of the Barber cases see: Amull A, 'Sex discrimination in occupational pension schemes' 
(1986) 11 ELR 363; IRLB, 'Sex equality in occupational pensions', No 508 p.2; Anon, 'Equality in 
occupational pension schemes: still waiting for Coloroll' (1994) 23 ILJ 155; Honeyball S and Shaw J, 
'Sex, law and the retiring man' (1991) 16 ELR 47; Hudson D, 'Some reflections on the implications of the 
Barber decision' (1992) 17 ELR 163; Deakin S, 'Equality in pensions law - the limits of Barber' (1994) 53 
CLJ 236; EOR, 'Sex equality and occupational pensions - Barber five years on', 1995, No 62, P 15; Moore 
S, 'Justice doesn't mean a free lunch: the application of the principle of equal pay to r ... cupational pension 
schemes' (1995) 20 ELR 159; Grant M, 'Judgment day', Pensions World, November 1994, p 2; NAPF, 
Parliamentary Bulletin No 17, October 1994 and Ellis E, EC Sex equality law, (1998), p 69. To the extent 
that recent developments have actually had an impact on pensions equality see: Whiteford E, 'From non-
discrimination to equality: pensions and EC law' in Dashwood A and O'Leary S, eds, The principle of 
equal treatment in EC law, (1997). 
112 Barber v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group [1990] IRLR 240, ECl See also Moroni v 
Firma Colla GmbH [1994] IRLR 130, ECl However, the ECJ applied a temporal restriction to the 
judgment so that pensionable age only has to be equalised for periods of pensionable service after the date 
of the Barber judgment ie 17 May 1990: Ten Dever v Stichting [1993] IRLR 601, ECl See also Protocol 
2 to the Treaty on European Union which incorporates the temporal restriction into Article 141. The 
potential effects of Barber were limited even further by the EeJ's decision in Smith v. Avdel Systems Ltd 
[1994] IRLR 602, that the requirement to level-up benefits only applies until such time as the rules of the 
scheme are equalised. 
113 Ten Dever v. Stichting [1993] IRLR 601, ECl The Barber limitation on retrospective effect also applies 
to survivors' and dependants' benefits and therefore schemes are only required to provide equal 
dependants' pensions for periods of service after 17 May 1990: see Coloroll above, paras 51-60. For some 
of the earlier cases on survivors' benefits see: Szyszczak E, 'Equality, survivor's benefits and occupational 
pension schemes' (1988) 51 MLR 355 _ 
114 Neath v. Hugh Steeper Ltd [1994] All ER 929, ECJ, Coloroll Pension Trustees Ltd-'. Russell [1994] -
IRLR 586, EeJ. 
115 Birds Eye Walls Ltd v. Roberts [1994] IRLR 29, Eel For industry reaction to this case see: 'Surprise 
ruling on pensions bias' Financial Times, 23 December 1993. ... 
116 In line with the temporal restriction applied by the EeJ the change only applIes to penods of servlce 
after 17 May 1990. 
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Bridging pensions 
The European exception for bridging pensions is contained in article 2 of the amended 
OSSD which reads as follows: 
This Directive does not preclude an employer granting to persons who have 
already reached the retirement age for the purposes of granting a pension by 
virtue of an occupational scheme, but who have not yet reached the retirement 
age for the purposes of granting a statutory retirement pension, a pension 
supplement, the aim of which is to make equal or more nearly equal the overall 
amount of benefit paid to these persons in relation to the amount of be~fit paid 
to persons of the other sex in the same situation who have already reached the 
statutory retirement age, until the persons benefiting from the supplement reach 
the statutory retirement age. 
The exception has been implemented into domestic law in substantially the same form by 
ss 62-66 of the Pensions Act 1995 and reg 13 of the Occupational Pension Schemes 
(Equal Treatment Regulations) 1995.117 
The rationale behind the exception for bridging penSIOns is clearly stated in 
article 2. The difference in state pensionable age means that women are entitled to a state 
pension at the age of 60 while men have to wait until they are 65. The use of bridging 
pensions is an attempt by employers and pension schemes to compensate men for the 
direct discrimination in the state scheme. The result of the exception is that in terms of 
overall pension (state and occupational combined) women and men receive the same 
albeit between the ages of 60 and 64 women receive a lower occupational pension than 
men. IIS 
Single sex actuarial factors 
The difference between a pension and most other savings schemes is that a pension 
guarantees the scheme member a regular income for the rest of his or her life. 
Obviously, the longer a member lives the more expensive the pension becomes for the 
pension provider. At the age of 60 average life expectancy is 18 years for a man and 22 
117 S1 1995/3183. The Regulations came into force on 1 January 1996. 
118 The other way of dealing with the difference in state. pe~si?nable age is to integrate the occu~ational 
scheme with the states scheme so that the flat rate penSIOn IS Ignored for the purpose of calculatmg 
benefits. For example, a member entitled to 2/3rds of his or her fmal sala~ on retirement will ac~ally 
receive from the scheme 2/3rds of fmal salary minus the flat rate state penSIOn payable at any partIcular 
time. Because of the difference in the state pensionable age the state pension is deducted from a man's 
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years for a woman.l19 Thus, if they both retire at the age of 60 the average woman will 
receive her pension for four years longer than the average man. Despite the fact that 
single sex actuarial factors involve the application of a sex stereotype, the OSSD and 
domestic law120 pennit their use in the following three situations. 
First, in relation to final salary schemes, it is not permissible to pay women a 
lower periodic pension than men (except where a member takes early or late 
retirementl21) or to require women to make higher pension contributions. However, it is 
lawful to discriminate between the sexes in relation to the payment of capital s,ums, in 
-" 
particular the conversion of part of a periodic payment into a capital sum, transfer 
payments and a reversionary pension payable to a dependent in return for the surrender 
of part of a pension (art 6(l)(h)).122 What does this mean in practice? In addition to a 
periodic pension, a member of a final salary scheme often has the right to commute part 
of his or her periodic pension into a lump sum. Depending on the age at which the lump 
sum is taken a different multiple is applied to the amount of the annual pension that is 
surrendered. Typically, for each £ 1 of pension surrendered by a woman at the age of 60 
a multiple of 11 is applied while for each £ 1 surrendered by a man at the age of 65 a 
multiple of 9 is used. 123 In most schemes, different multiples are uSl=-:i'or women and 
men. This means that a woman with exactly the same periodic pension entitlement as a 
man will receive a greater lump sum payment. However, not all schemes use different 
multiples for women and men. Some schemes use the same multiples for women and 
men and no account is taken of the longer life expectancy ofwomen. 124 
The exception for capital sums also has an effect on transfer payments and buy-
outs. A member of a final salary scheme who leaves the service of his or her employer 
before retirement may wish to transfer his or her pension benefits to another scheme. 125 
occupational pension from the age of 65 and from a woman's occupational pension from the age of 60. 
119 ONS, English Life Tables No 15, (1997). At 65 the difference in life expectancy is also four years. 
120 Pensions Act 1995 ss 62-66 and the Occupational Pension Schemes (Equal Treatment Regulations) 
1995, SI 1995/3183, reg 15. 
121 In this situation the periodic pension is subject to an actuarial adjustment in order to compensate for the 
early or late payment of benefits. . . . 
122 Employers can also make different levels of contnb~tJ.ons to fmal salary ~chemes m order to ensure the 
adequacy of the funds (article 6(1)(i)). Howeve~, as thIS does. no~ h~ve anY.lffipact on the benefit that the 
individual receives it is questionable whether thIS would be dIscnrnmatory m the first place. 
123 Curtin D, 'Occupational pension schemes and Article 141: beyond the fringe?' (1987) 24 CML Rev 
215, at 220, note 19. . 
1:4 For example, see rule 18 of the British Gas StaffPenslOn Scheme. . . 
125 The right to a transfer payment was introduced by Pt II of Sched 1 of the SocIal Secunty Act 1985 
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For an individual member transferring the amount of the transfer payment is usually 
calculated by reference to the capital value of the deferred pension to which the member 
is entitled on leaving service. The receiving scheme will then use the transfer payment to 
give the member either additional years of notional service in the new scheme or a 
deferred pension. In determining the capital value of the deferred pension account is 
taken of the different life expectancy of the sexes with the result that women's transfer 
payments are higher than men's. However, it should be noted that unlike a lump sum 
payment which is money a member can actually spend, a transfer payment is only used to 
",,,' 
purchase benefits in another scheme. Since most schemes use similar mortality tables, a 
woman needs a higher transfer payment in order to purchase the same benefits as a man 
with the same number of years of service and the same final salary. As a result, the fact 
that a woman has a larger transfer payment will not always means that she receives a 
higher level of benefits from a receiving scheme. 
As an alternative to transferring to another occupational scheme a member may 
choose to use his or her pension rights to purchase an annuity contract with an insurance 
company. This option is often referred to as a buy_out. 126 The amount of the buy-out is 
the cash equivalent of the member's accrued rights. Again, in determining the amount of 
the cash equivalent the use of actuarial factors results in greater transfer payments for 
women but not necessarily a higher level of benefit from the receiving scheme. This will 
depend on whether the insurance company uses single sex or unisex multiples. 127 If the 
company does use single sex multiples the results can be quite dramatil For example, as 
at 6 May 1999, Standard Life annuity rates for a lump sum of £10,000 were £892 for a 
man aged 65 and £741 for a woman of the same age. 128 In other words, for the same 
lump sum women receive only 84% of the periodic pension paid to men. 
The second exception deals with the use of actuarial factors in the payment of 
benefits by a money purchase scheme (art 6(1)(h)). In a money purchase scheme the 
contributions are invested by the pension scheme in order to build up a fund that is 
amending paras 11-13 of Sched 1 A of the Social Secruity Pensions Act 1975 for members leaving service 
after 1 January 1986. . . 
126 The right to a buy-out was introduced for I?embers leavmg servlc.e after 1 Janua~ 1986, se~ above. 
m Under s 45 of the SDA, insurance compames are allowed to use smgle sex actuanal factors many 
insurance policy as long as it is reasonable to rely on the data .. F ~r a criticis.m .of the us~ of single sex 
actuarial factors in insurance contracts see Khan K, 'Sexual dlscnmmatlOn m msuran.;p" (1986) 137 ~LJ 
839. 
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personal to the member. On retirement the member may elect to take some of the fund as 
a lump sum payment. Unlike the position with final salary schemes, the lump sum is the 
same for women and men and will depend entirely on the size of the fund. (The same is 
true if the member makes a transfers payment to another scheme prior to his or her 
retirement.) The remainder of the money in the scheme must be used to buy an annuity 
contract, either with the same or another pension provider. As with buy-outs, if the 
company uses single sex factors the result is that the same lump sum gives women a 
lower periodic payment than men. 
.. .( 
The third exception allows employers to make different levels of contributions to 
money purchase schemes but only if the aim is to equalise the amount of the final 
benefits. In other words, employers can make higher contributions for women members 
on the basis that they need a bigger fund in order to buy the same level of periodic 
pension (art 6(1)(i)). 
What would be the effect of using single sex actuarial factors in the calculation of 
benefits? 129 In theory, the result should be an averaging out of benefits so that, for 
example, in purchasing an annuity, men will receive a lower periodic pension than they 
do at present while the pension paid to women will increase. However, there appears to 
be some concern that the use of single-sex factors will do more than just average out 
benefits and that instead, the effect will be a general levelling down of benefits to those 
levels currently paid to women. It is not clear why this should be the case. 130 The use of 
unisex factors does not mean that total life expectancy increases, it just involves a greater 
distribution of the risk. The result, of course, will be that the average man subsidises the 
average woman but this communal pooling of risk is already the accepted basis for many 
insurance schemes. The main problem with unisex factors is the risk of market distortion 
between occupational schemes and private pensions provided by insurar.ce companies. If 
unisex factors are used by final salary schemes to calculate capital sums the same lump 
sum payment would purchase women a lower level of annuity than men thus making the 
position more unequal than it is at present. The solution to this problem would be to 
128 Jvlonevwise, June 1999, p 98. 
129 This ~ould not prevent the continued use of single sex factors in order to predict the future liabilities of 
the scheme or pension provider and, in the case of fmal salary schemes, to ensure the solvency of the fund. 
130 Curtin D, 'Scalping the community legislator: occupational pensions and "Barber'" (1990) 27 CML 
Rev 475 at .+94. 
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extend the requirement to use unisex factors to insurance companies. The evidence 
seems to be that this would have little significant impact on the long-term insurance 
market in the UK in terms of business volumes, profitability and solvency.l3l 
In light of the above, what is the rationale underlying the continued use of single 
sex actuarial factors? It seems that the primary reason is the risk of market distortion 
between occupational schemes and the private insurance market. If occupational 
schemes are forced to use unisex factors while insurance companies used single sex 
factors women purchasing annuity contracts will be particularly disadv::mtaged. To avoid 
this all pension providers would have to be forced to use unisex factors at the same time. 
What is not clear is why the Government has not gone down this route. The fact that 
unisex factors are already used in several countries (eg the United States,132 France and 
Germany133) implies that the problem of market distortion can be resolved. Perhaps the 
lack of movement in this area is simply a resistance on the part of the pensions and life 
insurance industries to the idea that the risk of life expectancy should be shared across 
the sexes with the result that the average man subsidises the average woman. 
CONCLUSION 
The existing legislative categories can be divided into two groups. The iirst group 
contains the positive action exceptions. Included in this group are the exception for more 
favourable treatment on the grounds of pregnancy and maternity (although strictly 
speaking this is a defence to a claim of indirect sex discrimination) the exceptions for 
bridging pensions and actuarial factors and, most significant of all, the positive action 
exception itself. The first three exceptions all take an identifiable sex difference (ie 
pregnancy, state pensionable age and life expectancy) and attempt to render the 
difference costless. In this way their aim is to enhance rather than detract from the 
ultimate aim of sex equality. The positive action exception itself is not limited to any 
particular sex difference but instead it is aimed at equal representation of the sexes in the 
workforce. The goal of equal representation can be achieved in many W dYS not all of 
which involve direct discrimination. From the perspective of legal certainty it is 
131 See Curtin D (1990), above, p 495, note 73. 
132 See Hervey T, 'Case note on Neath v Hugh Steeper Ltd' (1994) CML Rev 1387 at 1395. 
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desirable that the extent to which any exception covers direct discrimination should be 
clearly ascertainable. In this respect the domestic approach to positive action is 
preferable to the European approach. Although the domestic exceptions are not as wide 
in their application as the European exception they are extremely detailed and there can 
be little doubt whether they apply in any particular situation. By contrast, the European 
exception is no more than a general principle and, as a result, its application is very 
unclear as the case law demonstrates. 
Two lessons can be learnt from the confusion surrounding the European P9sitive 
action exception. First, any model justification defence for direct discrimination should 
be very detailed so that it is as clear as possible whether the defence applies or not in any 
given situation. Second, despite the comments of the European Commission in Birds 
Eye Walls Ltd v Roberts!34 that employers should be able to justify direct discrimination 
on the grounds of substantive sex equality, it is far from clear that this should be case. 
The extent to which employers should be allowed to use direct sex discrimination as a 
form of positive action is a very political question. It is arguable that scope for positive 
action direct discrimination should be decided by Parliament rather than individual 
employers and, therefore, positive action should be left outside the boundaries of the 
model justification defence. This whole issue is discussed in more detail in chapter 7. 
The second group contains exceptions that allow direct discrimination despite the 
fact that it detracts from the ultimate goal of equality. In this group various rationales 
can be discerned. First, some of the exceptions are financially based in that they enable 
an employer to operate rnore profitably. For example, the exception that allows 
employers to restrict jobs working abroad to one sex. The second rationale is social 
utility. In these situations the goal of equality is sacrificed to another social goal. 
Perhaps the best example is the exception for personal services. The third rationale is the 
preservation of decency. This largely comes down to the idea that individual's should 
not have to undress or use toilet facilities in the presence of someone of the opposite sex. 
Finally, there is the entertainment exception that subordinates the goal of equality to 
artistic licence. 
133 Curtin (1987), above, p 217, note 9. 
134 [1994] IRLR 29, ECl. 
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5 
JUSTIFICATION OF INDIRECT SEX DISCRIMINATION 
INTRODUCTION 
Indirect sex discrimination is a mechanism for dealing with the detrimental effects of 
distribution sex differences. A prima facie case of indirect sex discrimination arises 
where a particular measure or working practice has a disproportionate and detrimental 
'hi' 
impact on one sex. However, the act of discrimination is not complete unless the 
employer fails to justify its use of the disputed measure or practice. Thus justification is 
an element of the tort of indirect sex discrimination although it is more often viewed as a 
defence.! This chapter takes a critical look at the constituent parts of the justification 
defence as a prelude to constructing a justification defence for cases of direct sex 
discrimination in chapter 7. 
THE DEFINITION OF OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATION 
The European test for objective justification was originally set down by the ECJ in the 
case of Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v Weber von Hartz2 in the context of Article 141 and later 
applied to the ETD.3 The test, which has not materially changed since Bilka, has now 
been incorporated into article 2(2) of EC Directive 37/97 on the burden of proof in cases 
of sex discrimination (BPD). Article 2(2) defines indirect sex discrimination in the 
following terms: 
I Strictly speaking justification is an element of the tort of indirect discrimination rather than a defence. 
Thus, if the employer is able to justify the practice there is no discrimination in the first place rather than 
unlawful discrimination being rendered lawful by being justified. While it may be considered that this is 
purely a semantic distinction Bernard has argued that the way in which justification is viewed can have an 
impact on the way in which it is applied by the courts: Bernard N 'What are the purposes ofEC 
discrimination law?' in Dine J and Watt Beds, Discrimination law: concepts, limitations and 
justifications, (1996) P 84. 
2 [1986] 2 CMLR 701, ECl See also the earlier case of Jenkins v Kingsgate (Clothing ProductiorI.\) Ltd 
[1981] 2 CMLR 24, where the ECJ considered a difference in pay between part-time and full-time workers 
but did not actually define the treatment as indirect discrimination. For an overview of the other <.:I<.:mcnh 
of indirect discrimination see: Prechal S, 'Combating indirect discrimination in the Community law 
context' (1993-4) LIEI 81. 
3 See Kordingv Senator Fur Finanzen [1997] IRLR 710, RCJ and Gerster v Frl'lSI(/ot If([~l('m r II)fnl 
IRLR 699, EeJ. 
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[I~ndi.rect discrim~natio~ shall exist where an apparently neutral prOVISIOn, 
cntenon or practIce dIsadvantages a substantially higher proportion of the 
members of one sex unless that provision, criterion or practice is appropriate and 
necessary and can be justified by objective factors unrelated to sex. 
The definition of indirect discrimination applies to Article 141, the EPA, the ETD, the 
Pregnancy Directive and the Directive on Parental Leave (article 3). The BPD was 
adopted by the Council of Ministers in July 1997 and is due to be implemented by the 
member states no later than 1 January 2001. The wording of the SDA test for 
justification (which also applies to the EPA 4) is slightly different in that the re.~pondent 
must show that the measure is "justifiable irrespective of the sex of the person to whom it 
is applied". Over the years there has been much criticism that the application of the SDA 
test by the national courts has fallen short of the stricter test set down by the ECJ. 5 More 
recently, the national courts appear to have come much closer to the European test6 and 
with the implementation of the BPD any remaining differences between the two tests 
should disappear. 
The justification test can be broken down into three elements. 7 First, the 
employer must identify the objective or reason for the measure that has caused the 
disproportionate impact and that is unrelated to sex (the reason test). For example, an 
employer might give as reason for paying part-time staff a lower hourly rate of pay the 
additional administrative costs associated with part-time work. Second, the employer 
must prove that there is causal connection between the contested measure and the reason 
given for its use (the causation test). Thus, an employer might seek to justify the use of 
seniority payments on the basis that they reduce staff turnover. In which case, the 
employer must show that seniority payments do in fact reduce staff turnover and that 
there is a causal connection between the two. Third, there is the proportionality element. 
4 Jenkins v Kingsgate (Clothing Productions) (No 2) [1981] ICR 715, EAT and Rainey v. Greater Glasgow 
Health Board [1987] ICR 129, HL. Although, for a different approach see the judgment of Lord Slynn in 
Ratcliffe v North Yorkshire County Council [1995] IRLR 439, HL, where he said: "In my opinion the EPA 
must be interpreted in its amended form without bringing in the distinction between so-called 'direct' and 
'indirect' discrimination". 
5 See for example Hervey T, 'Justification for indirect sex discrimination in employment: European 
Community and United Kingdom compared' (1991) 40 ICLQ 807; Her:ey T, Ju~tifications for ~ex 
discrimination in employment, (1993) and Hepple B and others, Improvmg equalzty law: the optIOns, p 6. 
6 See for example, the decision of the House of Lords in R v Secretary of State for Employment ex parte 
EOC [1994] IRLR 176. . ,. , 
7 Townshend-Smith R, 'Economic defences to equal pay clailllS m Hervey T and 0 Keeffe D eds, Set 
equality in the European Union, (1996) p 38. 
115 
This is essentially a two stage test: could the same benefit have been achieved using non-
discriminatory means and does the adverse impact on the disadvantaged sex outweigh 
the benefit to the employer. Unless all three elements of the test are satisfied, the 
respondent's attempt to justify a disputed practice will fail. 
THE REASON TEST 
The first stage of the objective justification test involves the respondent putting forward a 
"'-$ 
reason for using the practice or measure that is unconnected with sex. Several 
parameters can be ascertained from the case law. First, the reason must correspond to a 
real need on the part of the employer. Obviously, this rules out mere whims such as a 
minimum height requirement because the managing director has a preference for tall 
people. However, there is no need for the employer to demonstrate that the reason is 
essential to the viability of the business although the degree of benefit to the employer is 
a factor that the court can take into account as part of the proportionality test (see 
below). 8 Furthermore, the reason must be one that is relevant to the function of the 
business of the employer as opposed to a wider policy objective for the benefit of the 
population at large. Thus the Police Authority could not justify a rule that candidates in 
receipt of an occupational pension would not be considered for appointment because the 
policy of reducing unemployment was entirely extraneous to the function of the 
Authority.9 This rule does not apply where the practice being challenged is enshrined in 
legislation. Where a government is seeking to justify a legislative provision, the only 
requirement is that the government should be able to come forward with a legitimate 
social aim. Thus in R v Secretary of State for Employment ex parte EOC the House of 
Lords accepted that increasing the availability of part-time work could properly be 
regarded as a beneficial social policy.lo Second, where a reason is expressed in the form 
of a policy decision by the employer, the policy must be constantly reviewed to ensure 
8 See Anderman S, 'Constitutional law and labour law dimensions of Article 119: the case of justification 
for indirect discrirnirIation' in Dine J and Watt Beds, Discrimination law: concepts, limitations and 
justifications, (1996) p 105. 
9 Greater Manchester Policy Authority v Lea [1990] IRLR 372, EAT. 
10 Fora criticism of the Court's failure to consider whether the social policy put forward by the 
Government was indeed desirable see: Villiers C and White F, 'Agitating for part-time workers' rights' 
(1995) 58 MLR 650. 
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that the reason still applies. Thus a policy that job sharing will not be allowed in senior 
management position must be reviewed to ensure that the nature or the jobs has not 
changed thereby making job-sharing a feasible option. 
Third, the fact that a job attracts a certain label or is in a certain category is not by 
itself a sufficient reason. Employers must go behind the label and identify the specific 
aspect of the job that justifies the measure being challenged. For example, the fact that 
an employee is employed on a casual basis is not by itself a reason for excluding the 
employee from certain benefits. The employer must identify the particular f~'!-tures of 
casual employment eg the way in which the employee is scheduled to work or the actual 
number of hours worked as reasons for the difference in treatment. l1 Fourth, the reason 
put forward by the employer must be one that is sufficiently significant to account for the 
whole of the difference in treatment. If it is not, only that part of the difference that is 
accounted for is justified. 12 Thus, if an employer is able to prove that 60% of a difference 
in pay is attributable to length of service but has no explanation for the remaining 40%, 
the defence can only succeed in respect of the 60% attributable to length of service. 
Finally, the existence of separate bargaining structures does not by itself justify a 
difference in treatment as collective bargaining is merely the process by which pay 
practices are agreed between employers and unions - it does not explain the reason for 
the difference. 13 
Although there is no limit on the kind of reason that can be put forward by an 
employer (subject to the parameters set out above) in most cases employers tend to rely 
on one of the following seven reasons. The first reason is that an employee must have 
the right skills to do the job. Thus selection criteria are often justified on the basis that 
they represent a necessary skill and without them the employee could not perform the job 
or could not perform it as effectively. Similarly, the factors in a job evaluation scheme 
11 Buckle v Abbey National pic IT, EOR Discrimination Case Law Digest, No 38, Winter 1998, p 2. 
12 Enderby v. Frenchay Health Authority [1994] 1 CMLR 8, ECl See Fredman S, 'Equal pay and 
justification (1994) ILJ 37 at 40 and Hepple B, 'Equality and discrimination' in Davies P ~n.d Sci~rr.a S 
eds, European Community labour law: principles and perspectives (1996), P 25.1. The posI.non ongmally 
adopted by the domestic comts was that as long as the reason put forward ~xplams a. ~ate:Ial part of the 
difference in treatment as opposed to a de minimis part, the whole of the dIfference IS JustIfied: Calder v 
Rowntree Mackintosh Confectionary Ltd [1993] ICR 811, CA and Byrne v Financial Times Ltd [1991] 
IRLR 417, EAT. 
13 See Enderby (above) and Barber v NCR (Manufacturing) Ltd [1993] IRLR 95, EAT. 
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can be justified on the basis that they reflect the requirements of the job. 14 The second 
reason relates to the timing and location of the work. Employees must be available to do 
the work when and where it occurs. Thus an employer can justify moving employees 
from tenn-time only working to year round working on the basis that the workload is 
reasonably constant throughout the year. 15 Similarly, it will be reasonably easy for an 
employer to justify the need for a mobility clause in case the business relocates in the 
future. 16 Third, there is seniority. Length of service is often considered to be an indicator 
of capability and performance and seniority is commonly used as a criterioll, in both 
promotion and redundancy situations. 17 
The fourth reason that is often put forward by employers is the need for 
continuity of service or management. This reason is often used in the context of part-
time work or job sharing. The employer claims that the nature of the job is such that it 
cannot effectively be performed by more than one person. 18 The fifth reason is indirect 
labour costs. Again, this argument is usually associated with part-time work and the 
costs involved often arise from the administrative expenses of employing more 
employees. 19 The sixth reason is increased productivity. For exa:rrple, in Jenkins v 
Kingsgate Ltcf° the employer sought to justify a lower hourly rate for part-time 
employees on the basis that part-time employees could not make the optimum use of the 
machinery. The seventh and final reason is market forces. This reason is problematic 
because of the possibility that the market is itself discriminatory and thus the reason is 
related to sex. The whole concept of market forces as a reason for a difference in 
treatment is discussed in more detail below. 
As the above list demonstrates, the reason put forward by the employer is 
invariably economic in nature. The measure having the disparate impact is necessary to 
14 Rummier v Dato-Druck [1987[ 3 CMLR 127, ECl. 
15 Dick and Lamberty v Cambridge Area Health Authority IT, EOR Discrimination Case Law Digest, No 
11, Spring 1992, p 2. 
16 Meade-Hill v British Council [1995] IRLR 478, CA. 
17 See for example Brook v London Borough ofHaringey [199~] I~.R 478, EAT. . . 
18 See for example, Eley v Huntley Diagnostics Ltd IT, EOR DlscnmmatlOn Case Law DIgest, No 32, 
Summer 1997, p 2. 
19 See for example, Kidd v DRG Ltd [1985] ICR 405, ~~ T. A1th~u.gh i~ seems that there m.ay be a . 
tendency amongst employers to over estimate th~ addltlon~l adrmmstratlve costs of employmg part-tune 
staff Szyszczak E 'Differences in pay for part-tune work [1981] 44 MLR 672. 
20 [1981] IRLR 388, EAT. Whether the lower hourly rate wasjustifed was never actually resolved because 
the case was settled after the EAT judgment. 
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the employer because it reduces labour costs, increases productivity or contributes to the 
efficient functioning of the enterprise. Without it, the employer would make less money. 
The bottom line is the profitability (or if it is a non-profit making, the efficiency) of the 
organisation. Thus justification of indirect discrimination is essentially an economic 
defence which allows employers to excuse practices that have a detrimental and 
disproportionate impact on one sex on the basis that it would cost too much to 
discontinue them. This raises the important question of how much is too much and at 
what point does the detriment to the applicant outweigh the cost to the employt;:!r. This 
difficult balancing exercise is discussed below in the section on proportionality. 
The reason put forward by the employer must be unrelated tc sex. When is a 
reason related to sex? The most obvious example is where the employer admits that the 
reason for the practice is that most of the persons are affected are of one sex. For 
example, an employer admits that it pays part-time staff less because they are 
, 
predominantly women. One of the areas where it is difficult to tell if the reason is sex 
related is market forces because of the possibility that a particularly market is 
discriminatory. At this point it is helpful to review exactly that is meant by the phrase 
market forces. The market is not a homogeneous entity but is made up of many 
individual organisations each of which puts its own value on particular jobs. The wage 
levels offered by a particular employer are influenced by a number of internal and 
external considerations. Internal considerations include matters such as the position of 
the job within the hierarchy of the organisation, the profitability of the organisation, the 
availability of training and career path structures within the organisation. The main 
external factor is the wages paid by other organisations for comparable jobs and the 
effect that this has on an organisations ability to recruit and retain staff.21 
When an employer relies on market forces in order to justify a difference in pay 
there are several possible scenarios. The first scenario is where an individual is recruited 
on a higher wage than other internal staff doing like work. The higher wage may be 
explained by factors specific to the individual such as special skills or experience. In this 
case market forces is something of a misnomer but, in any event, the reason for the 
difference is not related to sex. Alternatively, the higher wage could reflect the fact that 
21 See generally Rubery J, The economics of equal value, EOC, (1992), chapter 2 and Industrial Relations 
Service, Pay and gender in Britain, EOC, (1991). 
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the wages of the previous employer were directly discriminatory. For example, an 
individual was paid more because he was a man. In this case the reason is sex related 
and the employer should not be able to rely on it. The third alternative is that the 
previous employer valued the job more highly than the new employer. Job evaluation is 
not an entirely objective exercise and, to some extent, it reflects the value of a job to a 
particular employer.22 As a result, it is possible for one employer to value a particular job 
more highly than another without either valuation being discriminatory. Assuming this 
is the case, the market force is not related to sex and the employer should be abl~ to rely 
'r~ 
on it. 
It was this kind of market forces scenario that arose in the case of Rainey v. 
Greater Glasgow Health Board. 23 In 1980, a prosthetics fitting service was established 
in theNHS in Scotland. Previously, the service was provided to NBS hospitals by 
private contractors. The remuneration level for prosthetists was set according to the 
Whitley Council scale and all direct recruits were paid on this basis. HO'Never, in order to 
get the service going offers of employment were made to 20 prosthetists ( all male) 
currently working for private contractors. Since the NHS pay was below what the 
private sector prosthetists were currently earning, they were offered the option of 
remaining on their current pay and having any future changes negotiated by their trade 
union. The applicant, who was a direct recruit, compared herself to one of the men 
recruited from a private contractor. The HL accepted the respondent's argument that it 
was necessary to pay the private contractor prosthetists more in order to induce them to 
transfer. Despite the fact that all the prosthetists recruited from private contractors were 
male and all the direct recruits were female there was no evidence before the tribunal of 
gender segregation within the prosthetics profession as a whole. 24 It seems, therefore, 
that this may have been a case where the job of prosthetist was more highly valued by the 
private contractors than by the NBS. The alternative explanation is that the NBS 
undervalued the work of prosthetists although it is difficult to see why this would have 
22 On the mechanics of job evaluation schemes and the factors they take into account in evaluating work 
see: Equal pay for work of equal value: a guide to the non-discriminatory use of job evaluation, British 
Psychological Society, (1991); Aaron J and Lougy C, The comparable worth controversy, (1986); ACAS, 
Job evaluation: an introduction and EOC, Job evaluation schemes free of sex bias. 
23 [1987] ICR 129, HL. 
24 Townshend-Smith R, 'Equal pay and the material factor/difference defence' (1987) 16 ILJ 114. 
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happened given that all of the individuals offered work from the private sector were male 
and there was no evidence of gender segregation. 
The second market forces scenario is where there is a shortage of a particular 
profession and, as a result, wage levels rise. To the extent that a higher rate of pay is 
solely attributable to factors of demand and supply the market is not discriminatory. 
However, an element of caution is necessary where a profession is sex segregated ie 
predominantly perfonned by one sex. It has been suggested that one of the causes of low 
pay for women is that for reasons of custom or prejudice women are crowded into certain 
',,1' 
sections of the labour market. This leads to an over supply of women's labour in these 
areas which has a tendency to depress wages.2S Similarly, it is possible that a shortage of 
labour in male dominated professions can lead to an increase in the market rate. As a 
result, if a difference in pay is explained by reference to a shortage of suitable candidates 
in the labour market, there may still be an element of discrimination if the profession is 
sex segregated. This problem arose in Enderby v Frenchay Health Authority.26 The case 
involved a comparison between the predominantly female profession of speech therapy 
and the male profession of phannacists. The Health Authority argued that a part of the 
difference in pay arose as a result of a shortage of suitably qualified pharmacists. The 
ECJ held that the state of the labour market and, in particular, a shonage of candidates 
and the need to attract them by higher salaries, can justify a difference in pay. However, 
the ECJ failed to consider why there was a shortage of pharmacists and whether this was 
in some way attributable to the structure of the profession eg the availability of part-time 
work. 
The third market forces scenario arises in the context of work of equal value and 
the under valuation of women's work. For a number of social and historical reasons the 
value of women's work has been traditionally undervalued.27 One way of overcoming 
this problem is for employers to implement job evaluation schemes that attempt to value 
jobs on the basis of their content and the skills required. Of course, not all employers go 
25 See Rubery 1, above, p 9. For an analysis of the effect oflabour force segregation on wages see: 
McColgan A, Just wages for women, (1997) P 246. " ' ,. .... 
26 [1993] IRLR 591, EC1. For comment on this case s~e: ~e?tn~ge?, Drrect and ~dlrect dlSCrlrllillatlO~ 
after Enderby' [1994] PL 198; Fenwick H, 'Indirect dlscnmmatlOn ill equal pay ~lau.ns: b~ck.ward steps ill 
the European Court of Justice' (1995) 1 EPL 31 and Fredman S, 'Equal pay and]ustIficatlOn (1994) 23 
ILl 37. 
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down the job evaluation route. As a result, the market may continue to undervalue jobs 
that are predominantly done by women thereby creating a dichotomy between the 
employer's rate and the general market rate. In this situation, any attempt by an 
employer to use market forces as a basis for reducing women's pay will be 
discriminatory. 
This was the situation that arose in Ratcliffe v. North Yorkshire County Council. 23 
The applicants were employed as catering assistants by the respondent council. The 
applicants' jobs had been upgraded several years previously following a comprehensive 
r>(! 
job evaluation study undertaken by the National Joint Council (NJC) and, as a result, 
they were paid in excess of the market rate for catering assistants. To ensure that the 
council retained various catering contracts after the introductior of compulsory 
competitive tendering, the catering assistants were moved into a direct service 
organisation (DSO), dismissed and re-employed at rates some 10% lower than the NJC 
rates. Other higher graded staff and staff in predominantly male jobs transferred to 
DSOs were not subjected to pay cuts. The council argued that the reason for the 
difference in pay was the need to compete in the market place. The tribunal, in a 
decision that was upheld by the HL, found that while market forces may have been the 
material factor, it was not a material factor unrelated to sex because the market rates were 
themselves discriminatory. Despite recognising the difficulties faced by the council 
when dealing with external competition, the tribunal concluded that the market rates for 
catering assistants were discriminatory and could not be relied upon as a basis for 
reducing wage rates. 
THE CAUSATION TEST 
The second element of the objective justification test reqUIres the respondent to 
demonstrate a causal connection between measures causing the disproportionate impact 
and the reason put forward for the measure. Thus, if an employer attempts to justify 
paying part-time staff a lower hourly rate on the basis that they are less productive, the 
employer must actually prove that part-time staff are less productive to the extent of the 
27 See Rubery J, above, p 7 and Pronszynski F and Richards W, 'Equal opportunities in the labour market: 
tackling indirect sex discrimination' (1995) 2 EPL 117. ., . " 
28 [1994] IRLR 342 CA, [1995J IRLR 439, HL. On the deCISIOn ill the CA see: Collm.> H, CCT, equal 
pay and market forces (1994) 23 ILl341. 
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difference in pay. In some cases, the causal link will be self-evident and no problems of 
proof arise. Thus, in Rainey v Greater Glasgow Health Boarcf9 the HL was willing to 
accept the employer's assertion that private sector prosthetists would not transfer to the 
NHS unless their salary was maintained. However, even in the seemingly 
straightforward area of job requirements the causal link is not always self evident and 
problems can arise. For example, how does an employer prove that there is a causal link 
between age and an individual's ability to do a particular job, for example a social 
worker at a youth centre? The employer may argue that a younger person would be able 
, t 
to relate better to the young people using the centre. 3D This is not a matter that is capable 
of scientific proof but ultimately rests on the experience of the employer and other 
employers engaged in similar activities. Similarly, how does an employer prove that a 
particular bonus scheme encourages employees to work harder and, as a result, increases 
productivity assuming, of course, that it is possible to measure productivity in the first 
place? It may be impossible to separate out the effect of the bonus scheme from other 
factors that have an impact on employee productivity. In difficult areas such as these 
tribunals are likely to be satisfied that the causal link exists as long as some tenable 
evidence is put forward by the employer. 
However, vague generalisations about the effect of a particular measure will not 
be sufficient. After a hesitant start this point was made by the EeJ in relation to 
seniority. Seniority can be used by employers in a number of different ways. First, it 
can be used as a basis for increasing pay, for example the payment of annual increments. 
Second, seniority may be used as a criterion for promotion. In both of these cases the 
underlying assumption is that there is a casual link between experience and performance. 
The third use of seniority arises in the context of redundancy. Last in first out is 
commonly used as a redundancy selection criterion. In the context of r .::dundancy length 
of service could reflect either performance or loyalty to the employer. Initially, the EeJ 
appeared willing to accept that the link between seniority and experience did not require 
any special proof by the employer. Thus, in the Danjoss31 case the EeJ held that "since 
29 [1987] ICR 129, HL. . 
30 A similar argument was used in Jones v University of Manchester [1993] IRLR 218, CA. The tnbunal 
rejected the argument that a young careers adviser would be b:tter able to relate to students. . _ 
31 [1989] IRLR 532, ECJ. For a note on the case see: Shaw J, The burden of proof and the legalIty ot 
supplementary payments in equal pay cases' (1990) 15 ELR 160. 
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length of service goes hand in hand with experience and since experience generally 
enables the employee to perfonn his duties better, the employer is free to reward it 
without having to establish the importance it has in the performance of specific tasks 
entrusted to the employee.,,32 
In subsequent cases the Court has required a higher standard of proof and has 
rejected the use of generalisations about the effect of seniority on performance. For 
example, in Nimz v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg33 part-time employees working for 
between half and three-quarters of the nonnal working week had to work twice. as many 
"".-6 
years before being moved up to the next salary grade. The City of Hamburg sought to 
justify the rule on the basis that full-time or three-quarters time employees acquire the 
skills necessary to do the job more quickly than other employees and gain greater 
experience. The ECJ rejected this argument on the basis that it amounted to a simple 
generalisation about a certain category of employee. 
[A ]lthough seniority goes hand in hand with experience which, in principle, 
should allow the employee to carry out his tasks all the better, the objectivity of 
such a criterion depends on all the circumstances in each case and notably on the 
relationship between the nature of the duties performed and the experience 
afforded by the performance of those duties after a certain number of working 
hours have been worked. 34 
In line with the ECJ's comments in Nimz employers will only be able to rely on seniority 
if they can show that length of service enhances perfonnance in relation to a particular 
job. Thus, where a job involves a low level of skill and is highly repetitive in nature it is 
unlikely that seniority will lead to increased performance. On the other hand, the more 
skilled and diverse the job, the more likely it is that seniority is linked to performance. 
However, the employer still has to show that perfonnance continues to improve over the 
number of years specified. Thus, a job may be sufficiently complex that performance 
increases over the first three years but then levels off. In such a situation an employer 
32 In Danfoss the employer attempted to explain differences in salaI?' on the basis of len.gth of service. On 
reference back to the national court the link was rejected on the baSIS that over the prnlOUS five years the 
average differences in salary between women an,d men had, increase~ while the average differences in 
seniority had decreased: see Precht K, 'Danfoss m the DanIsh c,ourt~ (,1992) 21 ILl 32~. , 
33 [1991] IRLR 222, ECl. For a note on the case see: More G, Semonty pay for part-time workers 
(1991) 16 ELR 320, . ", ' 
34 The ECl made similar comments in relation to semonty ill Kordmg v Senator Fur Fmansex [1997] 
IRLR 710, ECl and Gerster v Freistaat Bayern [1997] IRLR 699, ECl. 
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may not be able to justify a length of service criterion of five years for promotion to the 
next grade. 
The rule that generalisations are an insufficient basis on which to establish a 
causal link also applies where the provision being challenged is enshrined in legislation. 
Thus in Rinner-Kuhn v FWW Spezial-Gebaudereinigung GmbH35 a German law 
excluded employees working less than 10 hours a week or 45 hours a month from the 
right to sick pay from their employers. The German Government sought to justify the 
rule on the basis that part-time workers are not integrated in and connected with the 
''''4/' 
undertaking in a way comparable to that of other workers. Although leaving the matter 
to the national court to decide, the ECJ indicated that the reason given by the German 
Government was insufficient as it only amounted to a generalised statement about certain 
categories of workers. 
The ECJ made the same point in the recent case of R v S~cretary of State for 
Employment ex parte Seymour-Smith and Perez. 36 The Government sought to justify 
increasing the service requirement for a right to claim unfair dismissal from one to two 
years on the basis that it would stimulate recruitment. The EeJ accepted that 
encouraging recruitment constitutes a legitimate social aim and that Member States have 
a broad margin of discretion in choosing measures capable of achieving those aims. 
However, that broad margin of discretion does not mean that no evidence of causation is 
required. 
Mere generalisations concerning the capacity of a specific measure to encourage 
recruitment are not enough to show that the aim of the disputed rule is unrelated 
to any discrimination based on sex nor to provide evidence on the basis of which 
it could reasonably be considered that the means chosen were suitable for 
achieving that aim.37 
35 [1989] IRLR 493, Eel On this case generally see: 'Discriminatory statutory rights can be challenged 
under EEC law' EOR No 28, NovemberlDecember 1989, P 39; Szyszczak E, 'European eourt rulings on 
discrimination and part-time work and the burden of proof in equal pay claims' (1990) 19 ILJ 114 and 
Craig V, 'Indirect sex discrimination and statutory conditions' (1992) 60 Scottish Law Gazette, 14. 
36 [1999] IRLR 253, Eel For a discussion of this aspect of the case see: Barnard C and Hepple B, 
'Indirect discrimination: interpreting Seymour-Smith' (1999) 58 eLJ 399 at 409. 
37 Although for a case where the EeJ did appear to be willing to accept a generalisation see Kirshammer-
Hack v Siddl [1994] IRLR 185, EeJ. German legislation on unfair dismissal does not apply to businesses 
employing five or less employees. The claim of indirect discriminatio~ f~iled at the first ~urdle because 
there was no evidence of disproportionate impact. However, the EeJ mdlcated that even If there had been 
evidence of disproportionate impact the measure would have been justifi~d on th~ basis that it was 
intended to alleviate the constraints on small businesses and thus lead to Job creatIOn. The Eel does not 
appear to have considered whether the right to claim unfair dismissal was in fact a bar to job creation or 
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Thus, mere generalisations are not enough to prove that a legislative measure has the 
desired effect. 
On the other hand, all a Government has to do is to provide reasonable evidence 
of a link. The inability of the United Kingdom Government to do even this was 
demonstrated in the case of R v Secretary of State for Employment ex parte EOC.38 The 
Government was seeking to justify the hours thresholds that applied to the right to claim 
unfair dismissal and redundancy. Employees that worked less than eight hours a week 
were excluded altogether and employees working between eight and sixteen hours a 
.,-.; 
week had to work for five instead of two years before becoming entitled to the rights. It 
was argued by the Government that the thresholds had the effect of increasing the 
availability of part-time work. In particular, if part-time employees had the same rights 
as full-time employees employers would be inclined to employ less part-time employees 
and more full-time employees. Lord Keith, giving the leading speech in the HL, 
accepted that bringing about an increase in the availability of part-time work could be 
regarded as a beneficial and necessary social aim. However, he found that the 
Government had failed to establish the requisite causal link. The evidence put forward 
by the Secretary of State "consisted principally of an affidavit by an official in the 
Department of Employment which set out the views of the Department but did not 
contain anything capable of being regarded as factual evidence demonstrating the 
correctness of these views." 
The Government lost the EOC case because it was unable to produce any factual 
evidence that there was a causal link between the thresholds and the availability of part-
time work. However, in light of the indication of the ECJ in Seymour-Smith and Perez 
that only a reasonable level of evidence is required, it seems that the standard of proof is 
not very high and had the Government approached the matter differently they may have 
been able to justify the thresholds. 39 
whether the claim of the German Government was a mere generalisation. For a note on this case see: 
Hervey T, . Small business exclusion in German dismissal law' (1994) 23 ILl 267. 
38 [1994] IRLR 176, HL. . . . 
39 For example, had the Government sought to justify the thresholds on the baSIS of.the dIs~roportlOnate 
costs associated with employing part-time employees. For the argument that there IS no eVIdence that 
thresholds increase part-time employment see: Disney Rand Szyszczak E, ~Part-~e work: reply to 
Catherine Hakim' (1989) 18 ILl 223. For a criticis~ of the EOC case ~nd ill p~cular ~e problems of 
proving the effect of measures on a macro-econorruc level see: Seba I, The doctrme of dIrect effect: a 
malignant disease of community law' [1995] LIEI 35 at 55. 
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THE PROPORTIONALITY TEST 
The proportionality test consists of two separate elements.4o Under the first element the 
court must consider whether it would have been possible for the employer to achieve its 
objective in a less discriminatory way (the means test). In other words, the tribunal has 
to decide whether the employer could have reasonably avoided the detriment to the 
employee. Assume an employer decides to relocate part of its business from London to 
"<.~ 
Glasgow. All those employees who are unable to move are dismissed. If the measure 
can be shown to have a disproportionate impact on one sex, under the means test the 
tribunal is obliged to consider whether the dismissals could have been avoided. For 
example by finding suitable alternative employment for the dismissed employees in the 
part of the business that remains in London. In theory, tribunals can go even further than 
this and consider whether the move itself could have been avoided. However, the courts 
have shown some reluctance to interfere with the management of a business, particularly 
where the arrangement complained of is complicated and has been agreed with the 
relevant trade unions. Thus the domestic courts have refused to interfere with 
redundancy schemes that fail to take account of an individual's previous full-time 
service41 or with selection for redundancy on the basis of last in first OUt.42 Furthermore, 
although the burden of justifying the detrimental treatment lies with the employer, in 
practice the courts are unlikely to consider alternative options unless the applicant brings 
them to the attention of the court. 
Even if an applicant does put forward an alternative option, there is no guidance 
in the legislation or the case law on the factors the tribunal should take into account in 
determining whether it would have been reasonable for the employer to adopt that course 
of action. In particular, it is not clear to what extent cost is a relevant consideration, both 
the overall cost of the option and the ability of the employer to accommodate the cost. 
The size and resources of an employer is a factor that is relevant in a number of 
employment contexts. For example, the size and administrative resources of the 
40 For the general application of the principle of proportionality in equal treatment cases see: Amull A, The 
general principles of EC law and the individual, (1990) chp 14. 
41 Barry v Midland Bank [1998] IRLR 139, CA, 
42 Brook v London Borough of Haringey [1992] IRLR 4 78, EAT. 
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employer is relevant in determining whether an employer has acted fairly in dismissing 
an employee.43 Similarly, under s 6 (4) of the DDA, the extent of the employer's 
financial and other resources is a factor that a tribunal must have regard to in determining 
whether it is reasonable for an employer to make an adjustment in order to accommodate 
a disabled person.44 In both of these situations the ability of the employer to cope with a 
particular level of cost is taken into consideration with more being expected of larger 
employers. There is no logical reason why indirect discrimination cases should be 
treated any differently particularly given that some of the adjustments employet:~-rnay be 
obliged to make under the DDA are likely to be similar, if not identical, to the changes at 
issue in cases of indirect discrimination. For example, a disabled person may only be 
able to work part-time. It would be anomalous if tribunals could take the resources of the 
employer into account in determining whether part-time work is a reasonable adjustment 
for a disabled person but not in the context of a single par~nt with child care 
commitments. 
One case where the cost of an alternative option was considered is London 
Underground v Edwards. 45 The employer introduced a new rostering system with 
anticipated savings of £ 10m. The applicant was unable to work under the new system 
because it did not give her the flexibility she needed. London Underground had at one 
point suggested a special roster for single parents but the scheme was dropped after it 
failed to gain the support of the unions. In a decision that was upheld by the EAT, the 
tribunal held that the needs of single parents like the applicant could have been catered 
for without a "significant detriment" to the £ 10m in savings sought to be made by the 
employer by the new rostering scheme. Although the tribunal did not attempt to put a 
figure on the cost of introducing a special scheme for the applicant, it· clearly took the 
view that whatever the cost was, it was reasonable for London Underground to 
accommodate it. 
Another factor that might be relevant is the impact of the option on the other 
employees. One of the points raised by London Underground on appeal was that a 
43 Section 98, Employment Rights Act 1996. ., . . 
44 The obligation on employers to make reasonable adjustments under the DDA IS dIscussed ill more detaIl 
in Chapter 6. 
45 (1995] IRLR 355, EAT. The case subsequently went to the CA but justification was not an issue as the 
appeal related solely to the issue of disparate impact: [1998] IRLR 364. 
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separate scheme for single parents amounted to positive discrimination in their favour. 
However, given the evidence that the applicant was the only one of over two thousand 
train operators who could not comply with the new system it is unlikely that a special 
scheme for single parents would have had much, if any, impact on the rosters of the other 
employees. However, in a situation involving a smaller workforce, the impact of an 
alternative arrangement on the other employees is a factor that the court can take into 
ac count. 46 
The second element of the proportionality test is used more by the ,domestic 
"..~ 
courts than the EC},47 According to the Court of Appeal in Hampson v Department of 
Education and Science48 the justification test requires an objective balance between the 
detrimental effect on the applicant and the benefit to the employer. The ECJ has not 
gone as far and only requires the first element of the proportionality test to be satisfied ie 
that there are no alternative non-discriminatory means of achiev~ng the employer's 
objective. It is not clear why the ECJ has adopted a less stringent test than the domestic 
courts. One possible explanation is a reluctance on the part of the ECJ to interfere too 
much with managerial discretion or to impose heavy costs on businesses.49 Another 
possibility is that it would be difficult for the ECJ to apply this aspect of proportionality 
in the context of legislative provisions without encroaching on the Droad margin of 
discretion left to member states in determining social policy (see below). 
At first glance the balancing exercise appears quite straightforward. The tribunal 
has to balance the detriment to the employee and the benefit to the employer. However, 
if the benefit to the employer is increased productivity and the detriment to the employee 
is a lost job opportunity how could the tribunal go about comparing these two things? 
(This is a discussion about what tribunals could do rather than what they actually do as it 
seems that in practice tribunals apply the proportionality principle in an impressionistic 
way rather than on the basis of any accurate costlbenefit analysis.) In any situation it is 
46 See for example, Bell v East Kilbride Development Corporation, EOR Discrimination Case Law Digest 
No 12, Summer 1992, p 2. The tribunal took into account the fact that allowing the applicant to work part-
time would have increased the pressure of work on all the other members of the department. 
47 Although it is used by the ECJ in other contexts for example in actions against the Community: see De 
Eurea G, 'TIle principle of proportionality and its application in EC Law' (1993) 13 YBEL 105. 
48 [1989] IRLR 69 at 75, CA. Hampson is a race case but the requirement for an objective balance has also 
been applied in cases of indirect sex discrimination: see for example Jones v University of Manchester 
[1993]IRLR218, CA. 
49 Anderman S, above, p 109. 
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impossible to balance two objects in the absence of a common cnaracteristic or a 
common criterion of measurement. When comparing the benefit to an employer and the 
detriment to an employee the only obj ective way of comparing the two is to work out 
their monetary values. In other words, the tribunal has to know how much a detriment or 
benefit is worth in each case. However, assigning a monetary value to a benefit or a 
detriment can itself be fraught with difficulty. In some cases the benefit to the employer 
is comparatively easy to estimate. For example, if an employer operates a production 
line and work has to stop in order to allow a shift change for part-time emplQyees the 
'; ,: 
employer may be able to calculate the value of the lost production. However, in the 
majority of cases the benefit to the employer is much more difficult, if not impossible, to 
quantify in monetary terms. An employer may seek to justify a re%sal to allow an 
employee to job share on the basis that the job requires continuity of management. The 
effects of discontinuous management may include a reduction in the level of customer 
service but the cost to the employer in terms of lost business may be hard to assess, 
partiCUlarly if the employer is predicting what the effect of allowing the job share would 
be rather than reporting on actual experience. Thus there may be significant evidential 
problems for the tribunal in determining the benefit to an employer of a particular 
practice. 
The other side of the equation, the detriment to the employee, is much easier to 
quantify. In most cases the detriment will fall into one of four categories; lack of 
promotion or appointment, dismissal, a lower rate of payor a denial of some other 
employment benefit eg access to an occupational pension or a severance scheme. 
Tribunals commonly have to assess the monetary value of detriments such as these in 
calculating the compensation element of an unfair dismissal or discrimination claim. 
There is also the question of whether injury to feeling should be taken into account. For 
example, in a dismissal case should the tribunal add into the equation the applicant's 
distress in losing his or her job? There is no logical reason why injury to feelings should 
not be considered in which case the tribunal must, in addition to assessing the financial 
loss, assign a monetary value to the injured feelings. 
Once the tribunal has assigned a monetary value to the benefit and detriment 
there are three possible outcomes; the benefit to the employer is greater than the 
detriment to the employees, the benefit to the employer is less than the detriment to the 
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employee or the two figures are equal. In which of these three possible situations is the 
employer's practice justified? The legislation is silent on this point and the case law is 
not particularly revealing. However, there are cases where tribunals have accepted that a 
practice is justified despite the fact that the benefit to the employer is less than the 
detriment to the employee. For example, in Buckle v Abbey National plc50 the tribunal 
held that the exclusion of casual workers from the benefit of private health insurance was 
justified. The benefit to an individual of private health insurance is essentially the cost of 
the premiums on the open market. On the assumption that employers like the, Abbey 
.-"..,.," 
National can buy health insurance for their employees more cheaply than an individual 
can do so on their own, the benefit to the employer of excluding casual staff is less than 
the loss to the employee. 
Another example where employers seem able to justify a practice even though the 
benefit to them is less than the loss to the employee is the exc,lusion of part-time 
employees from occupational pension schemes. In the case of Bilka-Kaujhaus the EeJ 
held that the exclusion of part-time employees from an occupational pension scheme 
could amount to indirect discrimination unless objectively justified by the employer. 
The view of several commentators is that it will be relatively easy for employers to 
justify hours thresholds on the basis of the relatively high administration costs of 
including employees with low working hours. 51 Unless the employee is working very 
few hours it is unlikely that the administration costs will exceed the benefit to the 
employee particularly if the scheme is non-contributory. Thus, the ability of employers 
to exclude part-time employees from pension schemes appears to be another situation 
where the benefit to the employer does not have to outweigh the loss to the employee. 52 
On the other hand, there are no reported cases where a tribunal has found that a practice 
is not justified in circumstances where it was clear that the benefit to the employer was 
more than the detriment to the employee. However, there is no reported case where the 
50 EOR Discrimination Case Law Digest, No 38, Winter 1998, p 2. 
51 See for example, Whiteford E, 'From non-discrimination to equality: pensions and EC law' in 
Dashwood A and O'Leary S eds, The principle of equal treatment in ECJ law, (1997) at p 264 and 
Fredman S, 'The poverty of equality: pensions and the EC], (1996) 25 ILJ 91 at p 106 .. 
52 See also the Vroege case [1994] IRLR 651, in which the right of the employer to restnct the scheme to 
employees working more than 25% of the time was not questioned by the ECJ and the social security cases 
of Megner and Scheffel [1996] IRLR 236, ECJ and Nolte [1996] ~R 225, ECJ in which the ECJ upheld 
the decision of the German Government to exclude employees workmg fewer than 15 hours per week 
from statutory old-age and sickness benefit schemes. 
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tribunal has actually attempted to work out the actual sums involved and, therefore, it is 
impossible to tell whether the benefit outweighed the detriment or visa versa. 
It is not certain what other considerations the tribunal can take into account. In 
particular, it is not clear if the ability of the employer to absorb the cost is relevant. If 
tribunals are allowed to take the size and resources of the employer into account in 
determining whether there is some other viable option under the means test, it seems 
sensible that this should also be a relevant factor under the second element of the 
proportionality test. However, if the effect on the employer's business is re I e:vant , the 
'hi 
effect of the detriment on the employee's life should also be taken into consideration. In 
other words, it is not the absolute benefits and detriments that should be in the balance, 
but the relative costs for the employer and employee. The detriment to the employee of a 
dismissal may be £5k in terms of lost income but the relative impact may be even 
greater. For example, the employee may lose his or her house due to an inability to pay 
the mortgage. On the other hand, a benefit to the employer of the same amount may 
have a relatively small impact on the business as a whole. Thus, if the relative impact is 
taken into account rather than a strict costibenefit analysis, the balance is more likely to 
come down in favour of the employee. The down side to a relative analysis is that the 
legality of a particular practice depends on the personal circumstances of the individual 
employee. Thus, it may be lawful for an employer to dismiss a wealthy employee but 
not a poor employee. 
Another point is that if tribunals do not take the resources of the employer into 
account, the cost of introducing a new working practice could push the employer into 
insolvency which itself could have a detrimental impact on the employee. There is little 
point in an employee managing to persuade a tribunal that part-time work should be 
allowed if the result is that the employer closes down and the employee loses his or her 
job. Again, there is no reported case law on this point and so there is no readily 
accessible way of telling whether tribunals take cost into account and if so, whether they 
apply a relative analysis of the benefits and detriments or whether they just look at the 
absolute amounts. 
Another possible factor is the number of employees affected. At first glance it 
seems sensible that the more employees detrimentally affected the more difficult it 
should be for the employer to justify the practice. However, a certain amount of caution 
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is needed in order to avoid any double counting. Where there are a number of employees 
affected the tribunal has three possible approaches; compare the total detriment with the 
total benefit, use an average benefit and an average detriment or try and work out precise 
figures for each applicant. Whichever method the tribunal uses, the number of 
employees has already been taken into account in determining the level of detriment and 
benefit. In order to avoid any double counting the question needs to be posed in a much 
more restricted way. If an employer implements a measure does it make any difference 
if it affects ten employees to the extent of £500 each or one employee to the extent of 
.,-,; 
£5,000? It is not immediately apparent that it is worse to impose a minor detriment on 
several employees than a major detriment on one employee. Once the question is 
reformulated in this way it is far from clear that the number of employees affected should 
be taken into account as an additional factor. 
The balancing exercise poses a particular problem in cases, ir. volving statutory 
provisions because there is a risk of the courts becoming embroiled in political decisions. 
The problem can be demonstrated by reference to the EOC case. The Government lost 
the case because it was unable to establish the requisite causal link. Assume that the 
Government had been able to overcome this hurdle. The HL would have had to consider 
three competing factors; the benefit to employers of a restricted right to unfair dismissal 
and redundancy, the detriment to part-time employees of the hours thresholds and the 
Government's objective of increasing the availability of part-time work. In his judgment 
Lord Keith indicated that the impact on employers would be limited by the relatively 
small number of part-time employees unfairly dismissed or made redundant in any year. 
Although no mention was made of the impact on employees, as far as redundancy is 
concerned, the cost to the employer of a redundancy payment is the same as the benefit 
to the employee. The position with unfair dismissal is more complicated because the 
right enhances job security and, therefore, it is worth more to an employee than the 
compensation available if he or she is unfairly dismissed. Furthermore, the benefit to 
employers of being able to dismiss with impunity is difficult to translate into monetary 
tenns. Even more difficult for the Court to assess is the Government's objective of 
increasing part-time employment. What are the benefits to society of an increase in part-
time work? Do these benefits warrant a restriction on the right to claim unfair dismissal 
or a redundancy payment? This is an inherently political decision which it is impossible 
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for a judge to decide without making a political judgment. 53 Given that the ECJ does not 
require national courts to engage in a balancing exercise and the political nature of the 
decisions involved, it is perhaps unlikely that the national courts will apply the second 
element of the proportionality test to cases involving statutory provisions. It is possible 
that some guidance will be given on this point when Seymour-Smith returns to the HL 
but, in light of the views of the ECJ on the issues of causation and disproportionate 
impact, it seems unlikely that the HL will get as far as applying the proportionality part 
of the justification test. 
CONCLUSION 
Indirect discrimination involves a balancing exerCIse between two competing aIms; 
eliminating the detrimental effect on employees of distribution sex differences versus the 
necessity for businesses to operate efficiently and make a profit. The ability of the 
legislation to achieve its aim of sex equality depends on the circumstances in which the 
primary objective (eliminating detriment) can be overridden by the secondary 
consideration (business need).54 If too much weight is given to the business needs the 
legislation becomes ineffectua1.55 On the other hand, if too much weight is given to 
eliminating the detrimental impact, employers will become less efficient which may 
result in lower wages, higher product costs and fewer jobs.56 This delicate balancing act 
is dealt with by the justification defence and, in particular, the proportionality test. 
Once it has been established that a particular practice had a disproportionate and 
detrimental impact on one sex the practice is unlawful unless it can be justified by the 
employer. The three stages of the justification defence are a considerable hurdle for 
employers to overcome. First, the employer has to identify the business reason or 
objective for the disputed practice. Although, in theory, employers should know why 
53 See Seba I, above, p 55 and Hartley TC, The foundations of European Community law, (1998) at 149. 
54 Leader S, 'Proportionality and the justification of discrimination' in Dine J and Watt Beds, 
Discrimination law: concepts, limitations and justifications, (1996). 
55 For the ways in which economic arguments and market forces limit the operation of anti-discrimination 
laws see Fredman S, 'European Community discrimination law: a critique' (1992) 21 ILl 119 at 130 and 
Fenwick H and Hervey T, 'Sex equality in the single market: new directions for the European Court of 
Justice' (1995) 32 CMLR443. ., . 
56 Posner R, 'An economic analysis of sex discrimination laws' (1989) 56 UmversIty of ChIcago Law 
Review 13 11. 
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they act in a certain way the reason for a particular practice may be historical and, 
therefore, difficult to trace or it may be obscured by the process of collective bargaining. 
Thus even at this first stage employers may encounter considerable evidential difficulties 
in establishing a justification defence. Secondly, the employer has to establish the 
requisite causal link ie that the disputed practice does in fact result in the intended 
objective. In many ways this is the most difficult element of the defence for employers 
to prove because it may be impossible to separate out the effect of the disputed practice 
on the stated objective from the impact of various other factors on the same objective. 
-, -:. 
Finally, and assuming that the employer is successful on the first two points, the 
tribunal applies the proportionality test. In many ways, the means test is the weakest 
element of the justification defence because tribunals are so reluctant to interfere with 
management decisions. Furthermore, in the absence of any specific guidance it is not 
clear to what extent employers are obliged to implement altemativ:e options that have 
additional costs attached to them. However, if the tribunal is satisfied that there was a 
non-discriminatory means of achieving the same objective the defence fails. The second 
element involves a balancing exercise between the detriment to the employee against the 
benefit to the employer. This balancing exercise is the key component of the defence 
because it is the point at which the tribunal decides whether the primary objective of sex 
equality should be overridden by the needs of the business. The whole concept of a 
balancing exercise implies that, subject to the application of other relevant factors such as 
the ability of the employer to absorb the cost, the tribunal should come down in favour of 
the party with the greater value. (This is assuming that it is the absolute amounts that are 
being balanced and not the relative detriments and benefits). Thus, if the detriment to the 
applicant is £100 and the benefit to the employer is £90 the tribunal should, in theory, 
find that the test of proportionality has not been satisfied. In practice it seems that 
tribunals do not always approach the matter in this way and in some cases they apply a 
weaker test based on whether the detriment is a significant proportion of the benefit. 
This means that an employer is able to justify a practice despite the fact that the 
detriment to the employee is greater than the benefit to the employer. This constitutes a 
very weak application of the proportionality test and allows the objective of equality to 
be overridden by the needs of the employer relatively easily. On the other hand, it is 
possible that there are cases where the tribunal applies a much stronger test and the 
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defence fails despite the fact that the benefit to the employer outweighs the detriment to 
the applicant. 
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6 
DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION 
INTRODUCTION 
The employment provisions of the DDA came into effect on 2 December 1996.1 The Act 
introduced into domestic law for the first time a prohibition against ""-disability 
discrimination. The DDA contains two forms of prohibited treatment. The first form 
involves less favourable treatment for a reason related to disability. The second form 
arises when an employer fails to make a reasonable adjustment in circumstances where a 
disabled employee is placed at a substantial disadvantage in comparison with a non-
disabled employee. In both cases the discrimination can be justified for a reason that is 
both material and substantial. There is a tendency for the courts and some writers to 
view the first kind of disability discrimination as a form of 'direct' discrimination that 
has the same effect as direct sex discrimination. 2 This, in tum, has led to the impression 
that it is possible to justify direct disability discrimination and, as a result, the prohibition 
against disability discrimination is weaker than the prohibition against sex 
discrimination. The purpose of this chapter is two fold. First, to consider whether there 
is such a thing as direct disability discrimination, and if so, why it is possible to justify 
direct disability discrimination but not direct sex discrimination. Second, the 
justification defence is examined to see if any of its elements are an improvement on the 
justification defence that is used in cases of indirect sex discrimination. 
DEFINITION OF DISABILITY 
Section I states that a person has a disability if he has "a physical or mental impairment 
which has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on his ability to carry out normal 
1 Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (Commencement No 3 and Saving and Transitional Provisions) 
Order 1996 SI1996/1474. On disability discrimination generally see: Doyle B, 'Employment rights, 
equal oppo~nities and disabled persons; the ingredients of reform' (1993) 22 IL] 89 and Doyle B, 
Disability discrimination: law and practice, (1996). , . 
2 See for example G Thomas, The new law on disability, (1997) p 14 and a Nez! v. Symm & Co Ltd, 
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day-to-day activities". The various elements of the definition are explained in more 
detail in schedule 1 of the DDA. In addition, the Government has issued guidance under 
s 3 of the DDA which must be taken into account by courts and tribunals in detennining 
whether the statutory test of disability applies. Finally, a number of conditions are 
specifically excluded from the definition of disability under Regulations made pursuant 
to schedule 1 of the DDA.3 
Normal day-to-day activities are defined in schedule 1, paragraph 4. The 
impairment must have an adverse affect on the applicant's ability to carry out one of the 
'''"-/I' 
following eight activities-
• mobility 
• manual dexterity 
• physical co-ordination 
• continence 
• ability to lift, carry or otherwise move everyday objects 
• speech, hearing or eyesight 
• memory or ability to concentrate, learn or understand 
• perception of the risk of physical danger 
In addition, paragraph 3 of schedule 1 states that a severe disfigurement is to be treated 
as having a substantial adverse effect on a person's ability to carry out nonnal day-to-day 
activities. It is not necessary that an individual is wholly unable to perfonn one of the 
eight activities. All that is required is that the applicant's ability to undertake one or 
more of the activities is substantially impaired. For example, a lack of manual dexterity 
may mean that a person is still able to cook but only with the greatest difficulty.4 
The guidance makes it clear that the phrase day-to-day activities is not intended 
to cover activities that are specific to particular groups of individuals or to particular 
forms of work (para C2). For example, the fact that an individual is unable to undertake 
a particular job or to playa musical instrument would not count as a nonnal day-to-day 
activity. The impainnent must have a substantial and long-tenn effect. Substantial is not 
defined in the DDA but paragraph Al of the guidance states that substantial means more 
than minor or trivial and represents a limitation going beyond "the nonnal differences in 
[1998] 1RLR 233, at para 41. . __ 
3 The Disability Discrimination (Meaning of Disability) RegulatIOns ~99~, S1 1996 No 14)). The 
conditions covered by the Regulations include addiction to alco~ol, TIlcotme and ~gs,.a tendency to steal 
and to sexual or physical abuse of others, exhibitionism, voyeunsm, tattoos, body plercmg and hay fever. 
4 Goodwin v. The Patent Office [1999] 1RLR 4, EAT. 
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ability which may exist among people". 5 In measuring the severity of the impact, no 
account is to be taken of any medical treatment or measures being taken to treat or 
correct the effect. For example, the fact that an individual's hearing l0ss can be treated 
with a hearing aid does not prevent that individual from continuing to suffer from a 
disability (schd 1, para 6(1)).6 The effect of an impairment is long-term if it has lasted 
for 12 months, is expected to last for twelve months or it is likely to last for the rest of 
the life of the person affected (schd 1, para 2(1)). In order to cope with fluctuating 
conditions, the Act states that where an impairment ceases to have a substantial ,adverse 
"~ 
effect, it shall be treated as continuing to have that effect if the effect is likely to recur 
(schd 1, para 2(2)).7 
It is not necessary that the disability must have occurred at a time when the DDA 
was in force (s 2(5)) but the individual must be able to show that at some time in the past 
he or she had a disability that actually lasted for at least 12 montJ;1s (schd 2, para 5). 
Finally, the employment provisions of the DDA also apply to a person who has had a 
disability in the past (s 2(1)). 
DISABILITY DIFFERENCES 
In chapter one the difference between direct and indirect sex discrimination was analysed 
in terms of the underlying sex differences. It was argued that that there are two forms of 
direct sex discrimination. The first form arises as a result of detrimental treatment on the 
ground of a categorical sex difference or the unique sex differences of pregnancy and 
maternity. To recap, categorical sex differences are characteristics that are shared by all 
of the members of one sex but no members of the other sex. They are small in number 
with the main three being chromosomal composition, the sexual organs and the gonads. 
Unique sex differences are characteristics that apply to some of, but not all, the members 
of just one sex. They are relatively few in number with the main female ones being 
pregnancy and maternity. The second form of direct sex discrimination involves the 
5 Examples of substantial adverse effects on the eight activities set out in schedule 1 to the Act are given in 
paragraphs C14 to C21 of the guidance. . . . 
6 The one exception to this rule is impairment of a person's SIght to the extent that the unparrrnent can be 
corrected by spectacles or contact lenses (schd 1, pa~a ~(~)). . . 
7 The guidance states that an effect is likely to recur if It IS more likely than not that the effect wIll recur 
(para B3). 
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detrimental application of a sex stereotype. By contrast, indirect sex discrimination 
involves the use of distribution sex differences (ie characteristics that apply to both 
groups but to varying extents) and the remaining unique sex differences other than 
pregnancy and maternity. The range of distribution differences between the sexes is 
enormous and includes both physical and social characteristics such as body weight and 
income levels. 
In contrast to the position with sex, there are no categorical disability differences. 
This is because disability is defined in relation to a range of eight normal dq.y-to-day 
... ·i 
activities and it is only necessary for one of these activities to be severely impaired for 
the definition to apply. As a result, there is no one characteristic that is shared by every 
person with a disability. On the other hand, there are a large number of unique disability 
differences that derive from the list of normal day-to-day activities set out in schedule 1 
of the DDA. Each of the eight activities on the list gives rise to a range of characteristics 
that are unique to the disabled. s For example, a severe visual impairment is a 
characteristic that is unique to some, but not all, people with a disability. There are also 
a large number of distribution disability characteristics including, for example, the ability 
to drive or use public transport. In some cases, a characteristic may be both a sex and a 
disability distribution difference although there is likely to be a variation in the size and 
distribution of the difference. For example, both women and people with disabilities are 
disproportionately likely to be in lower level jobs. 9 The fact that there are no categorical 
disability differences is a fundamental distinction between sex and disability 
discrimination and it is helpful to keep this point in mind when considering the disability 
differences underlying the two forms of disability discrimination. 
LESS FAVOURABLE TREATMENT 
Section 5(1) states that an employer discriminates against a disabled person if "for a 
reason which relates to the disabled person's disability, he treats him le~s favourably than 
8 S d' fi t' d emed to be a disability and therefore fonus the basis for another unique evere 15 Iguremen IS e 
disability difference (schd 1, para 3). . . . . . 
9 f E 1 t Emplo>lJment and Trainingfior people wzth dzsabziztles, (1990) p 13; B Department a mp oymen ,.T . . . ' . 
Doyle, Disability discrimination and equal opportunztles: a comparatzve stud; of the employment rzghts of 
disabled persons, (1995), P 17. 
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he treats or would treat others to whom that reason does not or would not apply." In 
other words, the section covers both less favourable treatment on the ground of disability 
per se and less favourable treatment for a reason related to disability. An example of the 
former is Lang v Redland Roofing Systems Ltd. 1o The applicant had a clinically 
recognised mental illness. During her first year at work she was absent from mid May to 
mid July. The following May she was ill again and presented her employer with a 
medical certificate indicating that she was suffering from a psychosis and would be 
absent from work for a month. She was subsequently dismissed because of hyf health 
." 
problems. The tribunal found that she would not have been dismissed if she had had a 
physical illness. In other words, the applicant was dismissed because of her disability in 
itself (that is, her psychosis) and not for a reason related to her disability (her absence 
from work). 
Section 5(1) also covers detrimental treatment for a reason that relates to a 
disabled person's disability. II For example, in Clark v TDG Ltdl2 the applicant was 
disabled as a result of an injury at work. He was dismissed after being absent from work 
for four months and at a time when his doctors were unable to give an indication of when 
he would be able to return to work in the next twelve months. The tribunal and the EAT 
accepted the respondent's argument that there was no discrimination under s 5(1) because 
a non-disabled person absent for a similar period of time would also have been 
dismissed. On appeal the CA rejected the respondent's argument and held that the 
section applies whenever there is a causal link between the applicant's disability and the 
reason for the dismissal irrespective of whether a non-disabled person would have been 
dismissed for the same reason. Thus, in this case it was irrelevant that a non-disabled 
person absent from work for a similar length of time would also have been dismissed. 13 
Another example of a disability related reason is Champeau v Bournmouth 
10 EOR Discrimination case law digest, No 35, p 9. 
II The fact that the less favourable treatment must be for a reason related to the applicant's disability 
means that the Act does not protect an individual treated less favourably because of a third party'~ 
disability, eg a parent who is refused employment because the employer assumes ~at he or she WIll have 
to take time off work to care for a disabled child: see para 2.5 of the code of practIce. 
12 [1999J IRLR 318, CA. . ' 
13 For other cases of sickness absence see: Cox v The Post Office II~S Bnef 609, p 1..J. (the applIcant was 
dismissed after he was absent from work for sickness as result ~fhls asthma) and Sam,uels v Wesleyan 
Assurance Society IDS Brief 601, P 11 (the applicant was dismissed for unacceptable evels of absence 
resulting from his multiple sclerosis). 
1.+1 
Orchestras. 14 The applicant was partially sighted to the extent that she was unable to 
drive. She was dismissed due to her lack of driving skills and, in particular, the fact that 
she was unable to drive to concerts at away locations. The tribunal held that she had 
been treated less favourably for a reason relating to her disability under s 5(1 ).15 
Similarly, in Fozard v Greater Manchester Police Authority16 the applicant had had 
learning difficulties as a child which resulted in her having reduced manual dexterity. 
She applied for the position of temporary word processor operator but was rej ected on 
the basis of the spelling and grammatical errors in her application form. The_tribunal 
held that the applicant was rejected, at least in part, for a reason related to her disability. 
It is not clear how close the causal connection has to be for a reason to be related 
to an applicant's disability. In Champeau the applicant could not drive because she was 
partially sighted and in Fozard the mistakes in the applicant's application form were a 
result of her lack of manual dexterity. However, it is possible to envisage cases where 
the causal link is less close. For example, an applicant is not offered a job because he or 
she does not have a GCSE in biology. Because of his or her disability, ~he applicant 
went to a special school where biology was not offered as an option. Was the applicant 
rejected for a reason that relates to his or her disability? In terms of the chain of 
causation the 'primary' reason for the applicant's lack of a biology GCSE is the fact that 
the school did not offer biology as an option. The fact that the applicant had to go to that 
school because of his or her disability makes the disability a 'secondary' link in the chain 
of causation. Whether s 5 (1) requires a 'primary' causal connection as opposed to a 
'secondary' causal connection is ultimately a matter that will have to be decided by the 
courts. Given that the employer still has the option of justifying the treatment, the courts 
are likely to interpret the section very widely and allow in all but the most remote causal 
connections. 
What kind of disability characteristics are covered by s 5(1)? For the reasons 
explained above, disability per se must relate to a unique disability characteristic. An 
applicant dismissed because she has a psychosis is dismissed for a reason that is unique 
to disabled people but it is not a reason that is shared by all disabled people. With regard 
1420.2.98, Case No.3103546/97, reported in IDS Brief 611, p.16. . ' ' 
15 See also Morse v Wiltshire County Council (1998] IRLR 352, EAT, .a ~ase ,u: whlch ,the applicant was 
dismissed because of his lack of flexibility, one aspect of which was his mabihty to drlve, 
16 COlT 3488/35, reported in IDS Brief 60 1, P 11. 
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to disability related reasons, most, if not all, of these will relate to characteristics that 
have a disproportionate impact on disabled people. For example, in relation to the above 
cases, an inability to drive, spelling and grammatical errors, and absence from work are 
all characteristics that can apply to disabled and non disabled people alike but they are 
more likely to apply to disabled people. As a result, they are all distribution disability 
differences. Any characteristic that is causally linked to an applicant's disability is likely 
to be one that affects more disabled people than non-disabled people. In practice, it is 
difficult to identify any reason related to disability that is not a distribution difference 
'~ '( 
although it is possible that some exist. Thus, the result is that s 5(1) covers both unique 
and distribution disability differences. I? 
Finally, the code of practice makes it clear that s 5(1) also covers the use of 
disability stereotypes. An example given by the code is the situation where an employer 
does not shortlist a blind person for a job involving computers because it thinks that 
blind people cannot use them (para 4.6). An example from the case law of a disability 
stereotype is British Sugar pIc v Kirker 18 where the applicant was viewed as having less 
of a future with the respondent because he was blind rather than on the basis of his actual 
abilities. 
REASONABLE ADmSTMENT 
The second form of discrimination contained in the DDA deals with the obligation on the 
employer to make reasonable adjustments in order to accommodate the special needs of 
disabled employees. The duty of the employer to make adjustments is contained in s 6 
which states: 
(1) Where-
(a) any arrangements made by or on behalf of the employer, or 
(b) any physical feature of premises occupied by the employer, 
place the disabled person concerned at a substantial disadvantage in comparison 
with persons who are not disabled, it is the duty of the employer to take such 
17 One difference between the treatment of distribution differences in sex discriminatirn and in disability 
discrimination is that in relation to the latter, there is no need for the applicant to demonstrate . 
disproportionate impact. The difficulty of assessing disproportionate impact on disabled people gIven that 
th t a homogeneous group is one of the main reasons why the Government deCIded not to adopt an ey are no . ., . . 1 S . 4 I' 
exact disability equivalent of indirect sex dlscnrrunatlOn: Department of SOCIa ecunty," consu tanon on 
government measures to tackle discrimination against disabled people, (1994) P 27. 
18 [1998] IRLR 624, EAT. 
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steps as it is reasonable, in all the circumstances of the case, for him to have to 
take in order to prevent the arrangements or feature having that effect. 
(2) Subsection (l)(a) applies only in relation to -
(a) arrangements for determining to whom employment should be offered; 
(b) any term, condition or arrangements on which employment, promotion, a 
transfer, training or any other benefit is offered or afforded. 19 
The duty to adjust arises whenever the arrangements made by the employer or the 
physical features of the employer's premises place the disabled person at a substantial 
disadvantage. The code of practice indicates that substantial in this context means not 
minor or trivial (para 4.17). The example given by the code is that an employ~r would 
not be required to widen a doorway for an employee with a wheelchair if there is an easy 
alternative route to the same destination. 
A failure to make an adjustment in accordance with s 6 is rendered discriminatory 
by virtue of s 5(2).20 In addition, the employee must show that the fajlure to adjust has 
resulted in one of the prohibited acts covered by s 4. In other words,it is not enough for 
a disabled employee to show that his or her employer has failed to make a reasonable 
adjustment under s 6. The employee must also demonstrate that that failure has resulted 
in a lost job opportunity, less favourable working conditions, dismissal or some other 
detriment. 21 For example, an employee with arthritis in the hands is unable to type as fast 
as other non-disabled employees. A small change in the employee's duties would 
remove the need to type. Despite the fact that the adjustment is reasonable the employer 
is unwilling to make the change because it is unconcerned by the fact that the employee 
is slightly less productive than other employees. Unless the employee can show that his 
or her lack of productivity is detrimental in some way, eg it could have an impact on the 
individual's promotion prospects, the employer's failure to adjust would not constitute 
discrimination under s 5(2). 
19 These words are wide enough to cover pre-dismissal discrimination but not the dismissal itself: see 
Clark v TDG Ltd [1999] IRLR 318, CA and Morse v Wiltshire County Council [199~] IRLR 352, EAT. 
The words are not wide enough to cover the provision of a carer to attend to an apphcant's personal needs 
such as assistance in going to the toilet: see Kenny v Hampshire ~onstabula,! [1999] I~R 76, EAT. 
20 A failure to adjust does not create an independent cause of acnon. It only lITlposes dunes for the purpose 
of determining whether an employer has discriminated against a disabled p~rson (s 6\12)). The d~ty to 
k easonable adjustment does not apply to a benefit under an occupatIOnal penSIOn scheme m respect ~:te~~ation of service, retirement, old age, death, accident, injury, sickness ?r invalidity (s 6 (11)). 
::1 S B D 1 above p 69 The same is true of sex discrimination. The applIcant must show that he or ee oye, , . . . 
she has suffered from ~ne of the forms of less favourable treatment specIfied m s 6 of the SDA. 
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Section 6(3) gives some examples of adjustments that an employer may have to 
make. The list includes allocating some of the disabled person's duties to another 
employee, altering working hours, moving the disabled person to another place of work, 
training, acquiring or modifying equipment, providing a reader or interpreter and 
modifying procedures for testing or assessment. The duty to adjust is not an absolute one 
but is subj ect to the test of reasonab leness Section 6(4) sets out fi ve fa~tors that must be 
taken into account in determining whether it is reasonable for an employer to take a 
particular step.22 The five factors indicated are-
• the extent to which taking the step would prevent the effect in question 
• the extent to which it is practicable for the employer to take the step 
• the financial and other costs which would be incurred by the employer in 
taking the step and the extent to which taking it would disrupt any of its 
activities 
• the extent of the employer's financial and other resources 
• the availability to the employer of financial or other assistance with respect to 
taking the step 
An example of a case in which the tribunal held that it was not reasonable for an 
employer to make an adjustment is Smith v Carpets International UK plc. 23 The 
applicant, who was an epileptic, was employed in a warehouse. After he had a number 
of seizures at work the respondent's doctor concluded that he should not be allowed to 
work in the warehouse because the heavy machinery and the fork -lift trucks were 
potentially dangerous to him. The applicant was offered alternative work in another 
department which he declined because it involved a significant pay cut. The tribunal 
held that it would not have been reasonable for the employer to have changed its method 
of work eg by removing fork-lift trucks from the warehouse so that the applicant could 
continue to work there. 
By way of contrast, a case in which an employer did fail to make a reasonable 
adjustment is Williams v Channel 5 Engineering Services Ltd.24 The applicant, who was 
deaf, was training to be a re-tuner. Part of his training involved watching a video. The 
respondent's failure to provide him with a video with sub-titles meant that he finished his 
training late. Further delay was caused by the respondent's failure to consider whether 
22 There is a power to make regulations under ss 6(8) and (9) specifying the circumstanc~s in which 
particular adjustments are or are not reasonable and to put a ceiling on the cost of any adjustments. 
23 IDS Brief 611, P 17. 
24 IDS Brief 609, p 13. 
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the applicant needed additional equipment, eg a pager, to help him communicate with his 
employer. As a result, all the positions for re-tuners had been filled by the time the 
applicant was able to start work. The tribunal held that the respondent's failure to 
provide the applicant with the necessary equipment in a timely manner amounted to a 
failure to make a reasonable adjustment. 
What kind of disability characteristics are covered by the duty to adjust? The 
duty arises whenever the arrangements made by the employer or the physical features of 
the employer's premises place the disabled person at a substantial disadvantage in 
comparison with persons who are not disabled. The requirement of a comparison with a 
non-disabled person means that the disadvantage must be one that is causally connected 
to the applicant's disability. There is no duty to adjust if the disadvantage is unrelated to 
the applicant's disability. For example, a deaf person is turned down for ajob because he 
or she is too short. The successful candidate is of the requisite height but is not disabled. 
In comparison to the successful candidate, the disabled person has been placed at a 
disadvantage in not being offered the job. However, the disadvantage is not causally 
related to the applicant's disability and, as a result, the employer is under no obligation to 
drop the height requirement. If the duty to adjust only arises where there is a causal link 
between the disadvantage and the applicant's disability, the disability differences covered 
are the same as those covered by s 5(1). In other words, the duty to adjust applies to 
unique and distributions differences. Thus, the two fonns of disability discrimination 
cover the same range of disability differences. 
mSTIFICATION 
Less favourable treatment and a failure to adjust can both be justified by an employer. 
Although the two justification defences are virtually identical in their wording, there are 
slight differences in the way in which they operate and, therefore, they are considered 
separately below. 
Justification of less favourable treatment 
Less favourable treatment of a disabled person is only unlawful if the employer cannot 
show that the treatment in question is justified (s 5(1)(b)). Treatment is justified "if, but 
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only if, the reason for it is both material to the circumstances of the particular case and 
substantial" (s 5(3)). However, an employer must first comply with its duty to make a 
reasonable adjustment before it can seek to justify any less favourable treatment unless 
the treatment would have been justified even after that adjustment (s j(5)). One of the 
examples given in the code of practice is of a typist with arthritis in the hands dismissed 
for a slow typing speed. The dismissal would not be justified if the typist's speed could 
have been improved by a reasonable adjustment, eg the use of an adapted keyboard (para 
4.7). 
In determining whether the reason is material and substantial the tribunal must 
apply an objective test. Thus, it is not sufficient for the employer to establish that it 
acted reasonably in concluding that the treatment was justified. The tribunal must decide 
for itself whether the reason is material and substantial and may substitute its own 
judgement for that of the employer.25 
Material 
The word material is not defined in the DDA. According to the code of practice a reason 
is material if it relates to the individual circumstances in question (para 4.6).26 For 
example, it would probably not be justified for an employer to refuse employment to a 
disabled person on the ground that he or she is unable to drive if the ability to drive is not 
a requirement of the job. By contrast, the code of practice indicates that it would be 
lawful to reject an individual with a severe skin condition for a job modelling cosmetics 
as this would be a reason that is material to the individual circumstances in question 
(para 4.6). 
What impact does the requirement of materiality have on the use of disability 
stereotypes? By definition, disability stereotypes are generalised assumptions about the 
effect of a particular disability on an individual's ability to work, eg an employer may 
assume that epileptics are unable to drive. The code of practice indicates that the use of a 
25 Morse v Wiltshire County Council [1998] IRLR 352, EAT. This is co~tra,st to the positio?, under s 24 of 
the DDA (disposal of premises) where less favourable treatmen~ can be JustIfied on the baSIS of a 
reasonably held opinion: Rose v Buchet [1999] IRLR 463, Shenff Court. , 
26 The word material also arises in the EPA. Under 1(3) ofth~ EP,A an empl~yer can defend a dIffer,ence 
, 'f h 'n' 'genuI'nely due to a material factor whIch IS not the dIfference of sex. Matenal has 
III pay 1 t e vana on IS " . 
been construed in this context as meaning "significant and relevant : Ramey v Greater Glasgow Health 
Board [1987] ICR 129 at 140, HL. 
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disability stereotype cannot be justified because it is not material to the particular 
circumstances of the case. The code of practice gives the following example of the 
unjustified use of a disability stereotype about blind people. 
Someone who is blind is not shortlisted for ajob involving computers because the 
employer thinks blind people cannot use them. The employer makes no effort to 
look at the individual circumstances. A general assumption that blind people 
cannot use computers would not in itself be a material reason - it is not related to 
the particular circumstances (para 4.6). 
The approach of the code of practice to disability stereotypes w~_s follow~4 by the 
., i 
tribunal in the case of Sandy v Hampshire Constabulary.27 The applicant was refused 
employment as a station enquiry officer because, in the view of the force's medical 
officer, the applicant's back condition would result in an unacceptably high level of 
absence. No account was taken of the fact that the applicant had previously worked for 
the force on a series of temporary contracts for 13 months during which time he had had 
only five days of sickness absence, none of which was related to his disability. The 
tribunal held that the failure of the medical officer to refer to the applicant's actual 
sickness record rendered the force's decision "speculative and inaccurate" and, as a 
result, it could not be justified.28 
In both the example given by the code of practice and the-.above case the 
underlying supposition was that the assumption made by the employer was inaccurate in 
relation to the particular applicant. In the example given by the code the implication is 
that the applicant in question could use computers despite being blind. In Sandy the 
tribunal indicated that the police force's decision about the applicant's likely sickness 
absence was inaccurate. It is not clear what the position is with regard to assumptions 
that tum out to be correct even if they are no more than a lucky guess on the part of the 
employer rather than an informed decision based on actual evidence about an applicant's 
capabilities. For example, an employer may refuse to employ an applicant with RSI 
because it assumes that all people with RSI are unable to type. Although the employer's 
assumption may not be true of all individuals with RSI, it may be accurate in relation to 
this particular applicant. Does this make the employer's assumption material to the 
27 EOR Discrimination Case Law Digest No 34, Winter 1997, p 2, , 
28 S I Gl L don Transport EOR Discrimination Case Law DIgest No 40, Summer 1999, p 12, 
ee a so ynn v on , . 1" ~ 'th fu h 
h h I, t s reJ'ected on the basis ofinformatlOn on hIS app lcatlOn lorm WI out any rt er were t e app lcan wa 
investigation by the employer. 
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particular circumstances of the case? It is not clear what the answer to this question is as 
it is not covered by the DDA, the code of practice or the case law. The better 
interpretation is probably that the assumption is not material and, therefore, the employer 
cannot justify the decision. This is because one of the aims of the DDA is to ensure that 
employers act on actual information about people with disabilities rather than 
stereotypical assumptions. For example, paragraph 3.2 in the general guidance section of 
the code is headed: "Do not make assumptions". If employers are able to justify 
decisions on the basis of untested assumptions this would clearly undermine the>~ttempts 
of the legislation to ensure that employers investigate the facts before reaching a 
decision.29 However, the applicant's loss is likely to be limited to damages for injury to 
feeling~ as it would probably be difficult to prove that the applicant had suffered any 
economic loss as a result of the employer's assumption. 
Another facet of the materiality requirement is that the employer must ensure that 
it has taken appropriate medical advice on the applicant's condition and its effect on his 
or her ability to work. This point was made in the case of Holmes v Whittingham & 
Porter. 30 The applicant, who was an epileptic, collapsed at work. Despite the fact that he 
had never collapsed before in his 31 years of service as a labourer he was dismissed on 
the basis of an investigation by a general practitioner. The tribunal held that the 
employer was not justified in dismissing the applicant on the basis of the general 
practitioner's report. The employer should have addressed its mind to taking further 
advice from a specialist in epilepsy and a specialist in occupational medicine.3! 
Substantial 
As with the word material, the expression substantial is not defined in the DDA. The 
code of practice indicates that a reason is substantial if it is not just "trivial or minor" 
(para 4.6). The examples given by the code of practice of treatment which would 
probably not be justified all involve a relatively small impact on the employer. For 
29 Anal gy with sex discrimination legislation would be an employer who rejects a woman's application 
for :j~b b~cause of an assumption that wOI?en lack the necessary m~them~tical skills t~ do the job. Even 
'f 't turn d t th t this particular woman dId not have the mathematlcal skIlls to do the Job, the lIe ou a di ' ' 
employer's behaviour would probably be classifie~ as directly 'scnmmatory, 
30 EOR Discrimination Case Law Digest No 34, Wmter 19~7, p 3" " ' 
3! Arguably this goes slightly further than the ,code of p,ractlce which states t~at: The Act do:s not obhge 
anyone to get expert advice but it could help m some CIrcumstances to seek mdepende.lt adVIce on the 
1.+9 
example, paragraph 4.6 of the code gives the following example of a clerical worker with 
a learning disability. 
A clerical :vorker with a leamin~ disability cannot sort papers quite as quickly as 
s~me. of hIS coll~ague~. There IS very little difference in productivity but he is 
dIsmIssed. That IS unlIkely to be a substantial reason. (emphasis added) 
Another example given by paragraph 4.6 deals with absence from work. 
A factory worker with a mental illness is sometimes away from work due to his 
disability. Because of that he is dismissed. However, the amount of time off is 
very little more than the employer accepts as sick leave for other employees and 
so is very unlikely to be a substantial reason. (emphasis added) ;:t 
Thus, unlike cases of indirect sex discrimination, justification of less favourable 
treatment does not appear to involve any balancing act between the interests of the 
employer and the employee. Nor does it seem to require the financial interests of the 
employer to be taken into account. All the employer is obliged to do is to satisfy the 
tribunal that, on an objective assessment, the applicant's disability' is likely to have a 
detrimental impact on the business that is more than just minor or trivial. 
Due to the recent nature of the DDA, there have not been enoegh reported cases 
to permit a proper analysis of how the word substantial has been applied by the courts. 
However, it is possible to gain some insight from the relatively few cases that have been 
reported. These cases seem to fall into three main categories, namely sickness absence, 
productivity problems or a risk to health and safety. With regard to sickness absence, the 
courts appear to have taken a fairly robust approach. For example in Cox v The Post 
Office32 the applicant postman was dismissed because of his poor attendance record. 
Over a period of 13 years he had 111 days' absence due to asthma in addition to his other 
sickness absence. The asthma absence amounted to an average of 8.5 days a year at a 
cost of £291 per annum. The tribunal found that there was neither evidence of disruption 
to the business nor was it an unreasonable burden for the respondent to cover the 
applicant's absences. As a result, the dismissal was not justified.33 This case indicates 
that tribunals may take the size of the respondent's business into account in detennining 
whether a decision is substantial. The implication being that large companies will be 
obliged to accommodate more sickness absence than small companies. 
extent of a disabled person's capabilities." (para 3.3) 
32 IDS Brief 609, March 1998, p 14. . . 
33 See also Mansoor v Secretary of State for Education and Employment IDS Bnef 611, Apnl 1998, p 16 
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The second category, productivity problems, provides some examples of cases 
where tribunals have found that the reason for the less favourable treatment was 
substantial enough to be justified. In Matty v Tesco Stores Ltd34 the tribunal held that the 
employer was justified in not employing the applicant diabetic as a fitter in its 
warehouse. One of the factors that the tribunal took into account was the fact that if the 
refrigeration system failed stock worth millions of pounds could be lost. 35 Another 
example is Fozard v Greater Manchester Police (above) where the tribunal accepted that 
the spelling and grammatical errors in the applicant's application form justijied the 
respondent's decision to refuse her employment as a word processor or erator. However, 
as both of these cases represent fairly substantial losses of productivity they are not 
particularly informative on where tribunals are likely to draw the line in cases where the 
loss is less pronounced. 
There have been several cases where the applicant's disability has given rise to a 
health and safety risk to the applicant, other employees or members of the public. It 
seems that if an employer can identify a health and safety risk, a tribunal is likely to 
accept the reason as substantial even if it is remote or difficult to quantify. For example, 
in Alvares v London Borough of Hounslow36 the tribunal held that the respondent was 
justified in dismissing the applicant from his post as a school technician because his 
auditory hallucinations and fantasies about mass murder posed an incalculable risk to the 
staff and pupils at the school. Similarly, in Toffel v London Underground Ltd37 the 
tribunal held that the respondent was justified in refusing to employ the applicant as a 
train guard because the side effects of the drug he was taking for his depression might 
have posed a serious risk to passengers. 
The lack of reported and, in particular, appeal cases on the meaning of the word 
substantial means that it is difficult to assess its impact. The code of practice indicates 
that substantial requires no more than a minor or trivial impact on the employer's 
business. However, there is some evidence that in one area at least, sickness absence, 
and Kerrigan v Rover Group Ltd EOR Discrimination Case Law Digest No 40, Sumrr. ~r 1999, p 11. 
34 IDS Brief 609, March 1998, p 13. . . . 
35 Another factor in this case was the impact of an irregular working pattern and workmg m low 
temperatures on the applicant's blood/sugar levels. 
36 EOR Discrimination Case Law Digest No 37, Autumn 1998, P 12. 
37 IDS Brief 609, March 1998, p 13. 
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tribunals are imposing a slightly higher test that is more difficult for employers to 
comply with. 
Justification of a failure to adjust 
The justification defence for a failure to adjust is virtually identical to the justification 
defence for less favourable treatment. A failure to adjust is justified "if, but only if, the 
reason for the failure is both material to the circumstances of the particular case and 
substantial" (s 5(4)). Given the similar wording of the two defences, the poin!s made 
above about the meaning of the words material and substantial also apply in relation to a 
failure to adjust. 
The justification provision only applies if there was a reasonable adjustment that 
the respondent could have made in the first place (para 4.34 of the code of practice). 
Thus, if the tribunal finds that there was no reasonable adjustment trat the respondent 
could have made the question of justification does not arise. 38 So far there has been no 
reported case in which an employer has managed to justify its failure to make a 
reasonable adjustment. In most instances where the employer has succeeded in 
defending a claim under s 5(2) the tribunal has found that the adjustment was not 
reasonable in the first place and, as a result, the question of justification has not arisen.39 
In what situations could the defence apply? The code of practice gives three examples of 
situations in which an employer might be justified in failing to make a reasonable 
adjustment (para 4.34). The first example is where an employer has made a reasonable 
effort to obtain information from a reputable source but is given the wrong information. 
According to the code this could justify the employer's failure to comply with its duty to 
adjust. The other two examples given by the code of practice both involve a failure to 
co-operate on the part of the disabled employee. However, the code also indicates that a 
failure to co-operate by a disabled employee could be a factor that is relevant to the 
question of reasonableness (para 4.32). This seems to imply that the same factor might 
be relevant both to reasonableness and justification. There is nothing in the DDA that 
expressly prevents an employer from using the same argument twice. However, it is 
difficult to think of any factor that is likely to be accepted by a tribunal at the justification 
38 The tribunal should consider the question of reasonableness before the question of justification: see 
Kenny v. Hampshire Constabulary, [1999] IRLR 76, EAT. 
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stage if it has already been rejected at the reasonableness stage. If this is correct, the 
justification provisions for a failure to adjust are likely to be of limited application. 
Deemed justification 
Regulations made under s 5(6) stipulate a number of circumstances in which less 
favourable treatment or a failure to adjust are deemed to be justified.40 Regulation 3 
deals with performance related pay. It is deemed to be justified for an ~mployer to pay a 
disabled person less if that person's pay is wholly or partly dependant on perfqnnance 
and the scheme applies to all the workers in the same class as the disabled employee. 
This does not affect the duty on the employer to make any reasonable adjustment which 
would improve the performance of the disabled person. 
Regulations 4 and 5 deal with benefits under occupational pension schemes in 
respect of termination of service, retirement, old age, death, accident, injury, sickness or 
invalidity. It is always justified to treat a disabled person less favourably in relation to 
the eligibility for or the amount of any of the above benefits if the cost of providing the 
benefit is substantially greater than it would be for a non-disabled person (reg 4(2)). The 
code of practice makes it clear that a minor degree of extra co:=.::- is not enough. 
Substantial additional cost is required and this means something more than minor or 
trivial. Employers should satisfy themselves with medical and/or actuarial evidence of 
the likelihood of there being a substantially greater cost (paras 6.10 to 6.14). 
Furthermore, it is justified for an employer to require a disabled person to pay the same 
level of contributions as a non-disabled person despite the fact that he or she is not 
eligible for a benefit or the same level of benefit for a reason related to his or her 
disability (reg 5). 
THE SCOPE FOR JUSTIFYING DIRECT DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION 
What scope is there for justifying direct disability discrimination under the DDA? This 
depends on how unique disability differences are classified. If detrimental treatment on 
the basis of unique disability differences is considered to be indirect discrimination, the 
39 See for example Smith v Carpets International UL pic, above. 
40 The Disability Discrimination (Employment) Regulations 1996, SI 1996 No 1456. 
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answer is that there is no scope for justifying direct disability discrimination. This is 
because the only form of direct disability discrimination that exists is the use of disability 
stereotypes. Although in theory the general justification defence applies to stereotypes, 
the code of practice states that the decision must be specific to the case in question. As 
stereotypes are by definition generalised assumptions about an individual on the basis of 
group membership they can never be specific. The one exception is in relation to the use 
of actuarial factors in the context of benefits under an occupational pension scheme in 
relation to which there is a separate exception. Thus the position is that~ there is 
effectively no scope for justifying direct disability discrimination. On the other hand, if 
detrimental treatment on the ground of a unique disability difference is classified as 
giving rise to a claim of direct discrimination, there is plenty of scope for justifying that 
discrimination. Both forms of disability discrimination cover unique and distribution 
differences and both forms of discrimination can be justified. Therefore, detrimental 
treatment on the ground of any unique disability characteristic can be justified. 
Leaving aside the question of whether unique disability differences should be 
classified as direct or indirect discrimination, why did the Government decide that 
employers should be able to justify their use? In a consultation paper issued before the 
DDA was passed, the Government indicated that disability discrimination would need to 
be formulated differently from race and sex discrimination for the following reason.41 
[The] right would need to recognise that a disability which affected a person's 
basic ability to do the job would be a reason why an employer might be acting 
fairly in deciding not to recruit the person. Another reason vyould be whether 
health and safety could not be safeguarded so far as was necessary. In both these 
respects, the legislation would need to be formulated differently from that on race 
and sex discrimination. 
In other words, the Government accepted that both types of disability characteristic 
which can occur may have an impact on an individual's ability to work. Therefore, 
unless the Government wanted the position to be that employers should always have to 
accommodate these differences no matter how absurd their impact (eg a blind lorry 
driver) there had to be some form of justification defence that covered both forms of 
disability discrimination. 
41 A consultation on government measures to tackle discrimination against disabled people, (1994) para 
2.27. 
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to improve the employee's productivity. Taken together, the duty to adjust and disability 
justification have much in common with the justification defence for indirect sex 
discrimination. The exact scope of the similarities and differences between the two 
defences is examined below. 
The reason test 
In cases of indirect sex discrimination the employer has to identifY a reason for the 
disputed practice or measure that is unconnected with sex. As indicated in chap~~I 5, the 
case law has set various parameters for the kind of reason the employer can rely on, eg 
the reason must correspond to a real need on the part of the employer. The 
corresponding provision in the disability justification defence is that the reason must be 
material. Because the case law on disability discrimination is not as developed as the 
case law on indirect sex discrimination, it is not possible to identify the precise 
parameters of the materiality requirement. However, the code of practice and the limited 
case law to date both indicate that the requirement of materiality imposes a test of 
relevance to the employer's business. Thus, the requirement of materiality is likely to 
have much the same impact as the reason test for cases of indirect sex discrimination. 
With indirect sex discrimination the reason must be other than sex. Although it is 
not expressly stipulated that justification of disability discrimination must be for a reason 
other than disability, it is arguable that this is implicit in the test of relevance imposed by 
the requirement of materiality. If the test of relevance means that the employer must put 
forward a reason that is relevant to the needs of the business, there is little if any scope 
for employers to use disability as a reason as this would amount, for example, to an 
employer attempting to justify a refusal to hire a deaf person as a telephonist on the basis 
that he or she is deaf. This is not a reason that relates to the needs of the business. 
Instead, the employer would have to use as a reason the effect on productivity of hiring a 
deaf person to do that particular job. In which case the reason would be productivity and 
not disability. Overall, the requirement of materiality is likely to bear a considerable 
resemblance to the reason test for indirect sex discrimination. This means that there will 
be a substantial overlap between the kind of reasons that can be used for justifying 
disability and indirect sex discrimination. 
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The causation test 
The second element of the objective justification defence for indirect sex discrimination 
requires the employer to demonstrate a causal link between the measure causing the 
disproportionate impact on one sex and the reason put forward for the measure. 
Although it is not expressly stated in the legislation, it is inherent in the materiality 
requirement that the causation test also applies to disability justification. If a disabled 
employee is dismissed because he or she is unable to drive, the employer must show that 
"'--{ 
an inability to drive results in the specified reason eg a reduction in productivity. Thus, 
the causation element is the same for both justification defences. 
The proportionality test 
The first element of the proportionality test for indirect sex discrimination is the means 
test. A similar requirement is found in disability discrimination in the duty to adjust. In 
both cases the tribunal has to consider whether the employer's objective could have been 
achieved in a less discriminatory way. The difference is that with disability the 
legislation sets out a very detailed test for determining whether it is reasonable for an 
employer to take a particular step. The five factors that the tribunal must take into 
account are set out in s 6(4). They include the effectiveness of the adjustment in 
question, the cost of the adjustment (including the cost of any disruption to the 
employer's business) and the ability of the employer to accommodate the cost (given the 
availability of any financial assistance). By contrast, there are no legislative guidelines 
for the application of the means test in cases of indirect sex discrimination. It is left to 
the discretion of the tribunal to decide what factors should be taken into account in 
deciding whether there are alternative non discriminatory means available for achieving 
the employer's objective. 
Which approach is better? Although the sex discrimination approach gIVes 
tribunals more flexibility, the disability approach has several advantages. First, the DDA 
clearly places the obligation on the employer to look for alternative ways of solving the 
problem. With indirect sex discrimination, unless the applicant comes up with an 
alternative solution, there is a danger that the means test will be overlooked. Second, the 
DDA makes it clear that employers are expected to spend money accommodating the 
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needs of disabled employees although how much money is reasonable depends on the 
size and resources of the employer. With indirect sex discrimination there is a danger 
that employers will be able to convince tribunals that they should not be obliged to 
introduce changes such as part-time work because they involve additional costs. Third, 
the existence of the guidelines in the DDA means that employers are more likely to be 
aware of their obligations and, therefore, comply with them and it makes it easier for 
disabled employees to understand and enforce their rights. With indirect sex 
discrimination the exact scope of the means test is hidden away in the case law Wpking it 
"-
difficult for employers to know exactly what their obligations are and hard for employees 
to know and enforce their rights. 
The point where the two justification defences diverge significantly is in relation 
to the second element of the proportionality test. With indirect sex discrimination the 
tribunal has to balance the detrimental effect on the applicant with the benefit to the 
employer. There is no similar requirement with disability. Instead, the tribunal merely 
has to be satisfied that the reason put forward by the employer is substantial. The word 
substantial is not defined in the DDA but the code of practice indicates that a reason is 
substantial if it is not just minor or trivial. There have been insufficient reported cases on 
this point to enable a detailed examination of how the provision has been applied in 
practice. However, the few reported cases on sickness absence indicate that tribunals 
may be giving the word substantial a slightly more robust meaning. The indirect sex 
discrimination cases are not particularly clear on this point, but it seems that employers 
are expected to accommodate something more than a small drop in productivity. Thus, 
with regard to this final element, it appears that the disability justification defence is 
somewhat weaker than the justification defence in cases of indirect sex discrimination. It 
will be impossible to ascertain whether this is indeed the case until there has been 
considerably more case law on the disability justification defence. However, if a weak 
form of justification is adopted in disability cases this could lead to peculiar anomalies in 
cases where the distribution characteristic in question is equally applicable to sex cases. 
For example, it would be somewhat incongruous if an employer is obliged to 
accommodate part-time working for a woman with children but not for a disabled person 
who is unable to work full-time due to ill health. 
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CONCLUSION 
There is a tendency amongs some writers and the courts to VIew less favourable 
treatment under s 5(1) of the DDA as the equivalent of direct sex discrimination. This 
has given rise to the impression that there is more scope for justifying disability 
discrimination than sex discrimination. In fact, an analysis of sex and disability 
discrimination in terms of categorical, unique and distribution differences reveals that 
there is considerable overlap in the application of the justification defence. There is no 
-, 'E 
difference in the treatment of categorical differences because they simjJly do not exist in 
the context of disability discrimination. In relation to distribution differences the , 
justification defence applies to both disability and sex. 
The one area of divergence arises in relation to umque differences. With 
disability, all unique differences are subject to the justification deff(nce. With sex, all 
unique differences can be justified other than pregnancy and maternity. Thus, the 
disability provisions offer less protection to a disabled person than the provisions on 
direct sex discrimination offer to a pregnant woman or a woman on maternity leave. 
There is no logical basis for this anomaly as both unique disability differences and 
unique sex differences can have an impact on an individual's ability to work. 
Taken together with the duty to adjust, disability justificatjon has much in 
common with the justification defence for indirect sex discrimination. The one area 
where disability justification could be said to be more effective than justification for 
indirect sex discrimination is in relation to the means test. Unlike indirect sex 
discrimination where the exact nature of the employer's obligation to accommodate the 
special needs of the sexes is not fully articulated, the duty to adjust in disability 
discrimination sets out the factors that a tribunal must take into account in determining 
whether an adjustment is reasonable. These factors make it clear that employers are 
obliged to make changes despite the fact that there may be some cost involved and it has 
the added advantage that it makes the provision easier for employers and employees to 
understand. On the other hand, disability justification appears to be weaker than 
justification for indirect sex discrimination in relation to the balance element of the 
proportionality test. With indirect sex discrimination tribunals are obliged to balance the 
detriment to the employee against the benefit to the employer. With disability 
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justification the employer just has to satisfy the tribunal that it has a substantial reason 
for the discriminatory treatment which, according to the code of practice, means a reason 
that is not just minor or trivial. 
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7 
A MODEL JUSTIFICATION DEFENCE FOR 
DIRECT SEX DISCRIMINATION 
INTRODUCTION 
The previous two chapters have examined justification defences for indirect .sex and 
-~~ 
disability discrimination. This chapter moves on to consider how some elements of these 
defences could be combined to create a model for a statutory justification defence for 
direct sex discrimination. As indicated in the Introduction, the purpose of postulating this 
model is to explore what impact such a defence would have on the dual goals of sex 
equality and clarity of the law. This is an impact study, not an. examination of the 
normative question of whether this defence is politically desirable; such an inquiry is not 
amenable to legal analysis and falls outside the scope of this thesis. 
The model defence described below seeks to achieve two things. First, to create 
an appropriate balance between the underlying aim of sex equality and the right of 
organisations to operate efficiently and profitably. It must be emphasised that the model 
represents just one of a range of possible formulations; where exactly the balance should 
be struck is ultimately a political question to be resolved by legislators. The second aim 
of the model is to set out a comprehensive list of the factors that courts and tribunals 
must address in reaching a decision - thereby maximising legal clarity. 
The model adopts the three elements of the defence used In indirect sex 
discrimination cases except that the third element is divided into two, so creating a four 
stage test. Each of the stages is analysed in detail below. Afterwards, the defence is 
applied to three instances of direct sex discrimination to illustrate how the defence would 
work in practice. Finally, the overlap with the main existing legislative exceptions is 
considered. 
THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENCE 
The reason test 
The first stage of the defence is the reason test. The respondent must put forward a 
reason for the difference in treatment. Not every reason will suffice. It must be one that 
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relates to the operational needs of the employer's business or organisation. This means 
that mere whims are excluded as are reasons that are extraneous to the respondent's 
organisation. This does not mean that all social considerations are excluded. An 
employer can put forward a social benefit as a reason as long as it relates to the operation 
of the business. For example, the objective of a rape crisis centre is to help rape victims 
rather than make a profit for the centre. Thus, it may seek to justify hiring only female 
counsellors on the basis that the purpose of the organisation can be more effectively 
achieved. On the other hand, a rape crisis centre could not justify a decision to hire 
--.. 
female cleaners on the basis that it will help to reduce female unemployment as the aim 
of reducing female unemployment is not related to the purpose of the organisation. 
Slightly different considerations would apply where the provision being 
challenged is enshrined in legislation. Adopting the test used in the justification of 
indirect sex discrimination, where a legislative provision is being challenged (eg in 
judicial review proceedings) all that the Government has to show is that the reason 
relates to a legitimate social aim. Thus, if the Government passes a law that stipulates all 
employers with more than 1000 employees must establish a free workplace nursery for 
the children of its female staff, the only issue for the tribunal would be whether the 
provision of free childcare to working women is a legitimate social aim. As the cases on 
indirect sex discrimination indicate, this will not be a difficult hurdle for the Government 
to overcome. 
The reason put forward by the employer must be the real or genuine reason for 
the difference in treatment ie it must not be a sham or pretence. l For example, an 
employer may claim that the reason for not employing women as security guards at a 
night club is that they do not have the physical strength to eject rowdy guests. However, 
the real reason for the difference in treatment is that the existing male security guards 
object to working with women. As the employer's reason is not genuine the defence 
fails. Does the reason have to be a good or material reason? In other words, is there any 
quality control over the reason put forward? For example, an employer claims that the 
reason why it employs only women at the cosmetics counter of its stf're is that women 
can model the cosmetics they are selling which then encourages customers to buy the 
1 A similar requirement of genuineness applies to the genuine material factor defence under s 1 (3) of the 
EPA: see Strathclyde Regional Council v Wallace [1998] IRLR 146, HL. 
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products. Should the tribunal look at the reason and decide whether it is a good enough 
reason to give rise to a justification defence? The answer is probably not because this 
would pre-empt the other elements of the defence. In order to determine if the reason is a 
good reason the tribunal would have to examine whether the ability to model the 
products does indeed increase sales and, if so, by how much. These are questions that 
are dealt with by the causation test and the balance test. Thus, the tribunal should not, at 
this stage, consider the quality of the reason. All that is required is that the reason should 
be genuine and should relate to the needs of the business. 
"'i 
To what extent can the reason relate to sex? In contrast to the justification 
defence for indirect sex discrimination, it would be permissible for the reason to be sex 
related. This does not mean that the use of sex related reasons is unrestricted because the 
reason must still be one that relates to the needs of the business. For example, an 
employer cannot justify a refusal to hire women simply because they are women since 
this is not a reason that relates to the needs of the business. However, if an employer can 
point to a sex difference that has an impact on the operation of the business this could 
give rise to a justification defence. 
Where an employer puts forward a reason that is based on a distribution sex 
difference it will almost certainly be invoking a sex stereotype. Thus, an employer who 
refuses to hire women on the ground that they are not strong enough to do the job is 
relying on a sex stereotype about the relative strengths of women and men. An employer 
who puts forward a reason based on a unique characteristic might also be relying on a sex 
stereotype. For example, an employer who refuses to hire young W0men on the basis 
that they may get pregnant and leave is invoking a sex stereotype about the behaviour of 
young women. (An employer who dismisses a woman who is already on maternity leave 
and, therefore, cannot work, is relying not on a stereotype but on actual information 
about her inability to work.) This does not mean that employers are given a free rein to 
use sex stereotypes. In chapter 3, two factors were identified for the rational use of 
stereotypes. First, the stereotype must be relatively accurate. Second, there must be an 
absence of reasonably accessible information about the individual that would negate the 
stereotype. It is only ifboth of these conditions are satisfied that it is rational to rely on a 
sex stereotype. Both of these factors are tested in the remaining elements of the 
justification defence. The accuracy of the stereotype is tested as part of the causation 
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element of the test. If the stereotype is not accurate the employer will not be able to 
show a causal link between the reason and the detrimental treatment. The availability of 
individuating information is examined under the means test. If information about an 
individual that contradicts the stereotype is reasonably accessible, the employer may 
have alternative non-discriminatory means of achieving the same objective. The impact 
of the causation test and the means test on sex stereotypes is discussed in more detail 
below. 
The causation test 
Under the causation test the employer has to establish a causal connection between the 
disputed measure and the reason put forward for the measure. For example, a respondent 
may try and justify a dress code under which women sales assistants are prohibited from 
wearing trousers on the basis that this would result in a loss of sales .. In this situation the 
employer must prove that there is a causal link between the dress code and the level of 
sales. In other words, unless the employer can actually show that customers are put off 
buying by women in trousers, the justification defence fails. It is very important that 
where the impact of a particular measure is quantifiable, employers provide actual 
evidence of its effect. Tribunals should not be willing to accept an employer's assertion 
that the causal link is self evident. Where the impact of a measure is not readily 
quantifiable employers should be required to put forward tenable evidence that the causal 
link exists. Thus, in the above example of a dress code, one way the employer could 
establish the causal link would be to adduce evidence of a properly conducted customer 
survey which shows that some of the respondent's customers would not buy from a shop 
where the female staff wear trousers. As long as a fall is sales is established the causal 
link is made out. However, the actual amount of the fall in sales is relevant to the final 
element of the justification defence where the tribunal has to balance the benefit to the 
employer against the detriment to the employee. 
An important consequence of the causation test is that it is impossible for 
employers to justify using different standards for the sexes. Assume that a police force 
has a rule that in order to train as a dog handler candidates have to be able to run a certain 
distance in less than a certain time. The rule is that men have to complete the course in 
under 16 minutes while women have to complete the same course in less than 17 
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minutes.2 The reason for the rule is that dog handlers often have to chase suspected 
criminals and, therefore, an ability to run fast over a long distance is required. The 
objective of the police force (catching criminals) is reasonable and it clearly relates to the 
operation of the business. But does it satisfy the causation test? The answer is almost 
certainly not, because if a woman who can complete the course in 17 minutes can run 
fast enough to catch criminals the same must apply to a man who can run at the same 
speed. Thus, the employer has to set the same time for women and men (and to avoid a 
claim of indirect sex discrimination the time has to be set at a level that is ge~uinely 
~, -e 
necessary to do the job). The same reasoning applies to many other situations where 
there is one rule for women and one rule for men eg different height requirements. If a 
woman who has a height of 5ft is tall enough to do a job so too is a man of the same 
height. The employer will not be able to show that there is a causal link between doing 
the job and any greater height. 
In many cases the reason put forward by the employer will be based on a sex 
stereotype. For example, an employer refuses to hire men as sewing machinists because 
employees with nimble fingers are more productive. Implicit in the employer's argument 
is the stereotype that women have more agile fingers than men. The causation test 
investigates the accuracy of this stereotype. Can the employer prove that by hiring only 
women the business will be more productive? This depends on the extent to which the 
stereotype is accurate. If the stereotype is inaccurate and equal numb~rs of women and 
men have the required flexibility to be productive, the employer will fail to satisfy the 
causation test. On the other hand, if the stereotype is relatively accurate, the employer 
may be able to show a link between the hiring women and productivity. It is also 
necessary to take account of the amount of the increase in productivity. The more 
accurate the stereotype is, the greater will be the increase in productivity. If the 
stereotype is accurate to the extent that 44% of men and 520/0 of women have the 
required flexibility, the employer's policy of hiring only women is likely to have only a 
small effect on productivity. Thus, when it comes to balancing the benefit to the 
employer against the detriment to the employees, the employer will not have much to put 
in the balance. By contrast, if the stereotype is highly accurate, say 20~ of men and 90% 
2 For a case with these facts see Allcock v Hampshire Constabulary EOR Discrimination Case Law Digest 
No 36, p 1. 
165 
of women have the requisite flexibility in their fingers, the effect on productivity is likely 
to be much greater, giving the employer more to put in the balance. 
The means test 
The means test requires the employer to demonstrate that there is no reasonable and less 
discriminatory way of achieving the same obj ective. In some cases this may involve 
substituting a rule that is directly discriminatory with one that that has a disproportionate 
impact on one sex. For example, an employer may move from differiw6 height 
requirements for the sexes to the same height requirement. In this situation, the 
employer must have another look and see if the objective can be achieved in a way that 
has a neutral impact on the sexes if it is to avoid a finding that the practice is indirectly 
discriminatory . 
The burden is on the employer to demonstrate that there is no other reasonably 
viable option. If the employer has not even considered the issue, the defence should fail 
unless it is self evident that no other option exists. Otherwise, the employer should 
present evidence to the tribunal on all the other options it has considered and the basis on 
which they were rejected. Furthermore, employers should consider the alternatives when 
the offending scheme is implemented and not after the event when it is challenged. This 
does not mean that an ex post facto investigation will never suffice if the employer can 
show that there were no alternatives when the scheme was instituted and none have 
arisen in the intervening period. 
What factors should the tribunal take into account in determining whether the 
employer has acted reasonably? In the DDA tribunals are given five factors that they 
must take into account in determining whether it is reasonable for an enlployer to make a 
particular adjustment (s 6(4)). The five factors are: 
a) 
b) 
c) 
the extent to which taking the step would prevent the effect in question; 
the extent to which it is practicable for the employer to take the step; 
the financial and other costs which would be incurred by the employer in 
taking the step and the extent to which taking it would disrupt any of his 
activities; 
d) the extent of the employer's financial and other resources; 
e) the availability to the employer of financial or other assistance with 
respect to taking the step. 
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The first of these five factors could apply to the means test for direct sex 
discrimination although it would be of somewhat limited impact as in most cases the 
alternative option would remove completely the direct discrimination. In contrast to 
cases of disability discrimination, it would not be possible to alleviate the problem in 
part. The second factor would need be changed so that the issue is not the practicality of 
the alternative option but the extent to which the alternative option delivers the 
employer's objective. The third and fourth factors could be adopted with appropriate 
amendments. The final factor is probably not relevant because, unliIf disability, there 
are no special schemes that provide financial assistance to employers to help them 
accommodate sex differences. Thus, the factors that the tribunal could take into account 
in detennining the reasonableness of an alternative option would be as follows: 
a) the extent to which the alternative option removes the direct 
discrimination; 
b) the extent to which the alternative option delivers the employer's 
objective; 
c) the financial and other costs which would be incurred by the employer in 
taking the alternative option and the extent to which taking it would 
disrupt any of his activities; 
d) the extent of the employer's financial and other resources. 
One factor that should not be taken into account is the im1 -::rct on the other 
employees. If an employer has a rule that only men have to work compulsory overtime 
the effect of changing that rule may be that both sexes are compelled to work overtime. 
(This involves a levelling down of benefits but the employer may be able to do this if it 
can not get enough employees to work overtime on a voluntary basis). It would be 
inappropriate for the tribunal to take account of the impact on the women employees as 
this is itself a sex based factor. This is in contrast to the position with indirect sex 
discrimination where the effect on the other employees is a factor that the tribunal can 
take into account. For example, an employer has a rule that all employees have to work 
one night shift a week. Assuming the rule has a disproportionate impact on women, in 
determining whether the rule is justified, the tribunal might take into account the impact 
(ie more night shifts) on the other employees of allowing some employees to work only 
day shifts. 
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The balance test 
The final stage of the justification test involves a balancing exerCIse between the 
detriment to the employee and the benefit to the employer. The only way to do this 
objectively is to attach monetary values to the benefit and detriment. Whenever possible, 
these monetary values should be based on the actual experience of the employer and the 
employee. However, in some cases this may not be possible, for example where the 
EOC complains about an employer's policy of hiring only one sex and no actual or 
potential candidates for the job can be identified. In such a case the tribunal will have to 
t"_.;; 
try and put a figure on the detriment although it may be no more than an educated guess. 
How should the tribunal undertake the balancing exercise? In cases of indirect 
discrimination it is not clear how the balancing exercise actually operates and in 
partiCUlar, whether the detriment to the employee has to outweigh the benefit to the 
employer. Leaving the whole matter vague has the benefit of giving the tribunal a degree 
of flexibility. On the other hand, it also means that tribunals can apply a weak version of 
the test thereby undermining the goal of sex equality. Some guidance on how the 
balance test should be applied would help to secure a stronger applicat.ion of the test 
while at the same time ensuring a degree of consistency and legal certainty. There is no 
obvious formula for working out the point at which the benefit to the employer 
outweighs the detriment to the employee in every case. The following three stage 
analysis is a relatively strong test that leans in favour of the employee while leaving 
reasonable scope for the employer to justify an otherwise discriminatory practice. 
Under the first stage of the balance test, the tribunal determines if the detriment to 
the employee is greater than the benefit to the employer. If it is, the defence fails and 
there is no need to consider the remaining two stages of the test. Thus, if the detriment to 
the employee is £2,000 and the benefit to the employer is £1,000, the employer's 
justification defence fails. In some cases it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, 
for the tribunal to quantify the benefit in monetary terms. For example, the organisers of 
a women only training scheme under s 47 of the SDA (positive action training schemes) 
operate a policy of hiring only female trainers in order to create a sympathetic and 
supportive environment and thereby encourage more potential trainees to take up the 
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course.
3 Even assuming that the employer is able to show how many more trainees have 
been induced to take up the course on the basis that all the trainers are women, it would 
be impossible for the tribunal to put a figure on the benefit of those additional trainees 
taking up the course. In this kind of situation the only option available to the tribunal is 
to balance the competing interests on an impressionistic basis. To some extent this 
involves the tribunal in substituting its own value judgements for those of the employer. 
However, the only other alternative is to abandon the test altogether with the result that a 
weaker test is applied to organisations with social aims as opposed to financial ones. 
~~ 
The second stage of the test only arises if the situation is reversed and the benefit 
to the employer is greater than the detriment to the employee. In this case the balance 
does not automatically come down on the side of the employer. Instead, the tribunal 
goes on to consider whether the benefit is disproportionately large compared to the 
detriment. Thus, if the benefit is £100,000 and the detriment is £1,000 the benefit is 
disproportionately large compared to the detriment. In this situation, the defence would 
succeed. The fact that the employer does not automatically succeed in its defence if the 
benefit is larger than the detriment strengthens the test in favour of the employee. On the 
other hand, the proportionality test works in favour of the employer. The rationale 
underlying the proportionality test is that it is not reasonable for an employer to spend an 
excessive amount of money in order to avoid a relatively small detriment to an employee. 
This raises the question of what is an excessive amount of money? One possibility 
would be to apply a straightforward mathematical formula, eg if the benefit is more than 
twice the detriment it is disproportionate. The problem with this particular formula is 
that it takes no account of the actual size of the amounts involved. While it may be 
unreasonable to require an employer to spend £70,000 in order to avoid a detriment to 
the employee of £35,000, it might not be unreasonable for the employer to spend £900 in 
order to avoid a detriment of £400. In order to take account of the actual amounts 
involved the formula would have to be much more complicated. To avoid the necessity 
for complex mathematical equations and in order to preserve a degree of flexibility, it is 
probably preferable to leave the issue of proportionality to the discretion of the tribunal 
without any additional guidance. 
3 Th th f: ts of Moult v Nottinghamshire County Council EOR Discrimination Case Law Digest 
ese are e ac , I l'fi ' d fi 
No 22, Winter 1994, p 4, The employer failed to establish a genuine occupatIona qua 1 lcatIon e ence 
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Finally, if the benefit is not disproportionately large compared to the detriment, 
the tribunal considers the third element of the test which is the ability of the employer to 
accommodate the cost. Thus, if the benefit to the employer is £8,000 and the detriment 
to the employee is £6,000, the tribunal takes into account the financial resources of the 
employer in determining whether the practice is justified. The underlying assumption is 
that the greater the resources of the employer, the more cost it should be able to absorb. 
Thus, it will generally be more difficult for large employers to justify direct 
discrimination than small employers. An indication of the ability of an employer:~o cope 
with a particular cost would be its employment practices in other areas. Thus, in 
determining whether an employer can cope with maintaining a woman on full pay during 
six months of maternity leave, a tribunal may look at how the employer treats other 
employees absent from work for similar periods of time eg sickness absence or study 
leave. 
The three stage analysis outlined above does not specifically take account of the 
relative impact of the detriment on the employee. There are three reasons for this. First, 
the relative impact of a financial detriment on an individual is extremely difficult to 
quantify and would involve a detailed analysis of an individual's lifestyle and family 
circumstances including the income of any spouse or partner. Second, taking the relative 
detriment into account means that the same action by the employer c0uld be lawful for 
some employees but not others. For example, if the employer refuses to hire five women 
that refusal might be lawful for some of the five but not the rest. In general, wealthier 
employees would have less protection than poorer employees. Furthermore, a relative 
analysis may have a discriminatory impact on married employees on the basis that they 
are disproportionately likely to be more affluent. Third, the fact that the balance always 
comes down in favour of the employee if the detriment is greater than the benefit means 
that the relative impact on the employee is assumed to be greater than the relative impact 
on the employer until such time as the benefit is larger than the detriment. By contrast, 
the relative impact on the employer is only taken into account once the benefit is larger 
than the detriment. 
Where more than one employee is affected, the tribunal should look at the total 
detriment and the total benefit rather than considering each case individually or using 
under s 7 of the SDA. 
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average figures. Because the detriment is likely to be different for each individual, if the 
tribunal looks at each case separately the result may be that the practice is lawful for 
some employees and not others. Not only would this be undesirable from the perspective 
of the employees, but it would also cause problems for an employer trying to implement 
a general strategy or reorganisation. Using average figures would avoid this problem but 
it would also create difficulties in the third stage of the analysis. In determining the 
ability of the employer to accommodate the cost, the total cost needs to be taken into 
account at the same time. Otherwise, if the cases are considered one at a time the costs 
, ~4· 
accumulate and at some point they may reach the point where the tribunal takes the view 
that the employer can no longer accommodate them. In which case the employees whose 
cases are considered before this point will win and those that are heard after will lose. 
Thus, in order to ensure consistency, both for the employees and the employer, it is 
important that the total amounts are considered by the tribunal. 
It is not clear if the balance test should apply at all where the offending measure 
is enshrined in legislation because of the danger of the courts becoming embroiled in 
political decision. For example, assume that the Government passes a law that gives men 
with children under 18 a right to two weeks' paid leave per year. (This leave would be in 
addition to any unpaid leave that both parents are entitled to under the Parental Leave 
Directive). The aim of the Government in passing this legislation is to encourage fathers 
to get more involved in childcare. It would be difficult to argue that this is not a 
legitimate social aim and, therefore, the reason test would be satisfied. The causation test 
would almost certainly be satisfied as there is generally a causal link between time spent 
at work and time spent with children. The means test might be more aifficult to pass as 
it could be argued that the same aim could be achieved by giving either (but not both) of 
the parents paid time off work. However, the Government might argue that in such a 
situation the tendency would be for the mother and not the father to take the paid leave. 
Leaving these problems aside, assume that the means test is satisfied. Should the court 
then go on and apply the balance test? In doing so the court would have to balance the 
detriment suffered by the women (no two weeks' paid leave from work) against the 
benefit to the state of fathers being more involved in childcare. It is extremely unlikely 
that a court could quantify the benefit to the state of an increase in paternal childcare. 
Even if it could, this is an inherently political decision and it is arguably not the role of 
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the judiciary to get involved in such matters. Abandoning the balance test for statutory 
provisions does not mean that the Government is completely free to pass discriminatory 
legislation as the other three elements of the justification test still apply. Thus, in order 
to satisfy the court that a discriminatory provision is justified, the Government would 
have to show that the offending measure does in fact achieve a legitimate social aim and 
that there is no other less discriminatory means of achieving the same g0al. 
LITIGATION COSTS 
The model set out above could give rise to increased litigation costs in two ways. First, 
there is a possibility of more cases being brought (or additional issues being added to 
existing litigation). Second, when litigation does occur, the model defence could give 
rise to complex evidential issues. In particular, the causation element of the defence may 
require expert evidence, for example where an employer seeks to establish the accuracy 
of a stereotype. It is very difficult to predict what these costs might be. However, to the 
extent that they do arise, they need to be set against any benefits that may accrue as a 
result of the introduction of the defence. 
THE EXAMPLES 
Set out below are three examples of how the justification defence would operate in 
practice. The examples are based on real cases although some factual assumptions are 
made where the requisite infonnation is lacking in the case report. In each case all four 
elements of the test are considered even if it is likely that the test would fail at an earlier 
stage. 
Automotive Products Ltd v Peake4 
In this case the respondent had a factory employing about 4,000 manual staff including 
some 400 women. The hours of employment were from 7.30 am to 4.30 pm. All of the 
manual staff stopped work at 4.25 pm at the sound of the first bell. However, while the 
female employees were allowed to leave the factory at the first bell, the men had to wait 
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until the second bell sounded at 4.30 pm before they could leave. The rule was explained 
by the employer as an administrative arrangement in the interests of health and safety so 
that the women would not be injured in the rush through the gates. The applicant's 
complaint of direct sex discrimination was rejected on the basis that the difference in 
treatment did not amount to a detriment to the applicant. Leaving aside the question of 
detriment, how would the justification defence operate on the facts of this case? The 
employer's objective appears to satisfy the reason test on the basis that it is genuine and it 
relates to the operation of the business. It would be difficult to argue that aV-Qiding a 
crush at the factory gates is not a genuine need on the part of the employer. The 
causation test might be more problematic. The employer would have tC' show that having 
the women leave at the same time as the men would constitute a health and safety hazard. 
This would be difficult given that there were already 3,600 men all leaving at the same 
time with apparently no danger to health and safety. Even if the employer is able to 
satisfy the causation test, the point where the defence is almost certain to fail is the 
means test. The employer could achieve the same result using non discriminatory means 
and at no extra cost to the employer. For example, employees could be allowed to leave 
five minutes early on the basis of eye colour or the ability to leave early could be rotated 
between groups of workers. Thus the employer could maintain its objective without 
differentiating between women and men. 
Assuming the employer could have passed the means test, what would be the 
effect of the final element, the balance test? The detriment to the male employees of 
having to wait an extra five minutes is the equivalent of five minutes' wages. Thus, the 
tribunal would have to work out the total value of five minutes' wages for all the men in 
the factory. There were 3,600 male manual workers. Assume that the average wage was 
£5 per hour or just over 40p for five minutes' work. The total detriment to the men is 
about £1,440 per day. Balanced against this is the benefit to the employer of avoiding an 
accident. This is an example of a benefit that is very difficult to quantify. To do so the 
tribunal would need some idea of what an accident would cost the employer in terms of 
compensation and possible fines by the Health and Safety Executive and how likely it is 
that an accident will happen.5 If the risk of an accident happening on any particular day 
4 [1977] IRLR 365, CA. . . . 
S There may be other associated costs such as the effect on sales or orders of any bad publICIty surroundmg 
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is 5% and the potential cost to the employer is one hundred thousand pounds the total 
benefit to the employer of avoiding the risk is £5,000. On this scenario the benefit to the 
employer outweighs the detriment to the employees and, therefore, the tribunal would 
have to consider whether the benefit is disproportionate to the detrimel~t. If not, tribunal 
would have to go on to consider whether the employer could accommodate the cost. 
James v Eastleigh Borough Council6 
This is a case on the supply of goods and services under s 29 of the SDA rather than an 
-. ,; 
employment case but it provides a good illustration of the operation of the means test and 
the balance test. The Council operated a public swimming pool that gave free admission 
to individuals of statutory pensionable age ie 65 for men and 60 for women. In a key 
judgment the HL held that the Council's policy was direct rather than indirect 
discrimination. As a result, the policy was not capable of justification and, therefore, it 
was unlawful. What would be the impact of the justification defence for direct 
discrimination on the facts of this case? The reason for the Council's policy was 
described by the Vice Chancellor in the CA as being "to give benefits to those whose 
resources would be likely to have been reduced by retirement. The aim was to aid the 
needy, whether male or female, not to give preference to one sex over the other." As 
long as the aim of helping those people living on a pension is not extraneous to the 
function of a local authority the reason test would be satisfied. What about the causation 
test? The idea that all people over pensionable age are living on a pension is, of course, a 
stereotype. Not all people over pensionable age are retired and some people retire before 
this age. However, it is probably a fairly accurate stereotype and it is likely that the 
Council would be able to produce statistics to this effect. The means test might be more 
problematic. Is there a better way of determining whether a person is living on a pension 
other than relying on pensionable age? This issue was addressed by Lord Griffiths in his 
dissenting judgment in the HL. He took the view that pensionable age was "the only 
practical criterion to adopt" on the basis that: "It would be quite impossible to interrogate 
every person as to whether they were or were not living on a pension or to apply some 
other fonn of means test before admitting them to the swimming pool". 
the accident. 
6 [1990J ICR 554, HL. 
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Clearly it would not be impossible to interrogate every person who visits the pool 
as to whether they are living on a pension or not although it might be costly. Another 
alternative would be to issue some form of identify card to pensioners who have 
confirmed in writing that they are living on a pension or who have provided the 
necessary documentary evidence of their pensionable status. What is the result of 
applying the four means test factors set out above to the identity card option? First, 
granting free admission only to those who are actually living on a pension would remove 
any traces of direct discrimination (although there might still be a problem withindirect 
~ ~~: 
discrimination). Second, it would meet the Council's objective of assisting those living 
on reduced incomes by reason of retirement. Third, the scheme would be more costly 
than just asking people their age although the costs associated with issuing pensioners 
with an identity card (it would only have to be done once for each person) are unlikely to 
be large. Finally, the chances are that any additional costs could be accommodated by 
the Council relatively easily. Obviously, it all depends on how much the alternative 
scheme actually costs, but it seems unlikely that the Council could satisfy the means test. 
Assuming the Council could persuade the Court that there was no viable 
alternative, how would the balance test work? The detriment in this case is the cost of 
admission to the swimming pool (7Sp at the time) multiplied by the lumber of visits 
made by men between the ages of 60 and 64 over a given period. The benefit of the 
scheme is free admission for all those over pensionable age. This is a rare case where it 
is possible to put a figure on a social benefit, it is the cost of admittance multiplied by the 
number of visits by persons of pensionable age over the given period. 7 Unless for some 
reason the swimming pool in question is particularly popular with men between the ages 
of 60 and 64 the benefit is almost certain to outweigh the detriment by a substantial , 
margin. Thus, the benefit would be disproportionate to the loss and the balance test 
would come down on the side of the Council. 
Eoe v MRM Distributions plc8 
The respondent in this case was a distribution and market research company 
commissioned by Proctor & Gamble to undertake door-to-door interviews in order to 
7 Arguably, some account should also be taken of men between the ages of 60 and 64 who would have 
attended the swimming pool but who are deterred by the cost of admission. 
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ascertain customer preferences for vanous household items including tampons and 
sanitary protection products. Research undertaken by the respondent showed that for 
questions relating to sanitary protection products, men tended to get a refusal rate of 21 % 
and women a refusal rate of 11 %. On the basis of this research, the respondent placed 
requests with the Employment Service for women only door-to-door interviewers. The 
EOe complained about the advertisements and the respondent tried, unsuccessfully, to 
defend the case under the genuine occupational qualification defence in s 7 of the SDA. 
What would have been the impact of the justification defence in thj~ case? 
Presumably the reason put forward by the respondent would have been a straight 
productivity argument: when it comes to door-to-door market research about sanitary 
products, women are more efficient than men because they illicit a higher response rate. 
The second stage of the defence is the causation test. Can the employer prove that there 
is a causal link between sex and productivity. Assuming the research undertaken by the 
respondent was accurate, this is an example of a relatively accurate sex stereotype. The 
respondent is able to show that on average, men get a higher refusal rate than women. 
Thus, in this case the employer would be able to establish a causal link between the 
offending measure (women only interviewers) and the reason put forward by the 
employer (increased productivity). 
The third element is the means test. Can the employer show that there was no 
other non-discriminatory means of achieving its objective? Again, the important point 
here is that the employer is relying on a sex stereotype and the response rates given are 
only averages. Therefore, some men will be as effective or possibly e\ en more effective 
than the average woman. The question is whether it is possible for the employer to 
identify during the recruitment process those men and women who are likely to get high 
response rates. In other words, is there individuating information available about the 
prospective employees? No doubt the ability to get women to talk about personal and 
intimate matters such as their use of sanitary protection products is a skill that is more 
difficult to measure than other work related skills such as the ability to do simple 
arithmetic. It is possible that it can be measured in an interview or role play situation. 
Alternatively, the employer may be able to demonstrate that it is impossible to tell 
whether a person will get a high response rate until he or she has been trained and sent 
8 EOR Discrimination Case Law Digest No 25, P 4. 
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out on some dummy runs. Assume that the most viable alternative option is to use a 
combination of special interviews and dummy runs. The tribunal then has to apply the 
four factors relevant to the means test. First, to what extent would the alternative option 
remove the direct discrimination? In this case the alternative option would remove it 
completely. Second, to what extent does the alternative option deliv~r the employer's 
objective? This would all depend on whether the option is a good predictor of response 
rates or not. The employer's objective would only be met if the alternative option is a 
better predictor than the stereotype. Third, the additional financial costs of the option . 
... ,.~ 
Obviously, the option is going to be more expensive than the normal recruitment 
procedure. No doubt, the employer would be able to put a figure on exactly how much 
more expensIve. Finally, there is the extent of the employer's financial and other 
resources and its ability to accommodate the extra cost. Without more information it is 
impossible to tell what the outcome of the means test would be but the key factor is 
likely to be the additional costs of the alternative option. 
The final element is the balance test. Does the notional detriment to the 
employee outweigh the benefit to the employer? The detriment to the employee is a lost 
job opportunity. It the context of a request for employees placed with the Employment 
Service and no actual candidates for the job, it is extremely difficult to put a figure on 
this notional detriment. One rather unsophisticated way to do it would be to use the 
average length of time that a male with similar qualifications is unemployed in that area. 
Thus, if the average time spent unemployed is two months and the annual salary is 
twelve thousand pounds the detriment per job would be two thousand pounds. Balanced 
against this is the benefit to the employer. The research undertaken by the employer 
indicates that women tend to get a refusal rate of 11 % and men a refusal rate of 21 %. 
This means that in order to get a hundred successful responses the average woman has to 
knock on 112 doors and the average man on 127 doors. How many extra days or hours 
of work this adds up to depends on how long it takes to knock on a door and get a refusal 
and the number of successful responses required. Assume, for the sake of simplicity, that 
the average man takes a week longer to get the requisite number of successful responses 
than the average woman. Broadly speaking, the benefit to the employer of the existing 
policy is the saving of one week's wages. On this scenario, the detriment would 
outweigh the benefit and the employer's policy of recruiting only female interviewers 
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would not be justified. However, the figures could easily be reversed with the benefit to 
the employer outweighing the detriment, particularly if the tribunal reached the view that 
any potential candidates for the job would be unlikely to be unemployed for any 
substantial period of time. In which case the tribunal would have to go on and consider 
whether the benefit is disproportionate to the detriment and, if not, whether the employer 
could accommodate the cost. 
OVERLAP WITH EXISTING LEGISLATIVE EXCEPTIONS 
The overlap between the existing legislative exceptions and the proposed justification 
defence is considered below. In most cases the extent of the overlap is determined by the 
reason element of the justification defence. If the employer can identify a reason that 
relates to the operation of the business or organisation there is at least scope for the 
justification defence to apply. On the other hand, if the rationale underlying the 
objective is wholly extraneous to the employer's organisation there is no possibility of 
the defence applying. As a result, the examination of the overlap will concentrate on the 
first element of the justification defence, namely the reason test. 
Genuine occupational qualification 
There is a considerable overlap between the justification defence and the genume 
occupational qualification exceptions in s 7 of the SDA. The exceptions in s 7 can be 
grouped under four headings namely artistic licence, decency, social utility and financial 
considerations (see chapter 4). The first heading, artistic licence, allows producers and 
directors to discriminate on the ground of sex in casting decisions. Given that the 
function of the organisation is entertainment, it should not be too difficult for the 
employer to satisfy the reason test on the basis that a woman/man in a particular role 
would improve the artistic quality of the production. 
Some of the situations covered by the decency exceptions would be covered by 
the justification defence. For example, an employer would probably be able to establish 
a business need for employing a female assistant in the fitting room of a lingerie shop. 
On the other hand, the exception for communal accommodation could be more 
problematic. An employer can refuse to hire a woman/man on the basis that there is no 
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separate sleeping accommodation available and it would be unreasonable for the 
employer to equip the premises with the necessary facilities. Under the justification 
defence the employer would have to show some genuine need for keeping the 
accommodation single sex. Unless the employees refuse to work if they have to share a 
room with someone of the opposite sex, it is difficult to see how the employer benefits 
from single sex accommodation. Thus, it would be difficult to bring this particular 
decency exception within the scope of the justification defence. 
Most, if not all, of the social utility exceptions could be covered-..~by the 
justification defence. It would not be difficult for a police force to justify using a male 
police officer in order to infiltrate a paedophile gang as this is clearly a reason that relates 
to the operation of the organisation. With personal services, in most cases the employer 
should be able to identify an operational need. In these cases the problem area is more 
likely to be the causation test and establishing that one sex is indeed bet~er at the job. All 
of the financial exceptions are likely to be covered by the justification defence. If 
anything, the justification defence is likely to go much wider than the financial 
exceptions in s 7 because it allows employers to use sex appeal in order to increase 
profits. For example, an employer might be able to justify hiring waitresses rather than 
waiters if it can show that waitresses sell more drinks. 
Positive action 
Under domestic law, the positive action exceptions in the SDA are restricted to outreach 
programmes. Employers are allowed to encourage an under-represented sex to apply for 
jobs, including the provision of relevant training. The scope of the European positive 
action exception in article 2(4) of the ETD is less clear but recent case law suggests that 
reverse discrimination is allowed provided that a number of conditions are met. Neither 
of these exceptions would be covered by the justification defence. This is because the 
rationale of these fonns of positive action is to improve the position of a currently 
disadvantaged sex. Thus under domestic law an engineering company can provide , 
training to female potential engineers in order to increase the number of women in its 
workforce. Under European law the same employer would be able to prefer a female 
candidate over an equally qualified male candidate. The result of the exceptions is to 
increase the number of women engineers in the workforce. However, this result is not 
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something that benefits the employer. It makes no difference to the operation of the 
business whether the engineers are female or male (unless for some reason one sex is 
better at the job in which case sex is a genuine occupational defence and it is not really a 
case of positive action). As a result, the employer cannot justify the difference in 
treatment on the basis of a reason that relates to the operation of the business. The 
rationale for positive action is a wider benefit to the community. On this basis, instances 
of positive action will never be covered by the justification defence. 
It would be possible to expand the justification defence in order to cover ,cases of 
positi ve action. F or example, the reason test could be rewritten to incorporate as a 
potential reason equal representation of the sexes at all levels of the workforce. This 
would allow an employer to recruit a woman/man for a job solely on the basis that one 
sex is under represented in that particular role. The problem with expanding the 
justification defence in this way is that at the balance stage of the defence, the employer 
would have to weigh the detriment to the applicant (in this case a lost job opportunity) 
against the benefit to the wider community of equalising the representation of the sexes 
at all levels of the workforce. Not only is the benefit impossible to quantify in monetary 
terms, but it is an inherently political decision that is unsuited to the .' --:dicial role. The 
extent to which reverse discrimination is permitted is probably a matter that should be 
determined by parliament rather than individual judges. On this basis, it will always be 
necessary to have a separate exception for positive action schemes. 
Pregnancy 
With pregnancy and maternity it IS important to remember that more favourable 
treatment gives rise to a claim of indirect rather than direct discrimination. 9 This is 
because the state of not being pregnant is a distribution characteristic. If an employer 
decides to give all woman who have a baby an extra week of annual leave, both women 
and men lose out. This means that even in the absence of any pregnancy and maternity 
exceptions, more favourable treatment has the potential to be rendered lawful under the 
justification defence for indirect sex discrimination. 
9 Although it should be noted that this is not the approach taken by. the. E~J ,:hich equates. more. favourable 
treatment on the grounds of pregnancy or maternity as direct sex dlscnmmatIOn: see the dISCUSSIOn of 
pregnancy and maternity in chapter 8. 
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Thus, the potential area of overlap with the model justification defence for direct 
discrimination is restricted to less favourable treatment. As discussed in chapter 4, the 
primary rationale for less favourable treatment is health and safety. An employer only 
has an interest in protecting the health and safety of its employees if it benefits the 
business in some way, although there will usually be a connection between the two 
simply because an employee who is ill is also likely to be absent from work. Thus there 
will be some overlap between the model justification defence and the existing exception 
for less favourable treatment on the grounds of pregnancy or maternity. 
Occupational pension funds 
There are two exceptions in the area of occupational pension funds, namely bridging 
pensions and actuarial factors. The rationale for bridging pension is to compensate male 
employees for the discrimination in the state pension scheme th,at arises from the 
difference in state pensionable age. This is not a rationale that relates to the operation of 
the employer's business. In fact, bridging pensions are more akin to a form of positive 
action and so, for the same reasons that are set out above, employers would not be able to 
justify the payment of bridging pensions. As indicated in chapter 4, the rationale 
underlying the use of single sex actuarial factors appears to be the risk of market 
distortion and the impact that that could have on women buying annuity contracts. The 
risk of market distortion is not a reason that relates to the operation of the employer's 
business and, therefore, the defence would not apply. This whole i~sue is covered in 
more detail in chapter 8. 
CONCLUSION 
The model justification defence set out in this chapter is a four stage test. First, the 
employer has to identify a reason for the difference in treatment that relates to the 
operation of the business (or, if the provision being challenged is enshrined in legislation, 
the Government must identify a legitimate social aim). Second, the employer must 
establish that there is a causal link between the discriminatory treatment and the 
obj ective of the employer. Thus, the employer must prove that tpe discriminatory 
treatment complained of actually has a beneficial impact on the business. Third the 
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employer has to prove that there is no less discriminatory means of achieving the same 
objective. In determining whether it would be reasonable for the employer to take an 
alternative course of action, the tribunal must take into account a specified list of factors. 
Finally, and assuming the employer is successful on the first three elements of the 
defence, the tribunal has to balance the benefit to the employer against the detriment to 
the employee. In order to do this the tribunal must assign monetary values to the benefit 
and detriment. While the assignation of monetary values may appear to be overly 
complicated, it is the only way of undertaking an objective balance of these two factors. 
'/ {" 
The balance test consists of three parts. First, the tribunal assesses whether the detriment 
to the employee outweighs the benefit to the employer. If it does, the applicant wins. If 
not, the next stage is to determine if the benefit is disproportionately large compared to 
the detriment. If so, the balance test comes down on the side of the employer. If not, the 
tribunal considers the ability of the employer to accommodate the additional cost 
associated with desisting from the discriminatory behaviour. If it is reasonable for the 
employer to accommodate the cost, the employee succeeds. 
In the case of Birds Eye Walls Ltd v RobertslO the Commission suggested that it 
might be possible to justify direct discrimination where the aim of the respondent is 
substantive equality. However, the model defence does not go this far. The fact that the 
reason must relate to the employer's business means that it does not apply to cases of 
reverse discrimination. This is because to do so would involve the courts in inherently 
political decisions. However, it should be noted that it would be possible to extend the 
model defence so that it covers instances of reverse discrimination by allowing 
employers to put forward as a reason the aim of substantive equality between the sexes. 
One of the main concerns about the model defence is likely to be that it will open 
the flood gates to direct discrimination by employers. However, as the three examples 
illustrate, the four stage test is a very difficult hurdle for employers to overcome. It will 
only succeed where there is a real difference between the sexes that is relevant in the 
work context and where it is unreasonable for the employer to accommodate the 
difference. In particular, the model defence is unlikely to permit much gender 
stereotyping. This is because the only stereotypes that are likely to get through are those 
where it is not reasonably possible to access individuating information. In the vast 
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majority of cases it will be relatively easy for an employer to tell whether an individual 
employee has a particular stereotypical characteristic and, therefore, under the means 
test, there is likely to be a less discriminatory way for the employer to meet its objective 
than by relying on a sex stereotype. 
Finally, there is some overlap between the application of the model defence and 
the existing legislative exceptions. The main areas of overlap are likely to be the genuine 
occupational qualification defence and less favourable treatment for pregnancy and 
maternity. This is because in both of these areas, the rationale underlying the ~~ception 
relates to the operation of the employer's business. There is likely to be no or little 
overlap with the exceptions that apply to occupational pension schemes and the 
exception for positive action. This is because the rationales underlying these exceptions 
are extraneous to the operation of the individual employer. 
10 [1994] IRLR29, EeJ. 
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JUDICIAL EXCEPTIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter looks at some of the problem areas that have arisen in the case law on direct 
sex discrimination due to the lack of an applicable legislative exception. The four areas 
considered are pregnancy and maternity, bridging pensions, actuarial factors:.and dress 
codes. In each of these areas it is arguable that the courts have used flawed and illogical 
reasoning in order to avoid a finding of direct sex discrimination thereby creating what 
can be described as a series of judicial exceptions. In relation to each area the 
justification defence formulated in chapter 7 is applied to the cases in order to see 
whether the outcome would have been any different and thus assess further the impact of 
the model defence. 
PREGNANCY AND MATERNITY 
The domestic courts initially accepted the argument that the SDA does not cover 
detrimental treatment on the ground of pregnancy or maternity. In Turley v. Allders 
Department Stores Ltd} the EAT held that since it was not possible to make a comparison 
between a pregnant woman and a man, discrimination against a pregnant woman was not 
unlawful. However, the EAT chose not to follow that line of argument in the later case 
of Hayes v. Malleable Working Men's Club and Institute. 2 Instead the EAT held that a 
pregnant woman could be compared with a sick man off work for a similar period of 
time. In other words, the circumstances to be compared were the consequences of 
pregnancy, ie the woman's unavailability for work, rather than the pregnancy itself. The 
domestic courts were able to use the device of the sick man comparison to ensure a level 
of protection for pregnant women while at the same time limiting the financial burdens 
on employers. 
1 [1980] IRLR 4, EAT. 
2 [1985] IRLR 367, EAT. For a critique of the sick man comparison see: Lacey N, Dismissal by reason of 
pregnancy, (1986) 15 ILJ 43 and Fredman S, Women and the law, (1997) p 186. 
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The whole concept of the sick man comparison was rejected by the EeJ in the 
case of Dekker v. Stichting. 3 In a landmark ruling the EeJ held that because pregnancy 
is a unique sex characteristic, it gives rise to a claim of direct sex discrimination 
irrespective of the treatment of a sick man. The facts were that the applicant was selected 
as the most suitable candidate for the post of training instructor. Under Dutch law 
employees absent from work due to illness or pregnancy are entitled to receive a certain 
percentage of salary for up to two years. However, the fund which insures employers 
against this risk is entitled to refuse payment in respect of an employee who,.:gecomes 
unable to work within six months of the cover being taken out if the inability to work 
was foreseeable at the time at which the cover commenced. The employer was 
concerned that the applicant's pregnancy would be regarded as a foreseeable event. 
Without payment from the fund the employer would be unable to recruit a replacement 
and so the applicant was not appointed. The EeJ held that the employer's decision was 
contrary to the ETD. 
As employment can only be refused because of pregnancy to a woman, such a 
refusal is direct discrimination on grounds of sex. A refusal to employ because of 
the financial consequences of absence connected with pregnancy must be deemed 
to be based principally on the fact of the pregnancy. Such discrimination cannot 
be justified by the financial detriment in the case of recruitment of a pregnant 
woman suffered by the employer during her maternity leave. 
Three important points come out of the Dekker judgment. First, the EeJ held that a 
refusal to hire on the ground of pregnancy is direct discrimination because pregnancy is a 
unique sex characteristic. Second, in determining whether the reason for the detrimental 
treatment is pregnancy you cannot disassociate the consequences of pregnancy, ie the 
absence from work, from the pregnancy itself. Third, direct discrimination cannot be 
justified on economic grounds. 
What are the logical implications of the Dekker judgment? First, a failure to 
appoint is just one example of the detrimental treatment that can befall a pregnant 
woman or a woman on maternity leave. There is no logical reason to distinguish a 
failure to appoint from any other form of detrimental treatment. This means that all 
detrimental treatment on the grounds of pregnancy or maternity should be unlawful 
3 [1991] IRLR 27, ECl Noted by Ellis E, 'Discrimination on the ground of pregnancy in EEC Law' 
[1991] PL 159. For an overview of the current state of the law on maternity and pregnancy see: Cox S, 
'Maternity and sex discrimination law: where are we now?' EOR No 75, September/October 1997, p 23. 
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unless it is covered by a statutory exception. Second, according to Dekker it is not 
possible to disassociate pregnancy from its consequences. The consequences of 
pregnancy include a period of absence from work in the form of maternity leave and, in 
some cases, a period of sickness absence. Thus, the logical consequences of the Dekker 
judgment are that it would be unlawful to subject a woman to any detriment either on the 
ground of pregnancy per se or any pregnancy related absence from work. In practical 
terms this means that it would be unlawful to dismiss or refuse to appoint a woman on 
the grounds that she is pregnant, on maternity leave or absent from work;.gue to a 
pregnancy related illness. It would also be unlawful to reduce the pay of a woman on 
maternity level or to cut her benefits in any way. The EeJ has been willing to follow the 
logic of Dekker to some extent. For example, in the Thibault4 case the EeJ held that it is 
unlawful to refuse a woman an annual assessment and, therefore, the opportunity of 
promotion to a higher grade, because she has been absent from work on maternity leave. 
However, in other areas the EeJ has departed from its decision in Dekker and has created 
what can arguably be explained as a series of judicial exceptions. 
The first judicial exception arises in the context of dismissal on the ground of a 
pregnancy related illness. If, as the EeJ held in Dekker, it is not possible to disassociate 
pregnancy from its consequences it should be unlawful to dismiss a WGlnan because of a 
pregnancy related absence whenever it occurs. The EeJ has been willing to accept this 
argument but only to the extent that the illness occurs between the beginning of the 
pregnancy and the end of maternity leave. The EeJ has refused to apply the same 
protection to pregnancy related illness that occurs after the period of maternity leave has 
ended. The extent of the protection for pregnancy related illness was recently confirmed 
by the ECJ in the case of Brown v. Rentokill Ltd. 5 The applicant was dismissed after she 
was absent from work for 26 weeks with a series of pregnancy related illnesses in 
accordance with the employer's rule that any sickness absence in excess of 26 weeks 
would result in dismissal. All of the absence took place before the commencement of her 
maternity leave. The ECJ held that the dismissal was directly discrimin~tory. 
4 Caisse Nationale D 'Assurance Viellesse Des Travailleurs Salaries v Thibault [1998] IRLR 399, ECJ, 
Noted by Caracciolo Di Torella E, 'Thibault 'in context': exiting the maze?' (1998) 27 ILJ 373. 
5 [1998] IRLR 445, ECl. Noted by Wynn M, 'Pregnancy discrimination: equality, protection or 
reconciliation?' (1999) 62 MLR 435. 
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[DJismissal of a female worker during pregnancy for absences due to incapacity 
for work resulting from her pregnancy is linked to the occurrence of risks 
inherent in pregnancy and must therefore be regarded as essentially based on the 
fact of pregnancy. Such a dismissal can affect only women and therefore 
constitutes direct discrimination on grounds of sex. (para 24) 
In reaching this decision the ECJ did not follow its earlier judgment in Handels-Og-
Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund v. Dansk handel & Service (the Larsson case)6 that 
pregnancy related illness which occurs during pregnancy can be taken into account in 
determining whether a woman's absence from work warrants dismissal. (In Larsson the 
applicant was dismissed as a result of her absences both during pregnancy and~fter her 
maternity leave.) However, the ECJ chose not to overturn its earlier decision in Hertz v. 
Dansk! that there is no protection for absences that occur after the period of maternity 
leave has finished. Thus, in Brown the ECJ confirmed that: 
... where pathological conditions caused by pregnancy or childbirth arise after the 
end of maternity leave, they are covered by the general rules applicable in the 
event of illness (see, to that effect, Hertz, cited above, paragraphs 16 and 17). In 
such circumstances, the sole question is whether a female worker's absences, 
following maternity leave, caused by her incapacity for work brought on by such 
disorders, are treated in the same way as a male worker's absences, of the same 
duration, caused by incapacity for work; if they are, there is no discrimination on 
grounds of sex. (para 26) 
It is difficult to identify any logical distinction between a pregnancy related 
illness that occurs during pregnancy or maternity leave and pregnancy illness that occurs 
at a later date, particularly in a case where the illness starts in pregnancy and continues 
after the end of maternity leave. The logical position is that a woman dismissed for a 
pregnancy related illness is dismissed because of her pregnancy irrespective of when the 
illness occurs.8 The Court was clearly influenced by the difficulties which would be 
faced by employers if they were unable to dismiss women absent from work with 
pregnancy related illnesses for extensive periods of time after the end of their maternity 
leave. In Hertz the applicant was absent from work for 100 days over the course of a 
year. As Advocate General Darmon pointed out in his Opinion, the issue in the Hertz 
6 [1997] IRLR 643, ECJ. 
7 [1991] IRLR 31, ECJ. 
S See Boch C, Case C-32/93, (1996) 33 CMLR 545 at 559 and Banforth N, 'The treatment of pregnancy 
under European Community sex discrimination law' (1995) 1 EPL 59 at 61. 
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case was "the difficult reconciliation between the principle of equal treatment and the 
requirements of economic life".9 
The result of the Hertz and Brown decisions is that pregnancy related illness that 
occurs after the end of maternity leave is to be treated the same as any other sickness 
absence. This means that the level of protection afforded to a woman is dependant on the 
sickness absence scheme of her particular employer. If the employer is willing to 
tolerate a high level of sickness absence, the woman will have a high level of protection. 
On the other hand, if the employer is unwilling to accommodate sickness absepce the 
level of protection will be low. 
What would be the position if dismissal on the ground of a pregnancy related 
illness after maternity leave was treated as direct sex discrimination but there was a 
justification defence available? First, the employer would have to establish the reason 
for the dismissal. The reason put forward is likely to be a loss of pr~ductivity although 
the precise fonn of the lost productivity will depend on the actual job involved. Second, 
the employer has to satisfy the causation test, ie that the woman's absence actually results 
in the alleged loss of productivity. No doubt there will be cases where employers can 
show that the absence of a particular employee has a detrimental effect on the business. 
However, in other cases it may be possible for the employer to cover the woman's 
workload with no resulting loss of productivity and no, or only nominal, additional costs. 
(The only issue here is whether the woman should be dismissed - not whether she should 
be paid. The latter point would be the subj ect of a separate application of the 
justification defence.) Under the third element of the test the employer has to show that 
there is no other reasonable and less discriminatory means of achieving the same 
objective. Thus the employer would have to convince the tribunal that the problem of 
the woman's absence could not reasonably have been dealt with in some way other than 
dismissal eg a moving the woman to another job where her absence could be more easily 
covered or offering her a career break. Finally, the tribunal has to balance the detriment 
to the woman with the benefit to the employer of dismissing her. Assuming the woman 
is not receiving sick pay her detriment is likely to be her loss of salary from the time she 
9 Docksey suggests that Hertz was simply a bad test case to bring because the period of absence was too 
long and that it might have been differently decided if the applicant had been dismissed a few days or 
weeks after the end of her maternity leave period: Docksey C, 'The principle of equality between women 
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is well enough to return to work until she finds another job and, if the new job is lower 
paid, she may have a continuing loss of earnings. The benefit to the employer is an 
increase in productivity. It is possible that having applied all four elements of the test the 
tribunal finds that the woman's dismissal is indeed justified because the loss of 
productivity caused by her absence outweighs her loss. However, it is a more difficult 
test for an employer to satisfy than just showing that the woman was treated in the same 
way as an other sick employee and it is, therefore, likely to afford pregnant women a 
higher level of protection. 
The second judicial exception concerns the right to sick pay for ~regnancy related 
illness. The extent to which women absent from work for a pregnancy related illness are 
entitled to sick pay was recently considered by the EeJ in the Pedersen case. 10 Under 
Danish employment law, employees absent from work due to illness are entitled to full 
pay and the employer is then reimbursed by the state. By contrast, pregnant women 
absent from work for a pregnancy related illness more than three months before the 
expected date of confinement were not entitled to any pay from the employer but had a 
right to pre-maternity benefits paid by the state. The EeJ held that the difference in 
treatment between pregnancy related illness and other illness was contrary to Article 141 
unless the maternity benefits payable were equal to the amount of pay. 11 
[The] fact that a woman is deprived, before the beginning of her maternity leave, 
of her full pay when her incapacity for work is the result vf a pathological 
condition connected with the pregnancy must be regarded as treatment based 
essentially on the pregnancy and thus as discriminatory. (para 35) 
However, the EeJ went on to distinguish between absences from work due to a 
pathological condition or to protect the unborn child and other absences based on routine 
pregnancy related inconveniences. In the latter case, the EeJ held that there is no 
obligation on the employer to pay the woman her salary. 
[In] contrast to the first three situations outlined by the national court, the 
pregnant woman is absent from her work before the beginning of her maternity 
leave not because of a pathological condition or of any special risks for the 
unborn child giving rise to an incapacity for work attested by a medical certificate 
but by reason either of routine pregnancy-related inconveniences or of mere 
and men as a fundamental right under Community law' (1991) 20 IL] 258 at 275. 
10 [1999] IRLR 55, Eel 
11 For a similar but much earlier decision by the domestic courts see: Coyne v. Exports Credits Guarantee 
Department [1981] IRLR 51. The tribunal found that the exclusion of maternity related illness from the 
employer's sick pay scheme was a breach of the EPA. 
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medical rec.o~endation, without there being any incapacity for work in either of 
those two sltuatlOns. 
Consequently, the fact that the employee forfeits some, or even all, of her 
salary by reason of such absences which are not based on an incapacity for work 
cannot be regarded as treatment based essentially on the pregnancy but rather as 
based on the choice made by the employee not to work. 
This finding was made by the Ee] in response to a hypothetical situation and, therefore, 
there is no concrete example of its application or what is meant by "routine pregnancy-
related inconveniences". However, it seems that the question referred by the national 
court was based on a difference in entitlement to pre-maternity benefits. According to a 
circular from the Social Affairs Appeal Committee that is set out in the Opinion of the 
Advocate General, not all pregnancy related illness gives rise to a right to pre-maternity 
benefits. The circular states that: 
In certain situations there is no right to benefit at all. This applies to general 
inconvenience associated with the normal development 0: pregnancy, not 
resulting in incapacity for work, such as nausea, malaise, vomiting, slight 
anaemia or very slight increase in blood pressure, and to cases where absence 
from work is based on a doctor's certificate advising rest on grounds other than a 
pathological situation in the strict sense or particular risks to the unborn child. 
Despite the Court's comment that these absences are based on a choice by the employee 
not to work, the circular indicates that the woman's absence will be supported by a 
doctor's certificate advising her not to work. The EC] appears to be drawing a line 
between the normal risks of pregnancy such as tiredness and morning sickness and more 
unusual or severe medical conditions. 12 It is not clear what the basis for this distinction is 
given that in both cases the woman is unable to work due to illness. Furthermore, it is 
not clear why the normal risks of pregnancy should be treated any differently from any 
other kind of ill-health. It may be that it was not the intention of the EC] to make this 
distinction and that it only intended to exclude women capable of working who choose to 
stay at home and who are not certified as sick by a doctor. However, the judgment does 
appear to go further than this and to the extent that it creates a distinction between 
women certified as incapable of working because of the normal risk of pregnancy and 
women with a more unusual or serious medical condition, the EC] seems to have created 
12 The possibility of distinguishing between the normal risks ofpregna~cy and other med~cal.conditions 
was fIrst raised by the Advocate General in the Hertz case (see above) m the context of dlsrrussal for a 
pregnancy related illness although the distinction was not expressly adopted by the Court. 
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an exception to the general principle that any detrimental treatment on the ground of 
pregnancy constitutes unlawful direct discrimination. 
If the situation is that women absent from work because of a normal pregnancy 
related illness are not entitled to sick pay, this exception is unlikely to be justified in the 
vast majority of cases. The employer's reason is clear enough, the cost of paying a 
woman who is not at work and the causal link is self evident. Also, there is no obvious 
way of achieving the same result, ie the saving in wages, other than by not paying the 
woman her salary. In relation to the fourth element of the test the detriment to the 
woman is the same as the benefit to the employer, in both cases the detrimentlbenefit is 
the woman's wages. However, the key point comes in the fifth element of the test and 
the ability of the employer to pay. By their very nature the normal risks of pregnancy are 
unlikely to result in long periods of sickness absence. Furthermore, many employers 
have a sick pay scheme that pays· employees absent for at least short periods of time. 
Thus, most employers will be able to accommodate the cost of paying sick pay to a 
woman absent from work with a normal pregnancy related illness. There are likely to be 
only a few cases of very small employers with no sick pay scheme where a refusal to pay 
will be justified. 
The third judicial exception concerns the right of employers to reduce a woman's 
pay during her period of maternity leave. A period of absence from work is an inevitable 
consequence of pregnancy and childbirth. How long that period has to be will differ 
from woman to woman. In some cases it may be only a few days and in other cases it 
may be several weeks. If a child is fully breast fed the necessary absence from work 
could be many months. For reasons of certainty and consistency it is preferable to adopt 
a fixed period rather than having a different period for each mother. Given that 14 weeks 
is the minimum period of maternity leave allowed to all women regardless of service 
under the PWD it is sensible to adopt the 14 week period for present purposes although it 
should be noted that this is an arbitrary figure and the appropriate period is a matter that 
is open to debate. 13 Following the logic of Dekker, if absence from work is an inevitable 
consequence of pregnancy, then detrimental treatment on the basis of that absence should 
13 For a discussion of the problems associated with the EeJ's failure to consider the. appropriate pe~od of 
maternity leave see: Kilpatrick C, 'How long is a piece of string? Europe~ regulatIOn of the post-bIrth 
period' in Hervey T and O'Keeffe D eds, Sex equality in the European UnlOn, chp 6 (1996) at p 94. 
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be treated as detriment on the grounds of pregnancy itself. On this basis it should be 
unlawful to reduce a woman's pay because she is absent from work or to stop any other 
employment rights such as the accrual of holiday pay during the 14 weeks of maternity 
leave. However, it would not be direct discrimination to subject a woman to a detriment 
during any extended period of maternity leave over and above the 14 weeks.14 This is 
because the extended period of leave is not an inevitable consequence of pregnancy or 
maternity but represents an additional right given to women under the maternity 
derogation in article 2(3) of the ETD. Thus, it would not be discriminatory to I~duce a 
woman's pay after the first 14 weeks or stop her right to accrue annualleave. 15 
The ECl refused to follow the logic of Dekker when it wa~ asked to give a 
preliminary ruling on maternity pay in the case of Gillespie v. Northern Health and 
Social Services Board. 16 The NICA asked whether under Article 141, the EPD or the 
ETD, an employer can reduce a woman's pay during maternity leave" The ECl held that 
the benefit paid during maternity leave is pay and therefore falls within the scope of 
Article 141 and the EPD but not the ETD. Completely contradicting its earlier decisions 
in Dekker and Webb the ECl went on to hold that there is no discrimination under Article 
141 because a pregnant woman is not in a position comparable with a man. 
It is well-settled that discrimination involves the application of different rules to 
comparable situations or the application of the same rule to different situations 
(see, in particular, Finanzamant Koln-Alstadt v. Schumacker, C-278/93 [1995] 
ECR 1-225, paragraph 30). 
The present case is concerned with women taking maternity leave 
provided for by national legislation. They are in a special position which requires 
them to be afforded special protection, but which is not comparable either with 
that of a man or with that or a woman actually at work. 
The EeJ did hold that under Article 141 the amount of money paid must not be "so low 
as to undermine the purpose of maternity leave, namely the protection of women before 
and after giving birth." However, the ECl found that there was nothing to suggest that 
the amount of benefit granted was inadequate in this case. 
14 In Boyle v EOC [1998J IRLR 717, the ECJ confirmed that that it is not directly discriminatory to stop 
the accrual of holiday entitlement during the extended period of maternity leave. See also Whiting v. 
Harrow and Hillingdon Health Care NHS Trust (1995) 26 July, Case No 61664/93/LhIB, reported in 
Palmer C, Maternity Rights, (1996) p 57. 
15 Boyle v EOC [1998J IRLR 717, ECJ. 
16 [1996] IRLR 214, ECl. 
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The first criticism that can be made of the ECJ's decision is that the facts of 
Schumacker are not comparable to the facts of Gillespie. In Schumacker Gennan 
legislation required that tax payers were treated differently depending on whether they 
resided within the national territory. The right to have tax assessed at a preferential rate 
only applied to residents. The EC] was asked to decide whether the provision was 
compatible with Article 48 which requires the abolition of discrimination based on 
nationality between workers of the Member States. The Court noted that the rules were 
applied on the basis of residency and not nationality and, therefore, any discrimination 
""< 
was indirect. The Court then went on to find that as a general rule, it is not 
discriminatory to treat residents and non-residents differently because their 
circumstances are not comparable. Usually, income is concentrated in the place of 
residence and income received in a country of non-residence is only a part of total 
income. As a result, it is usually desirable that any preferential tax ~reatment is applied 
in the country of residence. However, in the present case the cotr:plainant received 
virtually all of his income in the country of non-residence and virtually no income in his 
country of residence. On this basis the Ee] held that the difference in treatment was not 
justified and the complainant should have the right to be assessed for tax on the same 
basis as a resident. Schumacker was a case of indirect discrimination against foreign 
workers. The similarity in circumstances between the complainant and Gennan nationals 
meant that the treatment complained of was not justified. It was not a case in which 
there was no discrimination because of a lack of comparable circumstances. While the 
EC] did set out the general principle that discrimination involves the application of 
different rules to comparable situations, that principle was not applied in the case. 
The EC] was clearly influenced by the provisions of the PWD which only 
requires employers to pay maternity pay at a level that is comparable with sick pay. As a 
result, there is no obligation on employers to retain women on maternity leave on full 
pay. It seems that the EC] was reluctant to create a right to full pay when Member States 
had recently decided against this course of action when agreeing the provisions of the 
PWD. 17 
17 See the conunents of Me GlYIll1 C, 'Equality, maternity and questions of pay' (1996) 21 ELR 327. 
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The women in Gillespie had a separate claim relating to their level of maternity 
pay. Maternity pay was calculated on the basis of average weekly pay over a two month 
period preceding the maternity leave. While the women were on maternity pay there was 
a backdated pay rise. The employers did not recalculate the amount of the maternity pay 
to take account of this pay rise. The ECJ held that this did amount to direct 
discrimination. 
The benefit paid during maternity leave is equivalent to a weekly payment 
calculated on the basis of the average pay received by the wvrkers at the time 
when she was actually working and which was paid to her week by vVtiek, just 
like any other worker. The principle of non-discrimination therefore requires that 
a woman who is still linked to her employer by a contract of employment or by 
an employment relationship during maternity leave must, like any other worker, 
benefit from any pay rise, even if backdated, which is awarded between the 
beginning of the period covered by reference pay and the end of maternity leave. 
To deny such an increase to a woman on maternity leave would discriminate 
against her purely in her capacity as a worker since, had she not been pregnant, 
she would have received the pay rise. 
It is difficult to understand the distinction drawn by the ECJ between maternity pay and 
full pay. In both cases the comparison is between a woman who is on maternity leave 
and a man who is at work. It is inherently illogical to argue that the circumstances can be 
comparable in one case but not in the other. The ECJ made mucli.i of the fact that 
maternity pay is calculated on the basis of the wages the woman was receiving before her 
maternity leave. However, had the ECJ held that women are entitled to full pay during 
maternity leave the amount of pay would also have been calculated on the basis of 
earnings prior to maternity leave. 
The EeJ has recently used the same lack of comparison argument in the test case 
of Doyle v EOC18 brought by six employees of the EOC in order to challenge various 
aspects of their contractual maternity rights. One of the questions referred to the ECJ 
was whether it is contrary to Article 141 to have a clause in a contract that requires a 
woman to repay any contractual maternity pay in excess of the statutory minimum if she 
fails to return to work for more than a month after the end of her maternity leave. This is 
despite the fact that no similar obligation is placed on workers taking other forms of paid 
leave such as sick leave. The Eel held that the term is not contrary to Article 141 
because it is not possible to make a comparison between a woman on maternity leave and 
18 [1998] IRLR 717, Eel. 
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a person on sick leave. This is an extension to the Gillespie decision because if there is 
no obligation on employers to pay a woman more than the statutory minimum during the 
period of maternity leave, it must also be the case that if an employer chooses to make 
additional payments it should be free to attach conditions to the payments. 19 
To what extent would employers be able to reduce a woman's pay during the first 
14 weeks ofmatemity pay if the justification defence applied? The reasoning behind not 
paying a woman on maternity leave is the same as the reasoning behind not paying a 
woman sick pay: it is simply the cost to the employer of paying someone whQ is not 
'{ 
actually doing any work. Thus, as with sick pay, the first three elements of the test 
should present no problems for the employer. The detriment to the employer will be the 
same as the detriment to the employee ie the amount of the woman's wages. Once again, 
the key factor is likely to be the ability of the employer to pay. In the Pedersen case the 
Ee] held that there would be no discrimination if the benefits paid ,to a woman absent 
from work for a pregnancy related illness were the same as her salary. There is no 
logical reason why maternity leave should be treated any differently from sickness 
absence and so account can be taken of any benefits paid to the woman during her period 
of maternity leave such as statutory maternity pay (SMP). Thus, in detennining whether 
the employer has the ability to pay the issue is not whether the employer can pay the full 
amount of wages but whether the employer can afford to top up the statutory benefits to 
which the woman is entitled so that taken together she receives the same amount as she 
would have received had she not been on maternity leave. At the moment, women with 
26 week's service immediately preceding the 14th week before the expected week of 
confinement are entitled to SMP of nine tenths of their salary for the first six weeks 
followed by a flat rate payment (set at £54 per week from 7 April 1996) for a further 12 
weeks. 20 Women who do not satisfy the requirements for SMP may be entitled to a 
maternity allowance which is paid weekly by the benefits agency for a period of 18 
19 The lack of comparison argument was subsequently used by the CA in Clark v. Secretary of State for 
Employment [1996] 1RLR 578 although the tribunal declined to follow the lead of the ECJ in Iverson v. 
P&O European Ferries (Dover) Ltd case No.57265/95, IDS Brief 577, p 17. 
20 Social Security and Benefits Act 1992, s 165. Small employers can deduct 100% of the gross SMP paid 
from their national insurance contributions plus an additional 5.5% of the SMP paid. All other employers 
can recover 92 % of the total SMP paid: Statutory Maternity Pay (Compensation of Employers) and 
Miscellaneous Amendment Regulations 1994, S1 no 1882. 
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weeks.
21 
Thus on a justification defence the question for the tribunal would be whether 
the employer can afford to top up the statutory benefits to which the woman is entitled 
for a period of 14 weeks or, if not for the whole 14 weeks, for a lesser period of time. 
Once again, any contractual sick pay scheme is likely to act as an indication of what the 
employer can afford. Thus, if an employer is willing to maintain a sid, employee on full 
pay for six months, it would be difficult for the same employer to argue that it could not 
afford to keep a woman on maternity leave on full pay for 14 weeks. It is difficult to 
predict how many employers would be obliged to maintain full pay during maternity 
'r'~ 
leave but given that under Gillespie women are entitled to no more than the equivalent of 
statutory sick pay during their maternity leave, the justification defence is likely to result 
in a significant improvement on the present position. 
The possibility of a fourth exception has been raised by the decision of the EC] in 
Webb v Emo Air Cargo (UK) Ltd. 22 The applicant was recruited to cover for another 
woman's maternity leave although it was anticipated that she would remain employed 
after the other woman's return to work. Shortly after starting her employment the 
applicant discovered that she was pregnant and was dismissed. The tribunal, EAT and 
CA all dismissed the applicant's claim of discrimination under the SDA on the basis that 
she was dismissed not because of her pregnancy but because of her unavailability for 
work during her period of maternity leave in circumstances where a man similarly 
unavailable would also have been dismissed. 
The HL referred to the EC] the question of whether under the ETD it is 
permissible to dismiss a pregnant woman because of her anticipated unavailability for 
work where the woman is engaged for an indefinite period. The EC] reiterated its 
judgment in Hertz that dismissal of a woman on the grounds of pregnancy is direct 
discrimination. The EC] went on to find that the: 
... dismissal of a pregnant woman recruited for an indefinite period cannot be 
justified on grounds relating to her inability to fulfil a fundamental condition of 
her employment contract. The availability of an employee is necessarily, for the 
employer, a precondition for the proper performance of the employment contract. 
However, the protection afforded by Community law to a woman during 
21 The payment ofmatemity allowance is governed by the Social Security (Maternity Allowance) 
Regulations 1987 S1 No 416. 
22 [1994] 1RLR 482, ECJ. Noted by Fredman S, 'Parenthood and the right to work' (1995) 111 LQR 220; 
Hare I, 'Pregnancy and sex discrimination' (1991) 20 ILJ 124 and Boch C, 'Case C-32/93' (1996) 33 
CMLR547. 
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pregnancy and after childbirth cannot be dependent on whether her presence at 
work d~rin~ mat~mity leave is essential to the proper functioning of the 
~nderta~Ing In whlCh she is employed. Any contrary interpretation would render 
Ineffectlve the provisions of the Directive. 
While reaffinning the general principle that dismissing a woman because of pregnancy is 
direct discrimination, the reference to women who are recruited for an indefinite period 
leaves open the possibility that the dismissal of a woman recruited on a definite contract 
may not be unlawful. 23 
The Commission argued that women on definite contracts should not be afforded 
similar protection to women on indefinite contracts. The basis for the Commission's 
position was that it would be absurd to require an employer to recruit a woman in 
circumstances where she would be unavailable for work for the period of the contract. 
For example, a woman, who is already seven months pregnant, recruited in October to 
work for two months over the Christmas period. The Commission argued that in such 
circumstances it should be justified to discriminate against a pregnant woman by refusing 
to employ her. When the case returned to the HL Lord Keith referred to the Eel's 
emphasis on the indefinite nature of the applicant's contract and indicated that it may be 
possible to distinguish a case where the applicant is unavailable for the whole period of 
her contract. 24 
The emphasis placed by the [EeJ] upon the indefinite duration of the applicant's 
contract of enlploynlent suggests the possibility of a distinction between such a 
case and the case where a woman's absence due to pregnancy would have the 
consequence of her being unavailable for the whole of the work for which she had 
been engaged. 
The scope of any possible exception was considered by the EAT in Caruana v 
Manchester Airport plc.25 The applicant was employed as an independent contractor on a 
series of fixed term contracts. The final contract was from 1 January to 31 December 
1992. On 11 November 1992 the applicant informed her employer that she would 
commence her maternity leave on 11 December 1992 and on 3 December the applicant 
was told that her contract would not be renewed because she would be unavailable for 
23 See the comments of Jacqrnain J, in 'Pregnancy as Grounds for Dismissal' (1994) 23 ILJ 355. 
24 [1995] 4 All ER 577 at 581. See also Szyszczak E 'Community law on pregnancy and maternity' in 
Hervey T and O'Keeffe D eds, Sex equality in the European Union, chp 4 (1996) at p 56. 
25 [1996] IRLR 3 78, EAT. 
197 
work at its commencement. The tribunal accepted the evidence of the employer that a 
man absent in similar circumstances would have been treated the same vVay. 
Applying the decision of the HL in Webb before the reference to the EeJ, the 
tribunal held that the contract was not renewed because of the consequence of the 
applicant's pregnancy namely that she would be unavailable for work at the critical 
period. Since a man similarly unavailable for work would be treated the same, the 
tribunal found that there was no discrimination. On appeal, the EAT applied the decision 
of the HL in Webb after the reference to the EeJ. The EAT held that where the reason 
for a woman's unavailability for work is pregnancy her subsequent dismissal is on the 
ground of her sex. The EAT refused to accept the argument that the decisions of the HL 
and EeJ in Webb do not apply to fixed tenn contracts. The EAT thought that the 
reference to indefinite contracts was a mechanism to illustrate the hyp0thetical situation 
where a woman would be unavailable for work for the whole of the period for which she 
was engaged. In any event, the EAT thought that the applicant's circumstances were very 
different from those of a woman refused one contract. The applicant was already in a 
continuous employment relationship with the employer and her complaint was that the 
employer had failed to extend that relationship. 
Assume that the EAT was correct in its analysis and that any exception is limited 
to cases where the woman is unavailable for the whole of the period of her contract.26 
What would be the impact of the justification defence on such a scenario? The 
employer's reason for not employing the woman is likely to be the administrative costs of 
engaging a woman who is not going to be able to work for the whole period for which 
she is employed. There is no doubt that hiring a woman does involve some 
administrative costs and, therefore, the causal link is easily established. The third 
element of the test is likely to be satisfied as there is no other way of avoiding those costs 
than by not engaging the woman. On the fourth element of the test, what are the 
respective detriments and benefits? At this point it is important not to confuse the right 
to be employed with the right to maternity pay. The question of whether the woman is 
26 In practice the exception is more likely to be used as a reason for not recruiting rath~r ~an as a basis for 
dismissal as it is unlikely that the woman's unavailability will be discovered after she IS hrred: see 
Szyszczak E, 'Pregnancy Discrimination' (1996) 59 ML~ 589 at 591. Furthern:ore, a~icle 10 o~the p~ 
prevents the dismissal of a pregnant woman although by ltself, the PWD only gIves a nght to claIm unfau 
dismissal and not sex discrimination: see s 99(1)(a) of the ERA 1996. 
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entitled to maternity pay during her period of employment is subject to a separate 
justification test along the lines set out above. Thus, the issue of pay must be left out of 
this particular balancing exercise. Under the PWD a woman retains all of her 
employment rights other than remuneration during the first 14 weeks of maternity pay.27 
Therefore, the financial detriment to the woman is likely to be limited to the loss of these 
benefits. These could include annual leave entitlement, pension rights, the provision of a 
company car or other benefits in kind. There is an additional and less tangible loss to the 
woman which is the possibility that the fixed term contract would have been :r~newed 
~7 
and she would have secured a further period of employment. The employer, on the other 
hand, has the administrative costs of employing the woman plus the costs of any benefits 
to which she is entitled during her period of maternity leave. Unless there is a real 
prospect of further employment, the benefit to the employer is likely to outweigh the 
detriment to the employee and, therefore, subject to the final element of the test (the 
ability of the employer to pay) there would be scope for tribunals to find that the 
employer's decision not to employ the woman is justified.28 
BRIDGING PENSIONS 
Since 1940 the state pensionable age in the UK has been 60 for women and 65 for men.29 
As both women and men start contributing to the scheme at the age of 16, men are 
disadvantaged because they have to contribute for longer in order to get a full state 
pension. In addition, if men carry on working between the ages of 60 and 65 they have 
to continue making contributions while women do not.30 The Pensions Act 1995 
contains a formula for equalising the state pensionable age at 65. The change will start to 
27 Article 11(2) of the PWD and s 71 Employment Rights Act 1996. 
28 One of the problems with this approach is that a woman may not have decided at the time she applies for 
the job how much maternity leave she is going to take. Under the provisions of the PWD every woman, 
irrespective of her length of service, is entitled to 14 weeks maternity leave. However, she is only obliged 
to take a minimum of two weeks leave at the time of confmement: reg 2 of the Maternity (Compulsory 
Leave) Regulations 1994 SI 1994/2479. 
29 See the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992, section 122. One reason why the 
pensionable age for women was lowered was to increase the proportion of cases in which the married 
couple rate was payable when the husband reached the age of 65, the wife usually being a few years 
younger than her husband. 
30 For a more detailed analysis of the difference in treatment see De Vos D, 'Pensionable Age and Equal 
Treatment from Charybdis to Scylla' (1994) 23 ILJ 175. 
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take effect in 2010 and will be fully implemented by 2020. No women who are currently 
over the age of 44 will be affected. However, for the next 20 or so years the state 
pensionable age for women and men will continue to differ. 
Eliminating the discriminatory treatment in employment benefits linked to the 
state pensionable age has proved problematic. The ECJ was first faced with the problem 
in Burton v British Railways Board. 31 British Rail operated a voluntary redundancy 
scheme which was open to women from the age of 55 and men from the age of 60. 
Under the terms of the scheme, employees taking voluntary redundancy were entitled to 
''''", 
a redundancy allowance and an early retirement pension which was funded entirely by 
British Rail. Mr Burton applied for voluntary redundancy at the age of 58 but his 
application was rejected. He could not complain under the EPA because the scheme was 
discretionary and not contractual. His complaint under the SDA was excluded by virtue 
of s 6(4) which states that the Act does not apply to provisions in relation to death or 
retirement. The EAT referred to the ECJ the question of whether Mr Burton's treatment 
was contrary to Article 141 or the ETD. 
The ECJ rejected the Article 141 claim on the basis that the conditions of access 
to a voluntary redundancy scheme are covered by the ETD and not Article 141. Under 
article 7 of the Social Security Directive 79/7/EEC member states are permitted to set a 
different pensionable age for women and men for social security purposes. The ECJ held 
that a difference in treatment which is tied to permitted discrimination in the state social 
security scheme cannot be regarded as discrimination within the meaning of the ETD. 
The fact that access to voluntary redundancy is available only during the five 
years preceding the minimum pensionable age fixed by national social security 
legislation and that age is not the same for men as for women cannot in itself be 
regarded as discrimination on grounds of sex within the meaning of Article 5 of 
Directive 76/206. 
By contrast, the idea that a difference in treatment can be lawful where it is based 
on the difference in state pensionable age was rejected by the HL in James v Eastleigh 
Borough Council32 in relation to the SDA. Eastleigh Council waived the 75p admission 
charge to its swimming pools to persons over pensionable age. The purpose of the 
Council in applying this criterion was to assist those whose resources had been reduced 
31 [1982] CMLR 137, ECJ. 
32 [1990] IRLR 288, HL. 
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by retirement. The applicant, a man aged 61, complained that the provision was 
contrary to s 1 (1)( a) and s 29( 1) of the SDA. The HL held that because the state 
pensionable age was itself discriminatory, the adoption of that criterion for any other 
purpose which resulted in a difference in treatment between women and men would also 
be directly discriminatory. 
In Barber v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group33 the EeJ moved away 
from its decision in Burton and opened the way for employees to challenge 
discriminatory pension ages in occupational schemes. The facts were that the employer 
' ... -~ 
operated an contracted-out occupational pension scheme under which the nonnal 
pensionable age was fixed at 57 for women and 62 for men. The employer also operated 
a severance scheme which provided that in the event of redundancy, women over the age 
of 50 and men over the age of 55 with ten years' service were entitled to an immediate 
pension. The EeJ made two significant decisions. First, the age. at which a worker 
becomes entitled to a contracted-out occupational pension scheme is pay within Article 
141. Second, it is discriminatory to have different ages for women and men even if the 
difference is derived from the state scheme. The EeJ held: 
... it is sufficient to point out that [Article 141] prohibits any discrimination with 
regard to pay as between men and women, whatever the system which gives rise 
to such inequality. Accordingly, it is contrary to [Article 141] to impose an age 
condition which differs according to sex in respect of pensions paid under a 
contracted-out scheme, even if the difference between the pensionable age for 
men and that for women is based on the one provided for by the national statutory 
scheme. 
Having decided that the scheme in Barber was unlawful, but mindful of the financial 
implications the decision would have on contracted-out pension schemes, the EeJ 
limited the temporal effect of the judgment to benefits payable in resrect of periods of 
service after 17 May 1990.34 The effect of the temporal limitation was to allow 
discriminatory treatment in relation to periods of service prior to this date with the result 
that it will take 40 odd years to bring into effect full equality in occupational pension 
schemes. The Eel subsequently extended its decision that it is contrary to Article 141 to 
have different pension ages for women and men to supplementary pension schemes in 
33 [1990] IRLR 240, EeJ. 
34 The exact scope of the limitation was clarified in Ten oever v. Stichting [1993J IRLR 601, EeJ. 
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Moroni v Firma Colla GmbH. 35 The ECJ applied the same temporal limitation on the 
effect of the judgment as in Barber. 
On the face of it, the effect of the ECJ's decisions in Barber and Moroni was to 
render unlawful all differences in treatment in contracted-out and supplementary 
occupational pension schemes that stem from different pensionable ages for women and 
men. However, in Birds Eye Walls Ltd v Roberts36 the ECJ held that such a difference in 
treatment was permitted under Article 141. The difference in treatment arose out of a 
bridgin~ pension operated. by the e~~loyer under which employees fo~ced to retife early 
due to 111 health were paid an additIonal sum to make up the diffe~ence between the 
, 
pension they actually received (calculated on the basis of the years actually worked) and 
the pension they would have received had they continued to work until the state 
retirement age. It was common ground that the bridging pension was pay within the 
scope of Article 141. From the age of 60 the bridging pension for a woman was reduced 
by the amount of the state pension. The same reduction was made for a man at the age of 
65. Mrs Roberts retired because of ill health at the age of 57. She received an annual 
pension of £383 and a bridging pension of £919 making a total of £1,302. From the age 
of 60, Mrs Roberts' bridging pension was reduced by £749, the amount of her state 
pension.37 Mrs Roberts argued that the reduction in her bridgl·ng pension was 
discriminatory under Article 141. The EeJ held that Mrs Roberts had not been subjected 
to discriminatory treatment because the difference in state retirement ages put her in an 
incomparable position with a man between the ages of 60 and 65. 
It should be noted that the principle of equal treatment laid down by [Article 141] 
of the Treaty, like the general principle of non-discrimination which it embodies 
in a specific form, presupposes that the men and women to whom it applies are in 
identical situations. 
Accordingly, although until the age of 60 the financial position of a 
woman taking early retirement on the grounds of ill health is comparable to that 
of a man in the same situation, neither of them as yet entitled to payment of the 
state pension, that is no longer the case between the ages of 60 and 65 since that 
is when women, unlike men, start drawing that pension. That difference as 
regards the objective premise, which necessarily entails that t~le amount of the 
35 [1994] IRLR 130, Eel. 
36 [1994] IRLR 29, EeJ. . 
37 In fact Mrs Roberts was not entitled to a state pension because she had elected to pay reduced natlonal 
insuranc~ contributions at the reduced married women's rate although as a widow she was entitled to an 
equivalent pension. 
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bridging pension is not the same for men and women canLot be considered 
discriminatory. ' 
Although the finding that the circumstances were not comparable is not directly contrary 
to the facts of Barber, it is inconsistent with the general principle that it is contrary to 
Article 141 to impose an age condition that differs according to sex. The difference in 
treatment in Barber arose between the ages of 50 and 55 when women made redundant 
were entitled to an immediate occupational pension while men were only entitled to a 
deferred occupational pension. Between these ages, applying the analysis of the ECl in 
Roberts, women and men were in comparable circumstances because neither wasentitled 
to a state pension. By the time their circumstances became incomparable at the age of 60, 
there was no longer a problem in Barber because at that age there was no difference in 
treatment between women and men under the rules of the scheme. However, the general 
principle of Barber would apply equally to an occupational pension scheme under which 
women are entitled to a pension at the age of 60 while men have to wait until they are 65. 
On the basis of both Barber and Moroni such a scheme would be contrary to Article 141. 
However, if the analysis of the ECl in Roberts is applied, a man denied a pension at the 
age of 62 would not be in a comparable position to a women because she would be 
entitled to a state pension while he would not. However, it is almost inconceivable that 
the ECl would find that such a difference in treatment would be lawful. 
In Roberts both the respondent and the European Commission argued that it was 
a case of justified direct discrimination. Advocate General Van Gerven took the view 
that in exceptional cases direct discrimination based on sex could be justified. He 
thought the discrimination was justified in this case because one of the purposes of the 
bridging pension was to eliminate inequality brought about by the state pension scheme. 
The ECl was obviously affected by these arguments but was unwilling to deal with the 
justification issue. Instead, it used the inconsistent and illogical argument that the 
circumstances were not comparable in order to avoid a finding of discrirnination.38 
However, the practical effect of the decision is that it created yet another judicial 
exception to the principle that direct sex discrimination is unlawful. 
38 According to Ellis, the fact that the EeJ was willing to make such an artifical distinction in this case 
indicates its strength of feeling against the idea that direct discrimination can be justified: see Ellis E, 
'Gender discrimination law in the European Community' in Dine J and Watt Beds, Discrimination law: 
concepts, limitations and justifications, chp 2 (1996). 
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What would have been the impact of the justification defence in this case if it had 
been applied? The first stage of the justification defence is the reason test. The 
employer has to put forward a reason for the difference in treatment that relates to the 
operation of the business. In this case, the reason for the difference in treatment is to 
compensate men for the discrimination in the state pension scheme. It is difficult to see 
how this could be a reason that relates to the operation of the employer's business. The 
difference in treatment is really a form of positive discrimination in favour of men. As 
explained in chapter 7, positive discrimination will always fall outside the SCOpje of the 
justification defence precisely because the reason for the treatment does not relate to the 
employer's business. 
Is there any other mechanism by which the ECJ could have found the payment of 
the bridging pension to be lawful? One possibility would be to adopt the approach of the 
EeJ in the Pedersen39 case that the payment of state benefits can be taken into account in 
determining whether treatment is detrimental. As indicated in chapter 2, in Pedersen the 
ECJ held that it would not be discriminatory to refuse a pregnant woman sick pay if the 
amount of benefit to which she is entitled is the same as her pay. In other words, state 
and occupational benefits can be added together in determining whether the difference in 
treatment is detrimental. The parallel with bridging pensions is almost identical. The 
lower pension payment by the scheme is completely compensated for by the payment of 
the state pension. As far as the applicant is concerned, the overall level of income is the 
same. Viewed from the perspective of a reasonable employee (the test for detriment 
under domestic law) it is unlikely that this would be considered a detriment. 
The other possibility that could be used in the future is the new Article 141(4) 
which came into effect on 1 May 1999. 
With a view to ensuring full equality in practice between men and women in 
working life, the principle of equal treatment shall not prevent any Member State 
from maintaining or adopting measures providing for specific advantages in order 
to make it easier for the under represented sex to pursue a vocational activity or to 
prevent or compensate for disadvantages in professional careers. 
Clearly, the payment of a bridging pension does not make it easier for an under 
represented sex to pursue a vocational activity and, therefore, it would not satisfy this 
particular aspect of the exception. However, it is possible that bridging pensions could 
39 [1999] IRLR 55, Eel 
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be regarded as a mechanism for compensating disadvantage. The argument against this 
interpretation is that the disadvantage being compensated does not arise from the 
individual's career but from the state pension scheme. It is unlikely that the member 
states had bridging pensions in mind when they agreed the wording of sub-article (4). 
However, the exception is quite vaguely worded and it would provide a much better 
mechanism for reaching the result that bridging pensions are lawful than the current 
stance of the EC] that they are not discriminatory. 
SINGLE SEX ACTUARIAL FACTORS 
In Neath v. Hugh Steeper Ltcf° and Coloroll Pension Trustees Ltd v. Russe1l41 the Ee] 
was asked to decide whether the use of actuarial factors in final salary schemes is 
contrary to Article 141. The facts of Neath were that the respondent operated a 
contracted-out scheme under which the respondent and the trustee could consent to an 
employee retiring and taking a reduced pension at any time after the age of 50. Where 
the respondent and the trustee did not consent, the employee was entitled only to a 
deferred pension or a transfer payment to another scheme. The amount of the transfer 
payment was calculated on the basis of the capital cost to the scheme of providing the 
member with a pension. In calculating the cost to the scheme, account was taken of the 
fact that on average, women live longer than men. The transfer value for a woman was 
therefore more than for a man. Furthermore, if Mr Neath opted to take a deferred 
pension and commuted part of his pension for a lump sum payment, the sum would be 
less than for a woman because of the use of actuarial factors. Mr Neath complained that 
the use of actuarial tables was contrary to Article 141. In particUlar, he argued that it was 
not justified to use class assumptions in order to calculate individual rights since an 
individual may not conform to the class assumptions. 
The EC] rejected the claim on the basis that the process by which an employer 
determines the funding necessary to secure pension payments including the use of sex 
based actuarial factors is outside the scope of Article 141. 
40 [1994] All ER 929, EeJ. 
41 [1994] IRLR 586, EeJ. 
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In the context of a defined-benefit occupational pension scheme such as that in 
question in the main proceedings, the employer's commitment to his employees 
concerns the payment, at a given time, of a periodic pension for which the 
determining criteria are already known at the time when the commitment is made 
and which constitutes pay within the meaning of [Article 141]. However, that 
commitment does not necessarily have to do with the funding arrangements 
chosen to secure the periodic payment of the pension, which thus remains outside 
the scope of application of [Article 141]. 
In contributory schemes, funding is provided through the contributions 
made by the employees and those made by the employers. The contributions 
made by the employees are an element of their pay since they are deducted 
directly from an employee's salary, which by definition is pay (see the jUdgment 
in Worringham). The amount of those contributions must therefore be the same 
for all employees, male or female, which is indeed the same in the present case. 
This is not so in the case of the employers' contributions which ensure the 
adequacy of the funds necessary to cover the cost of the pensions promised, so 
securing their payment in the future, that being the substance of the employer's 
commitment. 
It follows that unlike periodic payments of pen$ion, inequality of 
employers' contributions paid under funded defined-benefit schemes, which is 
due to the use of actuarial factors differing according to sex, is not struck at by 
[Article 141]. 
That conclusion necessarily extends to the specific aspects referred to in 
the questions submitted, namely the conversion of part of the periodic pension 
into a capital sum and the transfer of pensions rights, the value of which can be 
determined only by reference to the funding arrangements chosen. 
In other words, with a defined benefit scheme employee contributions and the payment 
of a periodic pension are pay within the scope of Article 141. Employer contributions 
and the conversion of the periodic pension into a capital sum do not constitute pay. 
The use of actuarial factors was also considered by the Ee] in Coloroll Pension 
Trustees Ltd v. Russell42 in relation to the reversionary pension payable to a dependant in 
exchange for the surrender of part of the annual pension and a reduced early retirement 
pension. The Ee] followed its decision in Neath and held that in both these situations 
differences in the amounts of capital benefits or substitute benefits which arise out of the 
use of actuarial factors are not contrary to Article 141. 
A different analysis was put forward by Advocate General Van Gerven. He 
concluded that Article 141 does not prohibit the use of sex based actuarial factors in 
order to assess the financial liabilities of a scheme. However, where the use of actuarial 
factors results in the payment of a lower level of benefit to one sex, including transfer 
42 [1994] IRLR 586, EeJ. 
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payments, capital sums or reduced pensions on early retirement, this results in unequal 
treatment that is prohibited by Article 141. The Advocate General then went on to argue 
that while unequal treatment of women and men may be justified in some circumstances, 
the fact that in general women live longer than men could not justify different treatment 
in contributions and benefits under occupational pension schemes. The Commission 
argued that while direct discrimination can be justified in some c~rcumstances, the 
discrimination that derives from the use of actuarial factors is not justified. 
The decisions of the ECJ in Neath and Coloroll are based on the assump~ion that 
the element of a pension which is pay is not the capital fund itself but an employee's 
entitlement to benefits under the rules of the scheme. The funding arrangements by 
which the solvency of the fund is maintained are therefore outside of the scope of Article 
141. On this basis, the conclusion that employee contributions are pay under Article 141 
but employer contributions are not pay is understandable. What is more difficult to 
accept is the distinction drawn by the ECJ between the payment of a periodic pension 
and the conversion of that payment to a capital sum. The payment of a periodic pension 
is only one of the benefits that the members of a pension scheme are entitled to. In 
certain circumstances, a member is also entitled to a transfer payment. The transfer 
payment represents the member's entitlement to a periodic pension commuted into a 
capital sum. It is inherently illogical to argue that the commutation of a benefit from a 
periodic payment to a capital sum can change the benefit's status as pay under Article 
141. 43 The result is the creation of a judicial exception for the use of single sex actuarial 
factors that effectively mirrors the exceptions in the OSSD (see chapter 4). 
To what extent would the result have been different if the ECJ had applied the 
justification defence set out in chapter 7? In looking at this point it is helpful to deal with 
transfer payments and commutation payments separately from capital sums used to buy 
annuity contracts. With transfer and commutation payments it is difficult to identify the 
rationale underlying the use of single sex factors. Assume, for the sake of argument, that 
they do in fact enhance the efficient operation of the scheme. On this basis the first two 
elements of the justification would be satisfied. What about the means test? Where an 
individual commutes part of a periodic pension the member receives a lump sum which 
43 For a criticism of this argument see: Hervey T, 'Case note on Neath' (1994) CMLRev 1387 at 1396. 
207 
he or she is free to spend. The use of unisex factors would remove any discrimination in 
these payments. The same would apply with transfer payments as long as the member is 
transferring to another occupational pension that also uses unisex factors. Thus, the 
means test would not be satisfied in relation to these two uses of single sex factors and 
the justification defence would fail at this point. 
More problematic is the use of single sex factors in the calculation of lump sum 
payments for the purchase of annuity contracts. If occupational schemes use unisex sex 
factors and insurance schemes are allowed to continue using single sex factors the result 
will be that women are worse off because the same lump sum will give them a lower 
level of annuity than is paid to men. The only way this can be remedif>d is by removing 
the exception for the use of single sex factors by insurance companies in s 45 of the 
SDA. (This would have to be done at the domestic level as it is outside the scope of 
Article 14l.) Thus, the rationale behind using single sex factors in the calculation of 
lump sums used by purchase annuity contracts is to protect the position of the female 
members of the scheme. In other words, the use of single sex factors is a case of positive 
action intended to equalise the position of the sexes. As with all other cases of positive 
action it is outside the scope of the justification defence because it is not a reason that 
relates to the operation of the employer's business. The overall result, therefore, is that it 
is unlikely that employers or occupational pension schemes could justify the use of 
single sex actuarial factors. 
APPEARANCE AND DRESS CODES 
A dilemma that has faced the domestic courts is how to deal with the different dress and 
appearance conventions that apply to women and men.44 While it may have become 
more acceptable for women to wear trousers, skirts (other than kilts) and make-up on 
men is still an unusual sight. Some employers attempt to restrict the extent to which 
their employees can adopt an unconventional appearance. As dress conventions are 
different for women and men, this necessarily involves different rules for the two. 
44 For a comparative analysis of dress codes and sex discrimination legislation see: Flynn L, 'Gender 
equality laws and employers' dress codes' (1995) 24 ILl 255. 
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Of course, not all different treatment is unfavourable/detrimental to one sex. For 
example, imagine that for reasons of administrative convenience an employer issues all 
employees with a staff number that ends with the letter F for women and the letter M for 
men. Although this is different treatment it is unlikely to be viewed as unfavourable to 
one sex. Similarly, if an employer issues identical overalls to men and women save that 
the men's overalls are blue and the women's overalls are green there would not appear to 
be any unfavourable treatment. On the other hand, if the men are provided with overalls 
and the women have to supply their own this would appear to constitute unfavourable 
, { 
treatment for the women. The key issue, therefore, is the test for whether different 
treatment is less favourable or detrimental treatment for one sex. 
As indicated in chapter 2, the domestic courts have adopted an objective test for 
detriment based on the views of a reasonable worker. The correct test is whether a 
reasonable worker of the applicant's sex would find the treatment detrimental. 45 Thus, in 
determining whether it is discriminatory to prohibit a woman from wearing trousers to 
work, the question the court should ask itself is whether a reasonable woman would find 
the treatment detrimental. However, the courts have not followed this approach in cases 
involving dress and appearance codes. Instead, the courts have looked to see whether the 
rule in question is equally conventional for women and men. If it is, they have declined 
to find the treatment less favourable. This approach first emerged in the case of Schmidt 
v Austicks Bookshops Ltd. 46 The applicant was employed at one of the respondent's book 
shops. The rules on staff appearance required that when they were in contact with the 
public, women must wear a skirt. There were also restrictions on male employees eg 
they were not allowed to wear tee-shirts. Both the tribunal and the EAT rejected the 
applicant's claim. The EAT found that the most sensible approach v.Tas to look at the 
rules in their entirety rather than consider restrictions on individual garments. The EAT 
concluded that as long as there were rules in place for women and men that restricted 
wearing apparel and governed appearance there was no detriment despite the fact that the 
rules were different for each sex. 
45 See Jeremiah v Ministry of Defence [1979] IRLR 436, CA and the other cases discussed in chapter 2. 
46 [1977] IRLR 360, EAT. 
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In Burrett v West Birmingham Health Authority 47 the applicant was a nurse who 
was required to wear a uniform and a starched linen cap which the EAT found served no 
practical purpose. The applicant objected to wearing the cap because she found it to be 
demeaning and that it stereotyped nurses. On refusing to wear the cap she was 
disciplined and transferred to the operating theatre where no caps were worn. Male 
nurses were required to wear a different uniform including a white tunic and epaulettes. 
The EAT accepted the finding of the tribunal (based on Schmidt) that there was no less 
favourable treatment as the requirement to wear a uniform applied equally to w()"Q1en and 
~ 
men. The EAT rejected the applicant's argument that her honestly held belief that the 
cap was demeaning was sufficient to demonstrate less favourable treatment. However, 
the EAT failed to consider whether the rule was less favourable on an objective test of a 
reasonable employee. 
The issue was considered by the CA in Smith v Safeway pIc. 4~ The applicant was 
employed as an assistant in the delicatessen department of a Safeway's store. He was 
dismissed after he allowed his hair to grow below shirt-collar length in contravention of 
Safeway's appearance code. Women were allowed to have long hair as long as it was 
clipped back. Relying on Schmidt the tribunal dismissed the applicatio on the basis that 
it is not discriminatory to have different provisions in relation to the length of hair for 
women and men as long as both rules are equally rigorously applied. The Chairman of 
the EAT agreed with the tribunal that there was no less favourable treatment. However, 
the lay majority in the EAT reversed the decision and found that the applicant had been 
discriminated against. 
The lay members of this Tribunal have no difficulty in holding that the treatment 
was less favourable and self-evidently so. The requirements laid down by 
Safeway for the appearance of meat department and delicatessen staff with 
respect to hairstyle are capable of being applied to both men and women, in such 
a way as to take account of convention (and therefore be compatible with 
Schmidt), without placing the restriction they do on hair length for men only. 
There is no relevant physiological difference between men and women; 
and the need to present a conventional appearance at work is already met by the 
standards laid down as to hairstyle which, in the case of a pony-tail is specifically 
capable of being treated the same for both men and women. 
47 [1994] IRLR 7, EAT. 
48 [1996] IRLR 456, CA. 
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The CA reversed the decision of the lay majority of the EAT and reinstated the decision 
of the tribunal. Lord Justice Phillips held that there is no unfavourable treatment where 
the standard applied to both sexes is one of conventionality. 
I can accept that one of the objects of the prohibition of sex discrimination was to 
relieve the sexes from unequal treatment reSUlting from conventional attitudes, 
but I do not believe that this renders discriminatory an appearance code which 
applies a standard of what is conventional. On the contrary, I am inclined to 
think that such a code is likely to operate unfavourably with regard to one or 
other of the sexes unless it applies such a standard ...... As Mr Elias has pointed 
out, a code which made identical provisions for men and women, but which 
resulted in one or other having an unconventional appearance, woule( have an 
unfavourable impact on that sex being compelled to appear in an unconventional 
mode. Can there by any doubt that a code which required all employees to have 
18-inch hair, earrings and lipstick would treat men unfavourably by requiring 
them to adopt an appearance at odds with conventional standards? 
Finally, it is worth considering the different approach taken by the High Court in 
Northern Ireland. In McConomy v Croft Inns Ltcf9 the plaintiff was asked to leave the 
defendant's bar because he refused to remove two small stud earrings that he was wearing 
in his left ear. The plaintiff claimed his treatment was discriminatory contrary to the Sex 
Discrimination (Northern Ireland) Order 1976. Relying on Schmidt, the judge at first 
instance dismissed the complaint. Lord Justice Murray in the High Court upheld the 
plaintiffs appeal and had no hesitation in finding that the difference in treatment was on 
the ground of sex and that the treatment was less favourable. Unfortunately, the finding 
of less favourable treatment was made as a bald assertion with no explanation of the test 
applied. 
At first sight I find it difficult to see how it can be said that if refreshment 
facilities are provided without question to a women who is wearing earrings and 
are refused absolutely to a man who is doing the same thing, that the defendants 
are not infringing the provisions [on less favourable treatment]. 
It seems, therefore, that the domestic courts have applied two different tests for 
determining less favourable treatment. In cases not involving appearance or dress codes 
the courts have held that the correct approach is to consider whether a reasonable worker 
would find the treatment detrimental. It is not necessary to show that it is a majority 
opinion or that it has a degree of consensus attached to it. All that is necessary is that the 
opinion is reasonable. When it comes to dress and appearance codes the courts have held 
49 [1992] IRLR561, He. 
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that the correct approach is to consider whether the rules for women and men are equally 
conventional. A social convention is an agreement on social behaviour that has the 
implicit consent of the maj ority of the population. 50 The net effect is a test for less 
favourable treatment which requires that the majority of the population should view the 
treatment as detrimental. Clearly, this is a higher standard than the test of the reasonable 
worker and it makes it easier for employers to impose sex specific dress codes. The 
reasonable worker test does not, as Lord Justice Phillips suggested in Smith, require 
identical treatment for men and women. This is because men and women Ip.ay have 
" 
different views about what it is reasonable to wear. It may be that a reasonable woman 
considers it a detriment not to be allowed to wear trousers at work but it is no detriment 
to a reasonable man for him not to be allowed to wear a skirt to work. Allowing women 
to adopt some of the dress and appearance styles of men and vice versa will not result in 
men being forced to grow long hair or wear earrings and lipstick. 
If the lower standard of a reasonable worker had been applied in the above cases 
the decisions might well have been different. The applicant in Schmidt was told that she 
could not wear trousers when she was working in contact with the pUblic. The case was 
heard in 1977 and it may be that at that time it was less common than it is now for 
women to wear trousers to work. It is, therefore, difficult to predict the opinion of a 
reasonable worker. However, it is at least arguable that a reasonable female worker 
would have found the restriction on wearing trousers a detriment. In Burrett, a ballot 
showed a majority of female nursing staff were against wearing the cap. In addition, a 
colleague of the applicant gave evidence that she found wearing the cap demeaning. The 
applicant also had the sympathy of the director of nursing, although the director felt that 
the rule should be obeyed until it was changed. Thus there was at least some evidence on 
which the tribunal could have found that the requirement to wear tile cap would be 
considered detrimental by a reasonable worker. 
In Smith there was no evidence before the tribunal as to the public perception of 
men with long hair. However, the lay members of the EAT concluded that there was 
nothing unconventional about a pony-tail on a man. If that is correct, it is certainly 
arguable that to refuse to allow a man to wear his hair in a pony-tail would be a detriment 
50 The Oxford English Reference Dictionary, Second Edition, 1996. 
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in the opinion of a reasonable worker. Finally, there is McConomy and the rule that men 
could not wear earrings in the bar. The judge did not explain the basis on which he 
found the treatment less favourable. Strangely enough, given that it was the only claim 
of the four that was successful, it is probably the least likely to have got through the test 
of a reasonable worker or customer. Although it is not a rare sight these days to see a 
man wearing earrings, probably no less common than men with long hair, the difference 
is that earrings can be put on and taken off while hair takes a long time to grow. In 
McConomy the plaintiff demonstrated in the witness box that he could remove his 
.~ "( 
earrings in about 10 seconds and had he done so he could have stayed in the bar. 
Furthermore, unlike the wearing of trousers (which at least has the argument of comfort 
in its favour) earrings are purely decorative. 
Assume, that in each of the above four cases the difference in treatment was 
detrimental and, therefore, unlawful unless justified by the employer. How would the 
justification defence apply to these cases? In Smith and Schmidt it can be assumed that 
the reason put forward by the employers for the dress rules would be that women in 
trousers or men with pony tails would have a deleterious impact on sales. The employers 
would then have to establish the requisite causal link ie that the offending dress styles do 
indeed have a negative impact on sales. Probably, the only way the e! ;'Jloyers could do 
this would be by undertaking a customer survey. If there is no impact on sales the 
defence fails. On the other hand, if the employer can demonstrate any level of impact the 
potential drop in sales needs to be weighed against the detriment to the employees. The 
detriments of not being allowed to wear trousers or have long hair are difficult to 
quantify in monetary terms but they are unlikely to be large. Depending on how big the 
impact on sales is the benefit to the employer mayor may not be greater than the 
detriment. 
In Burrett the EAT found that the starched linen cap served no practical purpose. 
Given this finding the reasons the employer could put forward are limited to aesthetic 
arguments that are unlikely to result in any benefit to the employer. Thus, the defence is 
likely to fail at the first stage. The case where the justification defence has the best 
chance of succeeding is McConomy. The judge was sympathetic to the defendant 
landlord because he accepted that in a bar where trivial causes often result in disorder, a 
person under the influence of drink might be moved to violence against a man wearing 
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eamngs. On this basis, the defendant is likely to satisfy the reason test and the causation 
test. Are there any other less discriminatory means of achieving the same result? One 
solution would be to ban both sexes from wearing earrings. However, not only is this 
likely to reduce the level of female custom but it would also be difficult to enforce given 
the large number of women who wear earrings. The balance test is also likely to come 
down on the side of the employer. As discussed above, if there is any detriment to the 
individual male it is likely to be small in monetary terms. On the other hand, the benefit 
to the landlord of avoiding disorder is likely to be substantial both in terms dama2:e to the 
"" 7 
property and maintaining a level of custom. Thus, the benefit to the employer is likely to 
be disproportionately large compared to the detriment to the individual male asked to 
remove his earring. 
CONCLUSION 
The existing legislative exceptions have not been wide enough to deal with all of the 
instances of direct sex discrimination that, in the opinion of the courts, should be lawful. 
As a result, the courts have been forced to engage in a degree of judicial law making and 
to create a number of additional exceptions. In the process, the EC] in particular has 
applied some extremely suspect reasoning that contradicts not only its own previous case 
law but some of the basic tenets of sex discrimination law. 
The introduction of the model justification defence would not remove the need 
for judicial creativity in all four of the problem areas discussed above In particular, it 
would have no impact in those two areas (bridging pensions and actuarial factors) where 
the underlying rationale of the employer is positive action or the equalisation of the 
sexes. However, in the other two areas (pregnancy and maternity, and dress codes) the 
legal uncertainty inherent in the present approach could be removed by the application of 
the model justification defence. 51 Furthermore, the defence is likely to enhance rather 
51 An alternative means of dealing with the difficult pregnancy and maternity cases is to reclassify them as 
indirect discrimination. This approach has been suggested by Wintemute in his article 'When is pregnancy 
discrimination indirect sex discrimination?' (1998) 27 ILl 23. Essentially his argument is that pregnancy 
can be separate from its consequences and, therefore, it is possible to differentiate between situations 
where a woman is treatment detrimentally on the grounds of pregnancy per se and situations where the 
detrimental treatment is caused by the woman's absence from work or some other consequence of her 
pregnancy. In the former case the treatment is direct discrimination because pregnanry is a unique female 
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than detract from the level f l'ty . 
o equa 1 currently expenenced. In many of the cases 
discussed, the justification defence would require employers to do more than they are 
currently obliged to do. For example, the defence is likely to increase the entitlement of 
women to maternity pay. It would also make it more difficult for employers to 
discriminate in relation to dress codes. 
The defence would have the added advantage of requiring a proper investigation 
into the merits of allowing employers to indulge in directly discriminatory behaviour. 
This would bring out in the open the real issue, which is where the balance should lie 
'/-t 
between the financial interests of employers and the aim of equality. Instead of hiding 
behind an illogical finding that no discrimination exists the courts would have to be open 
about the fact that they are allowing direct discrimination to occur because they consider 
that the costs of stopping it are too great. 
characteristic but in the latter case the treatment is indirect sex discrimination because absence from work 
and the other consequences of pregnancy are things that can happen to both sexes. Thus, it would only be 
direct discrimination to dismiss a woman absent from work due to a pregnancy related illness if a man 
absent for a similar period of time is not dismissed. However, if all employees absent for a similar period 
are dismissed the issue becomes one of indirect sex discrimination because sickness absence has a 
disproportionate impact on women. In essence, Wintemute is arguing for the re-introduction of the sick 
man comparison that was rejected by the EeJ in the case of Webb v EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd [1994J 
IRLR 482. The downside to this approach is that the justification defence for indirect sex discrimination is 
weaker that the model defence for direct discrimination. See also Hare I, 'Pregnancy and sex 
discrimination' (1991) 20 ILl 124 at 129. 
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9 
EVALUATION 
INTRODUCTION 
The idea of a justification defence for cases of direct sex discrimination has generated a 
considerable amount of adverse comment from academic writers. The purpo~ of this 
chapter is to consider whether that adverse comment is warranted by evaluating the 
impact of the model justification defence set out in chapter 7. 
NOT A NOVEL CONCEPT 
It is worth making the point that the idea of justifying direct discrimination is not a novel 
concept in employment law. First, under domestic law, it is already possible to justify 
direct disability discrimination. I Although the absence of any categorical disability 
differences means that there is less scope for direct disability discrimination than direct 
sex discrimination, direct disability discrimination does exist in the form of unique 
disability differences and disability stereotypes. Detrimental treatment on the ground of 
a unique disability difference can be justified for a reason that is "material to the 
circumstances of the particular case and substantial" (s 5(3) of the DDA).2 Thus, there is 
currently an anomaly between the treatment of unique sex differences and unique 
disability differences as only some of the fonner but all of the latter are subject to the 
application of a justification defence. 
Second, there are the provisions of the European Directive on Part-Time Work3 
that are due to be implemented by January 200l.4 The Directive itself is very short and 
merely enacts a framework agreement made by the European-level social partners in 
1 This is assuming that unique disability differences are treated as giving rise to claims of direct 
discrimination: see chapter 6. 
2 The use of the word 'particular' implies that it is not possible to justify the use of a disability stereotype. 
3 Directive 97/811EC. 
4 Section 18 of the Employment Relations Bil11999 provides for the Secretary of State to make 
Regulations dealing with the implementation of the Directive and s 19 deals with the issue of a code of 
practice. At the time of writing no draft Regulations have been published. 
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June 1997 which is then annexed to th D' t' 5 Th .. I f d'" . e lrec lve. e pnnclp e 0 ilon- lscnmmatlOn 
is set out in article 4( 1) of the framework agreement. 
In respect of employment and conditions, part-time workers shall not be treated in 
a less favo~able manner than comparable full-time workers solely because they 
work part-tIme unless different treatment is justified on objective grounds. 
In other words the Directive prohibits direct discrimination on the ground of part-time 
work but at the same time introduces a general justification defence.6 This is not 
surprising given that there is a considerable overlap between direct discrimination against 
part-time workers and indirect sex discrimination. Once the new Dir~ctive is 
implemented, a woman dismissed because she works part-time could claim both indirect 
sex discrimination and direct part-time discrimination. (The advantage of the latter claim 
is that there is no need to establish disparate impact.) Given that the Jame action by an 
employer can lead to two separate causes of action, it would clearly be arbitrary if a 
justification defence applied in one case but not in the other or if the two justification 
defences were different. 7 
Third, the European-level social partners have concluded a framework agreement 
on discrimination against fixed-term contract workers. 8 Clause 4(1) of the agreement 
states that: 
In respect of employment conditions, fixed-term workers shall not be treated in a 
less favourable manner than comparable permanent workers solely because they 
have a fixed-term contract or relation unless justified on objective grounds. 
Clause 4(4) provides that the same service qualifications shall apply to fixed-term 
workers and pennanent workers "except where different length of ser lice qualifications 
are justified on objective grounds". If it is adopted as a directive by the Council of 
Ministers, the framework agreement will provide yet another example of a situation in 
which direct discrimination is subject to a general justification defence. 
5 For an overview of the Directive and the process by which it was concluded see: Jeffrey M, 'Not really 
going to work? Of the Directive on part-time work, 'atypical work' and attempts to regulate it' (1998) 27 
ILJ 193. 
6 It is not clear if the Directive also covers indirect discrimination against part-time workers. The use of 
the words "solely because they work part-time" in article 4( 1) implies that distribution characteristics will 
not be covered but it remains to be seen how the article will be implemented. 
7 The Directive does not provide any guidance as to when a difference in treatment is justified but in order 
to maintain consistency the Government is likely to adopt the justification defence for indirect sex 
dis crimina tion. 
8 Equal Opportunities Review No 85, May/June 1999, p 43. 
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BOUNDARIES 
The four stages of the model justification defence are set out in detail in chapter 7 and it 
is not proposed to repeat them here. However, it is worth reiterating the boundaries of 
the defence in terms of the reason that can be put forward by the employer. The 
employer has to identify an objective that relates to the operation of the business or 
organisation. Thus, this is primarily a financial defence for employers to use. The most 
Jr~-
common reason put forward is likely to be that an employer has to discriminate on the 
ground of sex because it would be too expensive not to do so. Again, it is worth making 
the point that this is not a novel concept. The idea that direct discrimination should be 
allowed on financial grounds already exists in some of the legislative exceptions. For 
example, financial considerations can give rise to a defence under s 7 of the SDA where 
the physiological differences between the sexes mean that sex is essential to the nature of 
the job. Furthermore, financial considerations appear to have slipped :nto the pregnancy 
and maternity exception with the decision of the Ee} in the Pedersen9 case that 
employers can avoid paying pregnant women sick pay by insisting that they start their 
maternity leave early. 
However, the model defence is not entirely financially based. There is scope for 
employers to rely on wider social objectives as long as these relate to the function of the 
operation. Thus, if an employer is a non-profit making organisation it will be able to put 
forward social utility arguments as a reason for the detrimental treatment of one sex. The 
example given in chapter 7 is of a rape crisis centre that hires only women counsellors on 
the basis that women make more effective counsellors for female rape victims. The fact 
that employers are able to rely on social utility arguments as long as they relate to the 
function of the organisation means that there is an overlap between the model 
justification and some aspects of the existing exception for cases where sex is a genuine 
occupational qualification. 
Where the objective of the employer is based on social utility arguments, the final 
stage of the defence, the balance test, becomes very difficult to apply. It is not possible 
9 [1999] IRLR 55, Eel 
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for a tribunal to put a monetary value on the benefit to society of social services such as 
effective rape counselling. This means that it is impossible for a tribunal to undertake an 
objective assessment of the benefit and detriments of the offending practice. All that the 
tribunal can do is to balance the competing interests on an impressionistic basis and try 
and decide whether the benefit to society outweighs the aim of sex equality. 
It is precisely because of this problem that the balance stage of the test does not 
apply where the practice being challenged is enshrined in legislation. It is proposed that 
where a discriminatory practice is contained in a legislative provisiop, the Goyernment 
-"''f 
has to put forward a reason that is a legitimate social aim. The causation test and the 
means test still apply but the court hearing the case does not go on to balance the 
detriment and the benefit. Not only is this impossible to do other than on an 
impressionistic basis, but it would involve the courts in political questions where all they 
would effectively be doing would be to substitute their own views for those of 
parliament. 
Political considerations are also the main reason for excluding positive action 
from the scope of the model defence. The aim of positive action is equal representation 
of the sexes in all areas of the workforce. Thus, an employer who engages in direct 
discrimination in order to ensure equal representation is engaging in a political action 
rather than securing a benefit for the business or organisation. The extent to which direct 
discrimination should be permitted solely in order to secure equal representation of the 
sexes is a highly contentious point. Directly discriminatory recruitment is allowed under 
European law as long as certain conditions are satisfied but it is not permitted in the UK 
- although some forms of outreach programmes (eg training schemes) are lawful. The 
fact that discriminatory recruitment is not allowed in the UK is indicative of how divided 
opinions are as to its use. Given this background it seems sensible to exclude any form 
of positive action from the scope of the model defence. Thus, employers will not be able 
to use the justification defence as a basis for securing equal representation of the sexes in 
the workforce. 
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IMPACT 
The main concern of some commentators about the whole concept of a justification 
defence for direct discrimination is that it will open the floodgates and allow employers 
almost unlimited scope to discriminate on the ground of sex.l0 Obviously, it is 
impossible to tell exactly how often employers would rely on the defence. But, it is 
possible to get a feel for its likely application from the three examples set out in chapter 7 
and the cases discussed in chapter 8. Perhaps the first point to make is that the 
... { 
application of the defence to sex stereotypes will be extremely limited. By their very 
nature, sex stereotypes are generalised assumptions about the sexes that can be more or 
less accurate. The causation element of the test means that only relatively accurate 
stereotypes stand a change of getting through. Even then, under the means test the 
employer has to satisfy the tribunal that there is no other way of achieving its objective. 
In the context of stereotypes this means that there must be individuating information 
reasonably available. While there will be situations where this is the case, they are likely 
to be few and far between. The number of instances where both the causation and the 
means tests are satisfied will almost certainly be modest. The prediction of Hepple that 
the introduction of a justification defence will undermine the conceptual framework 
necessary to prevent gender-stereotyping is unlikely to be realised. 11 
Another important consequence of the causation test is that the defence will not 
apply in cases where the employer applies different standards to the sexes eg differing 
height requirements. Under the causation test the employer has :0 prove that the 
discriminatory treatment results in the stated objective. It is not possible for two 
different standards to both cause the same effect. One of them must be superfluous. If a 
job can be done effectively by a woman capable of lifting 30 kilograms it cannot also be 
the case that the same job needs to be done by a man capable of lifting 50 kilograms. 
Thirty kilo grams is the necessary weight and the other weight fails the causation test. 
10 In the words of Ellis "it involves the danger of permitting a vague and potentially unlimited range of 
matters to obstruct liability": 'The principle of equality of opportunity irrespective of sex: some reflections 
on the present state of European Community law and its future development' in Dashwood A and 0' 
Leary S eds, The principle of equal treatment in E Claw, chp 9 (1997) P 175. 
11 Hepple B, 'Can direct discrimination be justified?', EOR No 55, May/June 1994, p 48. See also the 
quote from this article in chapter 1. 
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Instances of this type of di' t d' . . '. " . 
rec IscnmlnatlOn Ie where dIffenng standards are applIed to 
the sexes are outside the scope of the model defence. 
In relation to other fonns of direct discrimination the model defence is unlikely to 
cover a substantial number of cases simply because it is an incredibly difficult hurdle for 
employers to overcome. It is only capable of applying where there is a categorical or 
unique sex difference that has an impact on an individual's ability to do a particular job. 
Furthennore, the employer has to show that it has considered all the alternative options 
and that there is no less discriminatory means of achieving the same objective wbich it is 
".,~ 
reasonable to pursue. Finally, the tribunal has to balance the detriment to the individual 
against the benefit to the employer. The defence has been fonnulated in such a way that 
it is only if the benefit is greater than the detriment that the employer has a chance of 
succeeding. Even then, the tribunal has to go on to consider whether the benefit is 
disproportionate to the detriment and, if it is not, whether the employer can accommodate 
the additional cost. All of this amounts to a very narrow defence and, if it is properly 
applied by the courts, it will not amount to an open invitation to employers to indulge in 
discriminatory practices. 
The only area where the defence is likely to have a substantial impact is 
pregnancy and maternity. Employers are likely to argue that they are unable to afford 
full equality of treatment for pregnant women with long tenn pregnancy related illnesses 
or women on maternity leave in terms of keeping them on full pay. The extent to which 
employers will be successful will largely depend on the extent of their financial resources 
and their ability to accommodate the costs. However, the end result is likely to be that 
women are better off than they are at the moment given the current case law of the EeJ 
in this area. Under the justification defence there is at least the prospect of full maternity 
pay, which is better than the limited entitlement that currently exists. 
In assessing the impact of the defence it is also important to take account of the 
overlap with some of the existing legislative exceptions. The main area of overlap is the 
genuine occupational qualification defence. As indicated in chapter 4, the genuine 
occupational qualification defence covers a whole range of situations including artistic 
licence, decency, social utility and financial considerations. In the area of overlap, the 
main difference between the two defences is that the model justification defence is more 
stringent. First, there is no comprehensive causation test that applies to the genuine 
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occupational qualification exceptions. In other words, it is not always necessary for the 
employer to demonstrate that the discrimination actually results in the stated objective. 
In particular, the decency exceptions either require no evidence of causation or only 
evidence that a lack of decency might occur. Second, the means test is very weak. The 
employer has only to demonstrate that it does not have employees of the requisite sex 
who could reasonable undertake the duties without causing undue inconvenience to the 
employer (s 7(4)). There is no obligation on the employer to consider whether the duties 
could be dispensed with altogether or whether there is some other way of solving the 
~r,,-
problem. This is much weaker than the means test under the model justification defence 
where the employer has to demonstrate that there is no other viable option for avoiding 
the discriminatory treatment. 
Given that the original purpose of the genUIne occupational qualification 
exception was to deal with all the physical and social sex differences, that can be relevant 
to the performance of any job, it seems likely that the overlap with the model 
justification defence will be considerable. It is clearly unsatisfactory that the same 
factual situation can give rise to two separate defences, particularly where one is more 
stringent than the other. The best solution would probably be to repeal the genuine 
occupational qualification defence altogether. To the extent that the genuine 
occupational qualifications are wider than the model defence (eg lhe exception for 
communal accommodation) the scope for employers to discriminate on the ground of sex 
will be narrowed. 
One other impact that the model justification defence might have is to strengthen 
the justification defence for indirect discrimination. The two defences have several 
elements in common, in particular the means test and the causation test. However, there 
is a tendency for the courts to apply these elements in a rather weak fashion. For 
example, in relation to the means test, tribunals tend to be reluctant to interfere with the 
management of a business particularly if something has been agreed with the trade 
unIons. As regards the causation test, while the EeJ has made it clear that mere 
generalisations will not suffice, the courts are often inclined to acce!'t the employer's 
view about the consequences of a particular practice rather than requiring specific proof 
of a casual link. If these elements are strictly enforced in the context of direct 
discrimination it may encourage the courts to be more rigorous in their application of 
222 
these elements in cases of indirect discrimination. This could lead to a strengthening of 
the justification defence for indirect discrimination thereby realigning the balance of the 
defence more on the side of equality. 
LEGAL CLARlTY 
Another factor that needs to be considered in evaluating the model defence is its effect on 
legal clarity. Not all cases of direct sex discrimination can be described aspeing of 
fundamental importance. A woman's ability to wear trousers to work is probably not a 
fundamental right even if it is serious enough to constitute a detriment. But in many 
cases of direct discrimination, the potential or actual detriment to the individual is 
substantial - partiCUlarly where it involves the loss of a job. Thus, it is Important that the 
law in this area should be clear, consistent and, as far as possible, ~omprehensible to a 
lay person. This is particularly important in an area where there is limited access to legal 
aid and applicants often have to deal with cases themselves. It is probably fair to say that 
in some areas at least the law is in a state of confusion. Four of the main problem areas 
are discussed in chapter 8. Of these four areas the worst offender is unquestionably the 
case law of the EC] on pregnancy and maternity. Having decided that pregnancy and 
maternity should be classified as sex and, therefore, come under the aegis of direct rather 
than indirect discrimination, the ECJ has been unwilling to live with the consequences. 
In order to avoid the full financial implications of its decision, the EC] has created a 
whole series of judicial exceptions. As a result, the case law in this ar~a is riddled with 
inconsistencies and is barely intelligible to the expert practitioner, let alone the lay 
applicant. 
Furthermore, the situation is unlikely to improve in the future. Only recently, the 
EC] added a further layer of inconsistency in the Pedersen case in relation to the right of 
pregnant women to claim sick pay. It is only a question of time before a case is referred 
to the EC] where a pregnant woman applies for a job on a fixed term contract despite the 
fact that she is going to be absent for all or almost all of the contract period. When this 
happens the ECJ will be squarely confronted with the justification issue, although given 
the inventiveness it has displayed in the past, it would not be surprising if the Court finds 
a means of avoiding the issue. 
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The introduction of the model justification defence should have the effect of 
introducing some clarity and consistency into this difficult area. Both employers and 
employees would be aware that direct discrimination can be defended as long as it falls 
within the parameters of the defence. It would no longer be necessary for the EC] to 
utilise flawed and illogical reasoning in order to reach the same result. Furthermore, it 
would have the added advantage of bringing the whole issue out into the open. At the 
moment the fiction is maintained that there is no such defence and, as a result, there is no 
proper examination of the merits of the case. In particular, there is no proper attempt to 
-, 
balance the detriment to the applicant against the benefit to the employer. Under the 
model justification defence the courts would have to be open about the fact that the 
applicant's right to equality has been trumped by the financial interests of the employer 
or some other social goal. As with the introduction of any new defence, the benefit of 
legal clarity needs to be balanced against any increase in litigation costs that may occur. 
A SINGLE JUSTIFICATION DEFENCE FOR 
DIRECT AND INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION 
The main difference between the model justification defence for direct discrimination 
and the justification defence used in cases of indirect sex discrimination is that under the 
former defence the employer can put forward a reason based on sex. This is not possible 
in cases of indirect sex discrimination where the employer has to identify an objective 
other than sex. The remaining elements of the two defences are essentially the same save 
that the elements of the model defence tend to be stronger and, therefore, more difficult 
for employers to satisfy. In particular, the final element of the model defence, the 
balance test, is fonnulated so that the benefit to the employer has to outweigh the 
detriment to the employee. The position with indirect discrimination is much vaguer but 
it seems that the defence can succeed even where the detriment is greater than the 
benefit. 
It would be possible to amalgamate the two defences into one by making the 
model defence apply to cases of direct and indirect discrimination. The main reason for 
doing this would be to simplify the law. The result would be that both forms of 
discrimination would take the stronger elements of the model defence but it would also 
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mean that it would be possible for employers to justify instances of indirect 
discrimination for a reason that relates to sex. At first sight it may appear that this would 
constitute a significant downgrading of the justification defence for indirect sex 
discrimination. However, looked at more closely this might not be the result. In cases of 
indirect discrimination an employer has to defend a practice that has a disproportionate 
impact on sex. The practice might be the application of a height requirement or a 
requirement to work full-time. Under the model justification defence the employer 
would have to put forward a reason for the difference in treatment that relat~s to the 
operation of the employer's business. While in theory this reason could relate to sex, in 
practice, it is difficult to think of any instance in which sex is relevant to the operation of 
a business. For example, an employer might attempt to justify paying part-time workers 
a lower hourly rate on the basis that most part-time workers are women. This is clearly a 
reason that relates to sex but it is not a reason that relates to the operational needs of the 
business. As a result the defence would fail as would probably any other attempt to use 
sex in order to justify a practice that has a disproportionate impact on one sex. In 
practice, applying the model justification defence to cases of indirect sex discrimination 
would probably have the effect of strengthening rather than weakening the defence. 
To clarify matters, amalgamating the two justification defences would not have 
the effect of removing the distinction between direct and indirect discrimination. Direct 
and indirect discrimination are separate and distinct entities although the point at which 
one stops and the other starts may be rather indistinct. This is because the courts have 
adopted an intermediate position in relation to unique sex differences, with some of them 
coming under the aegis of direct discrimination and others being covered by indirect 
discrimination. However, in any particular case, the conduct of the employer is either 
direct or indirect discrimination. It cannot be both things at the same time. The fact that 
the same defence might apply to both fonns of discrimination would not mean that they 
cease to be distinct entities, much in the same way that there are two forms of disability 
discrimination although they are both subj ect to the same justification defence. Thus, the 
introduction of a common defence should not undennine the contextual framework of 
sex discrimination law. 
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CONCLUSION 
Sex discrimination legislation is based upon a weak asymmetrical model of equality. 
Sex differences are accommodated to an extent but they are not rendered totally costless. 
Thus, the legislation represents a compromise between complete asymmetrical equality, 
where all sex differences are rendered costless, and the financial needs of employers 
operating in a free market economy. The main concern of many commentators about the 
introduction of a justification defence for cases of direct sex discrimination seems to be 
-;-'" 
the possibility that it would tip the balance of the legislation too far in favour of the 
employer. It seems that those fears may be unfounded as long as the boundaries of the 
defence are properly delineated. Far from tipping the balance too far in favour of 
employers, it is possible that a justification defence for direct discrimination would 
actually enhance the level of sex equality as well as introducing a degree of clarity and 
certainty into this complex area of law. 
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